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The purpose of this study is to examine to the current state of sustainability reporting by New 
Zealand’s listed organisations and the likelihood that the revised New Zealand Stock Exchange 
Corporate Governance Best Practice Code (the NZX Code) will pressure listed organisations 
to increase their levels of disclosure. This was investigated using mixed methods and in three 
phases. First, an in-depth quantitative content analysis of the NZX50’s publicly available non-
financial information was undertaken. The GRI G4 Guidelines were used to assess the 
disclosures of the NZX50. This was carried out in order to understand of sustainability 
reporting, both in terms of quantity and quality of disclosure. Second, partially replicating the 
study of Hackston & Milne (1996), the effects of organisational characteristics on the quantity 
of non-financial disclosures by the NZX50 are examined. Third, a number of interviews with 
report preparers from the NZX50 as well as the market regulator were undertaken. These were 
qualitative semi-structure interviews. By utilising a mixed methods approach, a fuller picture 
of the current uptake of sustainability reporting and how the changes to the NZX Code might 
induce improved sustainability reporting in New Zealand has been comprehensively 
investigated. The researcher findings indicate the quantity of non-financial disclosures among 
New Zealand’s listed organisations are primarily driven by firm size, whereas smaller listed 
organisations do not typically report. By examining the most and least disclosed GRI items, 
the findings indicate that listed organisations do well in areas that require basic quantitative 
and qualitative disclosures, and tend to do poorly in areas where more specific quantitative 
disclosures are required. Given the NZX’s recommendation for ESG reporting is enacted on a 
“comply or explain” regime, the study suggests non-reporting organisations will more than 
likely utilise an “explain” option as a means of avoiding ESG disclosure. Overall, the study 
anticipates that it is unlikely that the NZX’s recommendation for ESG reporting will have a 
significant impact on the overall uptake of sustainability reporting in New Zealand, let alone 




KEY WORDS: The New Zealand Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Best Practice Code 
(NZX Code); Sustainability Reporting; Environment, Social and Governance (ESG); The 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI); Transparency; Disclosure; Legitimacy; Stakeholders; 
Institutional; Content analysis; Semi structured interviews; Corporate Governance; and 
Comply or Explain Principle.  
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Chapter One  
Introduction 
1.1 Overview  
The objective of this thesis is two-fold. First, the study will attempt to provide insights 
concerning the current state of ‘reporting’ and ‘non-reporting’ among New Zealand’s listed 
organisations. Second, the study will explore how and to what extent the revised New Zealand 
Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Best Practice Code (the NZX Code) might further 
induce the uptake of sustainability reporting among New Zealand’s listed organisations. The 
chapter provides a background to this study, drawing on key literature in social and 
environmental accounting and other relevant studies. This leads to a discussion of the research 
questions. Contributions of the thesis are then explained concluding with an organisation of 
the thesis. 
1.2 Background 
Nowadays, sustainability reporting has become part of an organisation’s essential 
communications that affords the organisation the opportunity to demonstrate it meets and 
satisfies stakeholders’ expectations (Arvidsson, 2010; Autry & Golicic, 2010; Fombrun, 2005; 
Lougee & Wallace, 2008; Stubbs, Higgins, & Milne, 2013). According to the latest KPMG 
Global Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Survey figures, published in 2017, 95% of the 
world’s 250 largest organisations (G250) and 75% of the top 100 organisations across 49 
countries (N100) have engaged in sustainability reporting. Wheeler & Elkington (2001) had 
earlier suggested that sustainability reporting would move “from a fringe activity pioneered by 
socially conscious non-mainstream organisations into a credible and serious practice embraced 
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by a number of major corporations” (p. 5). They were not wrong. Sustainability reporting has 
arguably become a feature of the organisation agenda for many multinationals (Stubbs et al., 
2013), and the “day when sustainability reporting is considered an ‘optional but nice’ activity 
are past” (KPMG, 2013, p. 18). This poses a question: while mandatory environment disclosure 
requirements have in fact remained unchanged since 1998 (Clarkson, Li, Richardson, & 
Vasvari, 2011) and the nature of sustainability reporting is still largely voluntary (Sutantoputra, 
2009), why are more organisations disclosing sustainability information to the public? 
 
To elaborate upon this question, various social accounting researchers have studied why some 
organisations undertake sustainability reporting, and what drivers exist in the external (societal) 
and internal (organisational) environment for doing so (Bebbington, Higgins, & Frame, 2009). 
It seems that the most prominent justification lies in the social and environmental impacts of 
organisational activities and according to Clarkson et al. (2011), environment and social issues 
have attracted attention from a wider range of stakeholders, and these concerns have become 
part of the public discourse with demands from stakeholders for trustworthy information in 
relation to corporate environmental and social impacts. Evidently, an outgrowth of this 
development has been the diffusion of reporting at an unprecedented rate in order to meet and 
satisfy stakeholders’ expectations of organisations (Arvidsson, 2010; Autry & Golicic, 2010; 
Bebbington et al., 2009; Fombrun, 2005; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Higgins, Stubbs, & Milne, 
2018; Lougee & Wallace, 2008; Stubbs et al., 2013). 
 
For this reason, sustainability reporting has slowly integrated into organisational mainstream 
business practice (Cerin, 2002; Milne & Gray, 2013), where a number of organisations have 
developed governance processes which allow the organisations to communicate sustainability 
efforts to a wider spectrum of stakeholders (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2017). In the development 
of modern societies, corporate governance has been seen as one of the foundations in 
 | P a g e  
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establishing standards of organisational ethics, which particularly aims at reducing 
unscrupulous corporate business practices, while also preserving a fair business environment 
(Fung, 2014). This justification can be traced back to corporate scandals taking place in ethical, 
social and environmental arenas (e.g., Enron, WorldCom, exploration of child and forced 
labour, and increased of pollution and CO2 emission) (Arvidsson, 2010; Kolk & Pinkse, 2010; 
Turker & Altuntas, 2014), resulting in the social role of the organisation to be called into 
question. With ongoing public scrutiny faced by organisations on various ends (Allouche, 
2006), it is crucial for organisations to find “new” and “active” ways to engage with their 
stakeholders (Stubbs et al., 2013), and one way for the organisations to engage with their 
stakeholders is to undertake sustainability reporting (Buhr, 2010). 
 
Over time, the new wave in the international business environment have led many of the major 
business world leaders to take serious steps in reviewing and altering the nature of the content 
of traditional business reporting (Ballou, Heitger, Landes, & Adams, 2006). Recent trends in 
organisational reporting have placed much emphasis on the importance of non-financial 
disclosure, and a key attribute is the expectations of stakeholders for an organisation to comply 
with the standards relating to transparency, disclosure and governance (Fung, 2014). Of 
significance, stakeholders, both internally and externally, no longer just evaluate the 
organisation from a financial point of view, but also by its non-financial performance (Eccles, 
Serafeim, & Krzus, 2011; Kolk & Pinkse, 2010; Popa, Blidişel, & Bogdan, 2009). This has 
resulted in a large number of regulators, in particular stock exchange authorities, from around 
the world concurrently reviewing their own respective corporate governance codes to ensure 
that organisations are focused on long-term performance (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2017). This has 
further raised a global awareness of the importance of sustainability, transparency and 
disclosure in corporate governance (Fung, 2014; Kolk & Pinkse, 2010). 
 
 | P a g e  
 
11 
In part this is clearly something to do with evaluating the transparency of operation(s), 
removing information asymmetry between investors and organisations, and complying with 
stakeholders’ expectations, through disclosure in order for them to make well-informed 
investment decisions (Daub, 2007; Fung, 2014; Legendre & Coderre, 2013; Milne & Patten, 
2002). Thus, the concepts of sustainable reporting, corporate sustainability and corporate social 
responsibility have gained significant traction, resulting in increased expectations for 
organisations to publicly report (Higgins et al., 2018). And this raises a question: beyond 
voluntary non-financial disclosure, how and to what extent do corporate governance guidelines 
imposed by a stock exchange on its listed members result in an uptake of sustainability 
reporting and, therefore, promote further transparency and disclosure at an organisational level? 
1.3 Research questions  
Social and environmental accounting scholars have found a variety of motives for why 
organisations undertake sustainability reporting (Autry & Golicic, 2010; Ball, 2005, 2007; 
Buhr, 2010; Higgins et al., 2015; Higgins et al., 2018; Lougee & Wallace, 2008; Milne & 
Patten, 2002; Scott & Christensen, 1995) or remain non-reporters (Adams, 2002; Bebbington 
et al., 2009; Fifka, 2013; Martin & Hadley, 2008; Mitchell & Hill, 2009; Stubbs et al., 2013; 
Wright, Milne, & Tregidga, 2016). A recent study, however, indicates national governments 
and stock exchange authorities can also play crucial roles in coercing the uptake of 
sustainability reporting (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2017). To improve and further encourage 
sustainability reporting, national governments and stock exchange authorities can help 
standardise corporate governance guidelines for an organisation to report against, and/or 
impose laws and regulations that mandate sustainability reporting (Dierkes & Antal, 1986; 
Ioannou & Serafeim, 2017). The provision of non-financial disclosure appears to be one of the 
most prominent aspects within the corporate governance code that market regulators are intent 
to fortify, for example through mandatory non-financial information disclosure in relation to 
 | P a g e  
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ESG (environmental, social and governance) or mandatory IR (integrated reporting) (Ioannou 
& Serafeim, 2017). 
 
In the context of New Zealand there are no regulatory requirements for ESG reporting. For this 
reason, the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX) has followed suit with the rest of world to 
promote and implement some type of regulatory requirements, whereby they have committed 
to reform their current NZX Code. Specifically, they have revised Principle 4 (Reporting and 
Disclosure) within the NZX Main Board Listing Rules (Listing Rules). The reform is situated 
on the principal ideal of the provision of non-financial information disclosure in relation to 
ESG reporting, and encourages organisations to provide ESG reporting. This results in changes 
to the NZX’s reporting requirements, whereby enforcing, in a sense of recommending on a 
‘comply or explain’ basis, every equity issuer to disclose the non-financial information in 
relation to ESG issues. This is extremely critical if New Zealand does not wish to lag behind 
in “the global maturing of sustainability reporting” (KPMG, 2013, p. 18). In the NZX’s own 
words, the revised NZX Code will help to align the code with current international best practice, 
and “keeps issuers accountable to stakeholders” (NZX, 2016, p. 19), as well as improving the 
overall transparency, disclosure, and consistency of sustainability reporting produced by the 
NZX’s equity listed issuers. 
 
To better understand how and to what extent the NZX’s ESG reporting requirements may affect 
organisational actions toward sustainability reporting, it is crucial to initially make sense of the 
overall extensiveness of the current state of ‘reporting’ and ‘non-reporting’ among New 
Zealand’s listed organisations. To achieve this, this study employs the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) guidelines, GRI G4, as a mechanism for content analysis with the intention of 
gaining an in-depth analysis of the quality of reporting among the NZX listed members. This 
essentially helps the researcher identify the pattern of the current state of quality of reporting 
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among New Zealand’s listed organisations. Thus, this provides the motivation for the first 
research question: 
RQ1 - What is the current quantity and quality of non-financial disclosure among the 
largest 50 New Zealand listed organisations? 
 
Surrounding the planned changes to the NZX Code, an initial step was taken to investigate the 
non-financial disclosures of all NZX-listed organisations. This permitted an understanding of 
the position of New Zealand listed organisations and their level of commitment to non-financial 
information disclosures. The results were a disappointment. The initial investigations indicated 
a majority of listed organisations do not disclose non-financial information systematically (see 
Appendix 2.1). A Venn diagram illustrates a low uptake of sustainability reporting, where 95 
out of 133 listed equity issuers do not report. The investigation can be reinforced with the recent 
KPMG global surveys, conducted in 2011 and 2013, where they report that NZ has remained 
in the “bottom quartile” in terms of sustainability reporting. This means that NZ is (still) far 
away from leading practice as seen in other jurisdictions. Thus, this affords a second research 
question: 
RQ2 - What is the likely effect of the revised disclosure requirements in the NZX Code 
to further induce the uptake the sustainability reporting among New Zealand’s listed 
organisations. And what effect will it have on the quality of sustainability information among 
the largest 50 New Zealand listed organisations? 
 
Finally, to unveil these dynamics altogether, once the pattern of the current state and quality of 
reporting among New Zealand’s listed organisations are known, a more comprehensive 
investigation can take place. Next the investigation turns to the motives underlying the 
reporting behaviour of New Zealand’s listed organisations. Using semi-structured interviews, 
the study was able to provide insights concerning the uptake of sustainability reporting in New 
Zealand and how the new proposed updates to the NZX Code may or may not induce some of 
the largest listed organisations to undertake sustainability reporting or further improve it. Past 
literature suggests that disclosure of non-financial information has significant consequences on 
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managerial practice (Adams, 2002; Dierkes & Antal, 1986; Eccles, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2012; 
Eccles et al., 2011). This gives rise to the third research question: 
RQ3 - What are managers’ perceptions and attitudes toward the changes to the new 
NZX code in the short, medium and long term and how might this change their disclosure 
practices? 
1.4 Contribution to Knowledge 
This research makes five contributions to knowledge in the area of sustainability reporting. 
First, in most studies, sustainability accounting scholars have long been interested in 
understanding the characteristics and motivations of the organisations that are reporting 
(Cormier & Gordon, 2001; Cormier & Magnan, 1999; Marshall & Brown, 2003; Roberts, 1991; 
Stubbs et al., 2013), whereas there has been relatively less interest in why organisations do not 
engage in sustainability reporting. Consequently, non-reporting has been less researched and 
relatively little is known (Bebbington et al., 2009; Stubbs et al., 2013). Hence, this thesis 
intends to broaden the scope of this understanding. Moreover, it has a potential to develop new 
contributing factors, in terms of social and organisational themes, relating to non-reporting in 
the New Zealand context. Although, the social and organisational factors that were found to 
explain reporting and non-reporting are not a whole lot different from the early explorations of 
the motivations, drivers and barriers associated with sustainability reporting. A finding from 
this research thesis, however, highlights that the lack of understanding around the value of 
sustainability reporting is the greatest threat that prevents the uptake of sustainability reporting 
in New Zealand.  
 
Second, the scope of this research is timely because this is the first time that the NZX has made 
such reporting requirements for listed organisations. The focus will be on ‘non-reporting’ 
organisations as well as ‘reporting’ organisations within the NZX. The rationale lies on the fact 
that New Zealand has remained in the “bottom quartile” in terms of sustainability reporting 
since the last KMPG global survey conducted in 2011 as well as in 2013 (KPMG, 2011, 2013). 
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As Choudhury (1988) explains, “the absence of accounting may tell researchers a lot about the 
nature of accounting and its existence” (p. 550). To relay this context into a simple sentence, 
Higgins et al. (2018) assert “non-reporters provide a contrast to reporting firms and isolate 
influences on reporting that are difficult to detect when reporting occurs” (p. 1). By 
distinguishing non-reporting from reporting organisations, a researcher may discover new 
convincing arguments that might explain why large listed organisations may choose to go 
against the new NZX Code and not plan to undertake sustainability reporting, but rather 
“explain” why not. Findings of this research study argue that the NZX’s recommendation will 
exert relatively little pressure on an overall uptake of sustainability reporting among New 
Zealand’s listed organisation because an “explain” option allows smaller listed organisations 
to explain why they deviate from the Code’s provisions while still maintaining their legitimacy. 
And, they are more than likely to do this by imitating or mimicking the statements of 
compliance provided by larger listed organisations, especially the NZX50, as a strategic 
response in order to gain and maintain their legitimacy. 
 
Third, this study not only examines why listed organisations might choose to avoid 
sustainability reporting, but this research is also interested in the current state of sustainability 
reporting practices by those listed organisations within the NZX that do report. To achieve this 
objective, the study has constructed a tool, in accordance with Clarkson, Li, Richardson, & 
Vasvari (2008) and Sutantoputra (2009), to specifically capture and measure the extensiveness 
of sustainability information. This quality index template predominantly focuses on the key 
performance indicators in relation to economic, environmental and social components, which 
are based on the GRI G4 guidelines. Clarkson et al. (2008) suggest good environmental 
performers incline to have a higher ratio of hard disclosure items as opposed to soft disclosure 
items. Findings of this research thesis indicate that the quality of sustainability-related 
information disclosed by the NZX50 can be summarised as inadequate. Organisations do well 
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in areas that require basic disclosures and tend to do poorly in areas where more specific 
disclosures are required, regardless of industry sensitivity. Consequently, the study further 
argues the need for increased ‘quality’ of sustainability-related information, not simply more 
disclosures. Furthermore, the findings of thesis on the quality of sustainability reporting among 
New Zealand’s listed organisation serve as a benchmark, and raise a number of potential 
avenues for future research. 
 
Fourth, this study partially replicates and provides a 25 year update of the study of Hackston 
& Milne (1996), which contributes to knowledge in itself. To ensure that the research findings 
are at least comparable to one another, the researcher has kept all independent and dependent 
variables the same. However, in order to contribute to knowledge as just discussed, a more 
robust and standardised quality index template is used. Findings of this replication highlight 
that sustainability reporting among New Zealand’s listed organisations is primarily driven by 
firm size. More specifically, size is most influential among high-profile industry organisations, 
and less so among low-profile industry organisations. A result consistent with Hackston and 
Milne (1996).  
 
Finally, this research provides valuable input and contribution to a policy-making process. 
Through interacting with managers of the organisations in relation to the NZX’s 
recommendation for ESG reporting, the findings indicate that, in the absence of mandatory 
sustainability reporting requirements, organisations need to be coerced to adopt reporting. 
Hence, the study suggests if the NZX Code is to have any real impact on the overall uptake of 
sustainability reporting in New Zealand, the NZX’s recommendation of ESG reporting should 
be regulated in a form of mandatory reporting, rather than enacting it on a “comply or explain” 
basis. 
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1.5 Structure of this thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter Two outlays the general overview 
of sustainability reporting, defines practice, and discusses the importance of sustainability 
reporting at the organisational level. It also provides a background to the GRI guidelines, which 
are used as a basis for constructing a quality reporting index. Together with the historical 
context of the New Zealand Stock Exchange, the rationale behind the revised NZX Code and, 
additionally, a brief discussion of the feedback on the proposed changes to the NZX Code from 
the perspectives of market participants. The chapter concludes with the theoretical framework 
discussion of past relevant literature. The discussion of the research methodology appears in 
Chapter Three, including an overview of data collection and analysis. Chapter Four and Five 
present the quantitative and qualitative research findings, respectively. A discussion of the 
findings is provided in Chapter Six. Chapter Seven covers the study’s conclusions, 
recommendations, directions for future research, concluding statement, and limitations. 
References and appendices, respectively, follow.  
  






This chapter consists of several sections. The first section will provide a general overview of 
sustainability reporting, define the practice, and disuses the importance of sustainability 
reporting at the organisational level. The second section provides a brief historical background 
into the GRI guidelines, how the GRI guidelines will be used to generate a quality reporting 
index, and why the GRI guidelines are feasible for this research regime is discussed with the 
past relevant literature. The third section will provide a brief synthesis of the historical context 
of the New Zealand Stock Exchange, the rationale behind the revised NZX Code, a brief 
discussion of the feedback on the proposed changes to the NZX Code from the perspectives of 
market participants and, additionally, the effectiveness of the NZX Code under the ‘comply or 
explain’ regime is discussed. And the last section will introduce a theoretical framework 
harnessing transparency and sustainability disclosure theories.  
2.1 Sustainability Reporting  
A sustainability report is a report published by an organisation, which comprises of the 
following disclosures: economic, environmental and social performance. The GRI defines 
sustainability reporting as:  
“…the practice of measuring, disclosing, and being accountable to internal and external 
stakeholders for organizational performance towards the goal of sustainable 
development…” (GRI, 2002, p. 4) 
 
According to Dyllick & Hockerts (2002), the distinctive conceptual framework of corporate 
social responsibility started to generate broader interest in the 1960s in the US and the UK, and 
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spread to continental Europe in the early 1970s. Over the last two decades, corporate 
sustainability reporting has developed into a broader more mainstream global business practice, 
where the patterns of reporting have already spread to three quarters (75%) of the top 100 
organisations across 49 countries (N100) surveyed in 2017 (KPMG, 2017). In the context of 
sustainability reporting, this is optimistic news because it potentially indicates that 
organisations and investors are becoming increasingly engaged and aware of sustainability 
issues. Along these lines, corporate sustainability initiatives can be diverted into two different 
modules: internal and external.  
 
The concept of internal corporate responsibility relates to how the implementation of an 
internal corporate sustainability-reporting program will give an organisation a competitive 
advantage. This view can be supported by the literature of Stephenson (2009), where he asserts 
that if an organisation can successfully implement a sustainability-reporting program, the 
programme will give an organisation a competitive advantage that will help the organisation 
to improve its long-term performance and risk management, which enhances its value-added 
activities. Correspondingly, when this programme is implemented at the organisational level, 
sustainability reporting can alone be described as meeting the needs of an organisation’s direct 
and indirect stakeholders (such as shareholders, employees, customers, pressure groups, 
communities etc.), without compromising its ability to meet the needs of future stakeholders 
(Dyllick & Hockerts, 2002). Barnett & Salomon (2006) summarised five key benefits for why 
an organisation may choose to become sustainable: (1) it is easier for the organisation to attract 
resources from an open market; (2) the organisation can attract and retain quality employees; 
(3) it increases marketability of the organisation’s products and services; (4) it affords the 
organisation with the unforeseen opportunities; and (5) it offers the organisation with a 
competitive advantage. Drawing on the prior literature, Adams (2002) argues that the internal 
organisational structure may affect the nature and the quality of sustainability reporting, and 
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suggests that management attitudes are equally vital in how the value of sustainability reporting 
is perceived and carried out (Bebbington et al., 2009). 
 
While the above mentioned benefits are realised at an organisational level, 50 years ago, the 
traditional concept of external corporate social responsibility (see Friedman, 1971) departed 
from the initial concept of “shareholders” to emphasise “stakeholders” (Estes, 1976; Freeman, 
1984; Ramanathan, 1976). It appears that compliance with the norms of certain stakeholders 
enables organisations to receive continuous support from the societies in which they operate 
(Clarkson et al., 2008; Arvidsson, 2010), and is a significant determinant of organisational 
growth (Galant & Cadez, 2017). Consequently, an external module of CSR emerged, whereby 
some organisations focus explicitly on stakeholders’ expectations (Milne, Tregidga, & Walton, 
2009; Milne & Gray, 2013) in order to ensure better corporate governance, transparency and 
accountability. Thus, emerging organisations are now working towards satisfying their 
stakeholders’ expectations and demands (Deegan & Samkin, 2008). 
 
Overall, the internal and external perspectives are useful ways to examine the nature and the 
quality of sustainability reports produced by organisations, because a researcher is led to 
believe that external corporate sustainability, to a certain extent, reflects the internal dynamics 
of how the value of sustainability is being perceived by managers in the organisation. This 
implies that an organisation with a strong internal corporate sustainability program should have 
a clearer view of its long-term performance that enables them to produce a trustworthy 
sustainability report, and be seen as socially and environmentally responsible. Unfortunately, 
there are cases where the internal and external perspectives are not interconnected with each 
other. Thus, this provides an opportunity for a researcher to gain an in-depth understanding of 
the quality of sustainability reporting produced by listed organisations in the NZX and 
additionally, helps to identify the patterns of the current state of reporting in New Zealand for 
a further analysis. 
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2.1.1 Motivations for organisations’ sustainability reporting 
Truth be told, it seems trust in business is deteriorating (Dilling, 2010). This leads organisations 
to find “new” and “active” ways to creatively engage with their stakeholders (Wheeler and 
Elkington, 2001; Stubbs et al., 2013). One way that organisations can engage with their 
stakeholders is to undertake sustainability reporting (Buhr, 2010). At face value, reputation is 
perceived to be one of the core motivations for why organisations may voluntarily engage in 
sustainability reporting. Fombrun & Rindova (1996) define a corporate’s reputation as the 
overall estimation of an organisation by its stakeholders, which is expressed by the net affective 
reactions of customers, investors, employees, and the general public. Good reputation is 
considered to be the most valuable intangible asset for an organisation, and is becoming 
increasingly significant in determining the value of an organisation, as it provides the 
organisation with a competitive advantage (Roberts & Dowling, 2002; Schwaiger, 2004; Toms, 
2002).  
 
Prior empirical research by Chauvin & Hirschey (1994) suggests that improving an 
organisation’s reputation creates goodwill and, ultimately, has a positive effect on the market 
value of the organisation. In essence, an organisation with a good sustainability reputation is 
able to improve its relationship with its external stakeholders, such as customers, investors, 
bankers, suppliers and competitors. Some literature asserts that an organisation’s actions 
towards sustainability would, in the near future, be critical for organisations to survive and 
compete (Atkinson, 2000; Porter & Van der Linde, 1995; Wheeler & Elkingto, 2001), as well 
as offering a number of additional and attractive advantages (Gray, Owen, & Adams, 1996; 
Marshall & Brown, 2003). 
 
However, do not judge a book by its cover, since there is also concern in regards to greenwash. 
Chen & Chang (2013) define greenwash as the act of misleading consumers regarding the 
environmental practices of an organisation. In recent years, many organisations have turned to 
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greenwash in order to make themselves look more socially and environmental responsible so 
they can try to enhance their stakeholder trust, and appear to conform to societal expectations 
(Ball, 2005, 2007; Milne & Patten, 2002; Scott & Christensen, 1995). As a result, greenwash 
can be a household tactic for an organisation to get ahead of their competitors by enhancing its 
appeal to consumers. Some organisations may exploit greenwash by selectively disclosing only 
positive information about their sustainability performance without revealing negative 
information and so build up positive organisation images (Lyon & Maxwell, 2011; Milne & 
Gray, 2013). Aside from having a good reputation, there is almost an indefinite array of 
motivations for why organisations may engage in sustainability reporting, such as social 
responsibility and accountability (Buhr, 2010; Bansal & Roth, 2000; Gray et al., 1996); for 
strategic legitimacy reasons (Higgins, Milne, & Van Gramberg, 2015; Higgins et al., 2018; 
Stubbs et al., 2013); and to meet its stakeholders’ expectations, both internally and externally 
(Buhr, 2010; Deegan, 2009; Deegan & Unerman, 2006; Fombrun, 2005; Lougee & Wallace, 
2008).  
 
It appears that without a quantified level of stakeholder pressure and interests, it is naive to 
assume organisations will undertake significant steps toward more “comprehensive and 
demanding forms of documenting the social impacts of its activities” (Dierkes & Antal, 1986, 
p. 112). Reasons for why organisations do not undertake sustainability reporting have been 
well documented by a number of past studies, which include: a failed role of business 
intermediaries (Wright et al., 2016); a lack of external stakeholder pressure (Bebbington et al., 
2009; Stubbs et al., 2013); organisational management priorities lie with shareholder interests 
(Stubbs et al., 2013); there are no perceived benefits (Stubbs et al., 2013); sustainability 
reporting is nice-to-do, but not a must-do (Stubbs et al., 2013); a compliance culture towards 
sustainability (Stubbs et al., 2013); a culture that does not encourage reporting (Stubbs et al., 
2013); organisational structure that does not facilitate sustainability reporting (Stubbs et al., 
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2013); organisational internal characteristics (Adams, 2002; Fifka, 2013); and management 
doubts (Martin & Hadley, 2008; Mitchell & Hill, 2009). At face value, it is clear that these 
justifications may be perceived as legitimate reasons for why organisations may not voluntarily 
engage in sustainability reporting. While past literature accepts the fact that motivations for 
why organisations may engage in sustainability reporting are complex (Gray, 2005), the 
complexity seems nowhere near the underlying motivations for why organisations do not 
engage in the reporting.  
2.2 The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Guidelines  
This research focuses on the use of the GRI guidelines in assessing the quality of organisations’ 
sustainability information. First, the background of the GRI is vital in understanding the 
concept of quality assessment and how the GRI helps to achieve it. In the last few decades, 
Ramanathan (1976) called for the implementation of CSA (corporate social accounting) with 
the objective of providing systematic information about an organisation’s social performance, 
yet today we still fall short of generally accepted sustainability reporting standards (Galant & 
Cadez, 2017). Nevertheless, several sustainability reporting initiatives have emerged in recent 
years - such as, the global reporting initiative (GRI), AccountAbility’s AA1000 - principles 
standards, the United Nations Global compact communication of progress (COP), and ISO 
26000. Due to the absence of a unified sustainability-reporting framework, the GRI guidelines 
were founded in 1997 by the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economics (CERES) 
and the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP). The GRI released its first 
publication in 2000. The objective was to guide organisations in constructing sustainability 
reports that integrated social, environmental and economic factors in their organisations’ 
annual reports, and established guidelines as an internationally accepted framework that 
promoted comparable sustainability reporting.  
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Soon after the first publication by the GRI in 2000, the GRI has intensively continued to reform 
and update their guidelines consistently. The second version, G2, was soon released in 2002, 
G3 in 2006, G3.1 in 2011, G4 in 2014, and the most recent version, the GRI standards, was 
released in 2016. The motivation was to ensure the effectiveness of assessing the quality of 
sustainability reporting and stay up-to-date, due to growing concerns and demands about the 
environmental and social impact of organisational activities. Likewise, on the GRI’s website, 
the GRI has explicitly stated that they are consistently developing the guidelines and reviewing 
them periodically to allow any organisations to provide effective sustainability reporting (GRI, 
2013) 
 
The GRI guidelines provide a framework for voluntary economic, environmental and social 
disclosure (Brown, de Jong, & Levy, 2009). However, in the context of voluntary disclosure, 
this may send a signal for organisations to not have disclosure of every topic under the GRI 
guidelines (Milne & Gray, 2013). Given the nature of voluntary disclosure, organisations may 
take advantage of this loophole to enhance their reputation by means of a selective reporting 
of indicators (Boysen, 2009). Despite the weaknesses in the GRI guidelines, many researchers 
still consider the GRI guidelines to be the most appropriate mechanism in measuring the quality 
of sustainability information as they are widely recognised and embraced by many 
organisations from around the world (Adams, 2004; Gallego, 2006; Gamerschlag, Möller, & 
Verbeeten, 2011; Roca & Searcy, 2012; Skouloudis & Evangelinos, 2009). In line with the 
latest KPMG Global CSR Survey, figures show 75% of the G250 and 63% of the N100 have 
applied the GRI framework as part of their sustainability reporting practices (KPMG, 2017). 
Thus, the use of GRI guidelines is appropriate in this study.  
2.2.1 Content Analysis Vs Disclosure Indices  
There are two prominent approaches in measuring the quality of disclosure in sustainability 
reporting (Guthrie & Abeysekera, 2006). The first approach looks at content analysis and the 
 | P a g e  
 
25 
other looks at disclosure indices. Content analysis is the method of codifying the content or 
text of a piece of writing into categories based on selected criteria (Guidry & Patten, 2010; 
Milne & Adler, 1999; Weber, 1990). However, a key concern of this approach lies on its major 
limitation, which focuses on quantity not quality of disclosure, and has been widely criticised 
(Gray et al., 1996; Guidry & Patten, 2010; Guthrie & Abeysekera, 2006; Milne & Adler, 1999). 
Theoretically speaking, this approach only captures the quantity of disclosure, such as the 
number of words, sentences, and pages, and the presence or absence of disclosure items. 
Despite a wide range of criticisms, past literature suggests that these simple measures are not 
reliable in assessing the quality of sustainability reports (Clarkson et al., 2008). 
 
In contrast, a disclosure index emphasises more on the quality of disclosure as it assesses, 
compares, and explains differences in the extent and comprehensiveness of sustainability 
disclosures (Marston & Shrives, 1991). Coy (1995) defines the concept of disclosure indices 
as a research instrument comprising a series of pre-selected items which, when scored, provide 
a measure that indicates a degree of disclosure in the specific context. For instance, the GRI 
guidelines are disclosure indices because they measure the degree of disclosures against the 
index. 
 
Despite a wide range of criticisms, the method most often used to analyse the content of 
sustainability reports is content analysis. However this thesis focuses on the quality of 
sustainability reports and the degree to which the requirements of the GRI guidelines (the GRI 
guidelines prescribe performance key indicators to assess the quality of an organisation’s 
sustainability report) has been complied with (Clarkson et al., 2008). For this reason, the 
disclosure index approach is more suitable, and is aligned with its research objectives. In 
addition, the use of a disclosure index has an advantage of allowing for direct comparisons 
with previous research literature, but its difficulty lies in the subjective nature of its use. 
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Determining the extent to which disclosure requirements of each performance indicator are 
covered by sampled organisations’ sustainability report relies on the researcher’s judgement of 
what is significant and important. Hence, the disclosure index is only valid when it is used 
appropriately with an honest judgement (Marston & Shrives, 1991; Milne & Adler, 1999; 
Galant & Cadez, 2017), otherwise this can detract from the reliability of the research findings 
overall.  
 
Clarkson, Li, & Richardson (2004) suggest that there are two types of environmental 
performers out there in regard to environmental disclosures: good environmental performers 
which over comply with current environmental regulations and poor environmental performers 
which engage in minimum compliance with current environmental regulations. To distinguish 
between the qualities of good sustainability performance as opposed to poor sustainability 
performance, Clarkson et al. (2008) have contributed a way of measuring the quality of 
sustainability reports using the GRI. To do this, they divided the GRI performance indicators 
in relation to economic, environmental and social elements into two categories: hard and soft 
disclosure items.  
 
A hard disclosure item is a disclosure item that cannot be easily mimicked by a poor 
environmental performer. More specifically, it focuses on the quantitative side of key 
performance indicators, such as direct GHG emissions (scope 1), total % of water use and total  
% of transported waste. They are disclosure items that a poor environmental performer cannot 
replicate. On the other hand, a soft disclosure item is a disclosure item that is not easily 
verifiable and lacks creditability, in regard to organisation’s clams to be environmentally and 
socially committed. This focuses on the qualitative side of key performance indicators, such as 
employees training, existence of response plans for environmental accidents or community 
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involvement. By incorporating this framework into this study, it becomes possible to assess the 
quality of sustainability information by examining the ratio of hard to soft disclosures. 
 
Clarkson et al. (2011) conclude that it is feasible to distinguish the quality of sustainability 
information produced by an organisation by observing the ratio of hard to soft disclosure items 
from the organisation’s sustainability report. A good sustainability performer organisation 
would be expected to have a higher degree of hard disclosure items, whereas a poor 
sustainability performer would expected have a lower degree of hard disclosure items, in 
comparison to soft disclosure items. This notion is integrated into this research’s template for 
quality assessment of an organisation’s sustainability information. 
2.2.1.1 Partition of Index 
Since economic, environmental and social performance indicators are mutually exclusive to 
one another. It is possible to partition out the hard and soft disclosure items into component 
parts, which allows each factor to be assessed individually. By being able to partition out the 
index, this permits the distinction between two reports with the same aggregated results. Hence, 
it is possible to compare the results between two distinct groups, ‘reporting’ and ‘non-reporting’ 
organisations, within the specific performance indicators in relation to economic, 
environmental and social performance indicators (Chapman & Milne, 2003; Milne, Tregidga, 
& Walton, 2003). 
2.2.2 Past literature  
There has been a growing body of research on corporate sustainability reporting, however only 
few studies have explicitly focused on the reporting content (Roca & Searcy, 2012). Adams & 
Frost (2008) had previously stressed that future research scholars should incorporate key 
performance indicators in their studies. To date, too few studies have actually done this, 
particularly in the New Zealand context (Chapman & Milne, 2003; Milne et al., 2003). 
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One of the earliest explorations of the quality and completeness of sustainability reporting 
among New Zealand’s organisations can be traced back to the study by Milne et al. (2003). In 
their study, using the UNEP/SustainAbility scorecard, the researchers conducted an in-depth 
review to explore the quality and completeness of the sustainability-related content produced 
in 2001 by eight New Zealand’s early sustainability reporters. With exceptions of two 
organisations, their findings indicated that the quality and completeness of sustainability-
related content produced by these organisations were relatively patchy when compared to 
international best practice at the time. In particular, the organisations tend to do well in areas 
that require basic quantitative and qualitative disclosures (e.g., corporate context, reporting 
policy, environmental auditing, employees, and local communities), and poorly in areas where 
more specific quantitative disclosures are required (e.g., water consumption, waste and 
effluents, environmental impacts, and environmental spending). 
 
Expanding on the above literature, further insights into New Zealand’s sustainability reporting 
practices can also be gained by utilising a bigger sample size. Chapman & Milne (2003) 
conducted a follow-up study that examined the sustainability-related content of 30 New 
Zealand’s organisation reports produced in 2002. In a similar vein, their findings were not a 
whole lot different from the early explorations of the study of sustainability-related content 
provided by Walton et al. (2003), and further suggested that the most commonly sustainability-
related disclosures were “issues that many would consider minimum staples in a stakeholder 
reporting diet: namely, corporate context, health and safety, employees, charitable donations, 
local communities, customers, and policies.” (p. 9). 
 
Using the GRI framework, Gallego (2006) conducted an in-depth analysis of 19 Spanish 
organisations to explore how and to what extent these organisations made use of the economic, 
environmental and social indicators in their sustainability reports. Her findings indicated that 
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the most frequently used GRI’s “environmental” indicators were “energy, water, biodiversity 
and emissions, effluents and waste” (p. 1), whereas “labour, practices and decent work, strategy 
and management, non-discrimination, freedom of association, child labour and forced and 
compulsory labour” (p. 1) were the most frequently used GRI’s “social” indictors discussed. 
The analysis further indicates that the industry sector influences the nature, the type and the 
amount of GRI indicators disclosed. For example, organisations that operate in high-
environmental impact industries (e.g., energy and water) tend to put an emphasis on specific 
environmental and social indicators, such as “indirect economic impacts, amount of 
impermeable surface, number of IUCN [International Union for Conservation of Nature] red 
list species with habitats in areas affected by operations, other relevant indirect greenhouse gas 
emissions, evidence of substantial compliance with the ILO [International Labour Organization] 
Guidelines, amount of money paid to political parties and institutions and description of policy, 
procedures and compliance mechanisms for preventing anti-competitive behaviour” (p. 91). 
Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that the majority of disclosure items disclosed 
among these organisations came from the GRI’s “economic” indicators. 
 
Skouloudis & Evangelinos (2009) conducted a comprehensive analysis of 17 Greek 
organisations’ sustainability reports over two periods between 2005 and 2006 to explore the 
quality and completeness of sustainability reports produced by these organisations. Their 
findings indicated there had been an improvement in the comprehensiveness of the 
sustainability reports produce by these organisations over these periods, however the quality 
and completeness of sustainability reports produced were typically not that great. In particular, 
the majority of disclosure items disclosed came from the GRI’s “economic” indicators, 
whereas the most commonly the GRI’s “environmental” indicators were “energy and water 
consumption, carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, and internal initiatives to improve energy 
efficiency” (p. 53). As regards to the GRI’s “social” indicators, the researchers did not 
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explicitly state the most disclosed social indicators, however the researchers noted that social 
issues such as “workplace health and safety policies and measures, employee education and 
skill management (including average hours of training per employee), and the benefits that 
employees receive from the organization” (p. 54) were frequently disclosed. 
 
Similarly, Roca & Searcy (2012) conducted an in-depth content analysis of 94 Canadian 
organisation’s sustainability reports published in 2008 to identify the disclosure behaviours, 
and explore the most and least disclosed GRI indicators among these organisations. Their 
findings indicated that 31 of the 94 organisations used the GRI framework in their sustainability 
reports, and further suggested the GRI indicators disclosed by these organisations varied 
considerably by sector. While the GRI’s “Economic” indictors were widely reported among 
these organisations, the analysis further indicated organisations that operate in high-
environmental impact industries (e.g., oil and gas, mining, steel, and transport) tend to put an 
emphasis on environmental indicators. Although the most frequent GRI indicators disclosed 
among these organisations were still considered to be “minimum staples in a stakeholder 
reporting diet” (Chapman & Milne, 2003, p. 46) - such as, EC1 (direct economic value 
generated and distributed), LA1 (total workforce by employment type, employment contract, 
and region), EN3 (direct energy consumption by primary energy source), EN16 (total direct 
and indirect greenhouse gas emissions by weight), and LA13 (composition of governance 
bodies and breakdown of employees per category).  
 
From the conducting this literature review, there are very few studies that actually examines 
the disclosure of GRI indicators in sustainability reports of organisations - more specifically, 
how and to what extent New Zealand’s listed organisations are embedding sustainability 
reporting in their disclosure practices has yet to be comprehensively investigated in terms of 
utilising the GRI framework. As noted by Daub (2007), a report can only be considered a 
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sustainability report when it consists of “qualitative and quantitative information on the extent 
to which the company has managed to improve its economic, environmental and social 
effectiveness and efficiency” (p. 76). Hence, further research that investigates the disclosure of 
GRI indicators in sustainability reports of New Zealand’s listed organisations is therefore 
needed. 
2.3 Corporate Governance 
A complete and symbolic definition of corporate governance can be elusive, almost non-
existent, as “corporate governance is a broad and complex concept that incorporates almost 
every aspect of corporate life” (Anand, 2007, p. 77). Many are lost for words that will capture 
everything that corporate governance is (Kolk & Pinkse, 2010). The area of corporate 
governance is far more complex and dynamic than it looks. Due to increased regulatory 
requirements and greater public scrutiny imposed on organisations, this creates increased extra 
responsibilities for board of directors to comply with rigorous governance standards, and meets 
the expectations of stakeholders for transparency and accountability (Fung, 2014). Corporate 
governance has become an integral element of every organisation, and is embedded deeply 
within the organisation because good corporate governance essentially “promotes investor 
confidence and provides the mechanisms by which organisations, and those in control, are held 
to account.” (NZX, 2015, p. 3).  
 
In early literature, corporate governance was seen as a system utilised to protect investors’ 
interests or the suppliers of finance (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000; 
Picou & Rubach, 2006; Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997; Trong Tuan, 2012). 
However, due to the current growth of modern societies, this view is no longer acceptable. 
Friedman (1971) argued the only responsibility of an organisation is to maximise profits and 
return for their financial shareholders. He was wrong. In the last few decades, it seems 
corporate scandals, particularly accounting and ethical scandals, such as Enron, WorldCom 
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and Parmalat, have caused a big stir in the corporate scene, and the social role of organisations 
have been called into question (Kolk & Pinkse, 2010). As such, organisations are starting to 
look beyond financial accountability as the sole route to creating shareholder value, resulting 
in a departure of the initial concept of corporate governance to a stakeholder-based approach 
(Money & Schepers, 2007).  
 
To ensure that corporate governance is accurately defined and aligns with the scope of this 
study, a definition of corporate governance must bring the perspective of stakeholders (Trong 
Tuan, 2012) into account. Hence, a definition of corporate governance can be found from 
Ethical Investment Research Services, where they define it as: 
“a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and 
its stakeholders. It is the process by which directors and auditors manage their 
responsibilities towards shareholders and wider company stakeholders. For shareholders 
it can provide increased confidence of an equitable return on their investment. For 
company stakeholders it can provide an assurance that the company manages its impact 
on society and the environment in a responsible manner” (Maier, 2005, p. 5) 
 
Because trust in business is deteriorating (Dilling, 2010), this successively leads to numerous 
rules and regulations beginning to reform (Fung, 2014), via ensuring that organisations 
maintain a healthy long-term focused organisational culture (Eccles et al., 2012), and meeting 
“society’s expectations in relation to organisations’ environmental, social and ethical 
responsibility” (Money & Schepers, 2007, p. 2). In particular, this increased alignment between 
corporate governance and sustainability has been reflected through the development of more 
formal governance structures, such as dedicated sustainability personnel, the publication of 
sustainability reports, and the implementation sustainability board committees (Money & 
Schepers, 2007). 
 
The importance of corporate governance is widely acknowledged by both academic and market 
regulators (Chi, 2009; Fung, 2014; Kolk & Pinkse, 2010; Popa et al., 2009; Money & Schepers, 
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2007) and, consequently, “a growing number of regulators globally are reviewing the 
governance arrangements of corporations to ensure that corporate practices are aligned with 
broader societal interests” (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2011, p. 2). This provides a positive spin off 
by broadening of standards in which organisations must adhere in order to preserve its “license 
to operate” (Kolk & Pinkse, 2010, p. 17) and, therefore, assuring better corporate governance, 
transparency and accountability (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). Of significance, codes of 
good corporate governance are considered a set of best practices in relation to the board of 
directors and other governance arrangements (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). In essence, 
the codes have been designed to address deficiencies in the corporate governance system by 
recommending a set of rules aimed at improving transparency and accountability among 
managers and directors (Thanasas, Kontogeorga, & Drogalas, 2018). 
 
Although the content of these codes varies (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004), a central 
source of corporate governance codes is the ‘comply or explain’ principle, which was first 
introduced in the United Kingdom’s Cadbury Report 1992 as a medium of establishing a single 
code of corporate governance whilst avoiding an inflexible “one size fits all” approach. As 
noted by the Cadbury Committee, “smaller listed companies may initially have difficulty in 
complying with some aspects of the Code” (Cadbury, 1992, 3.15), and if “the boards of smaller 
listed companies which cannot, for the time being, comply with parts of the Code should not 
that they may instead give their reasons for non-compliance” (Cadbury, 1992, 3.15). In core, 
the provisions of the Code are meant to be applied flexibly (Seidl, Sanderson, & Roberts, 2013), 
meaning that organisations should have some degree of flexibility to adjust the principles of 
corporate governance to their situation in order to become more efficient, rather than having to 
comply with all the Code’s provisions (Seidl et al., 2013). Hence, organisations are given, or 
provided with an option to justify why they deviate from the Code’s provisions (Seidl et al., 
2013) 
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As a continuous effort to improve the governance structure, more than eighty countries have 
introduced such codes, which are issued by a large variety of issuers such as stock exchanges, 
government commissions, shareholder, governance and professional associations, and other 
interest groups (Gregory, Grapsas, & Powell, 2007). This includes the New Zealand’s stock 
exchange. As a result of the “fragmentation between the NZX’s Code and other existing 
corporate governance frameworks” (NZX, 2017c, p. 1), the NZX recognises that the revised 
NZX Code is crucial for improving corporate governance standards at an organisational level, 
in particular among New Zealand’s listed organisations. After all, the primary objective of the 
NZX Code is essentially to: 
“promote good corporate governance, recognise that boards are in place to protect the 
interests of shareholders and to provide long term value.” (NZX, 2017b, p. 3).  
 
It is important to note that the revised NZX Code is the first substantial update to the code since 
2003. In the NZX’s own words, “good corporate governance is important for listed issuers 
because it promotes investor confidence and provides the mechanisms by which organisations, 
and those in control, are held to account.” (NZX, 2015, p. 3). To align with the current 
international best practice along with improving transparency, comparability and consistency 
with the corporate governance code of other stock exchanges, and between various reporting 
practices among listed equity issuers; the implementation of the revised NZX Code is critical. 
In the next subsection, a brief historical context to the NZX is discussed, and this is followed 
by an in-depth discussion of the revised NZX Code’s tiered framework. 
2.3.1 The New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX) 
The primary objective of a stock market exchange is to facilitate the exchange of securities 
between buyers and sellers thereby serving as a marketplace virtual or real. A stock exchange 
is simply nothing more than just a sophisticated farmers’ market providing a meeting place for 
buyers and sellers (Mehta, 2014). For this reason, a lack of clarity about the purpose of a stock 
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exchange can have a detrimental impact on understanding what the NZX Code is trying to 
achieve. 
 
The New Zealand Stock Exchange Limited (NZX) is a publicly-held New Zealand entity. 
Comparing to other stock exchanges in the OECD regions, the New Zealand Stock Exchange 
is one of the least regulated stock markets (Gan, Lee, Yong, & Zhang, 2006). This is being 
attributed to the deregulation of the financial market in 1984, since then, New Zealand’s capital 
markets are operated under a self-regulating organisation (SRO) model, with minimal 
government intervention. This means the NZX is simultaneously acting as an operator and 
regulator of the capital markets. According to the NZX’s website (NZX, 2017a), as a SRO, the 
NZX has two key regulatory roles in essence of the operations of the New Zealand stock market:  
 
1. “NZX’s responsible for developing and enhancing the market rules, practices and policies 
under which NZX’s markets. This function is undertaken by the NZX Policy team.” 
 
2. “NZX is responsible for monitoring and enforcing the rules under which NZX’s markets 
operate. This applies directly to issuers, market participants and indirectly (through market 
participants) to investors. This function is undertaken by the NZX Regulation team, with 
support from the NZX Market Services team.” 
 
As a central regulator of the markets, the NZX is held responsible for regulating corporate 
governance guidelines for equity issuers on the NZX via the NZX Main Board Listing Rules 
(Listing rules). These obligations consist of two broad categories: mandatory requirements and 
reporting requirements. Leaving mandatory requirements aside, due to the current 
fragmentation between various governance reporting requirements and guidance for the NZX 
Main Board’s equity issuers, there are currently no reporting requirements governed within the 
region of the provision of ESG reporting. In an attempt to rationalise reporting requirements 
by ensuring that the NZX Code is the central source of corporate governance guidelines for the 
NZX Main Board’s equity issuers, updates to the NZX Code were announced in 2016. 
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2.3.2 The Corporate Governance Best Practice Code (The NZX Code) 
The tiered framework can be partitioned out into three distinct elements, namely; principles, 
recommendations and commentary. See Figure 1. The first element is the most important as it 
outlays the principles of the NZX Code, which is fundamentally the heart of the code itself. 
An outgrowth of this reform is to resolve the current fragmentation between a number of 
corporate governance reporting requirements and guidance followed by the NZX Main Board’s 
equity issuers. In an attempt to reduce this fragmentation, the NZX has proposed to adopt and 
use the principles outlaid in the FMA’s (Financial Market Authority) Handbook as a basis of 
the revised reporting requirements, with an intention to rationalise it as a single set of standards. 
The NZX acknowledges that if issuers are complying with the revised NZX Code, then they 
are correspondingly satisfying the current reporting requirements under the FMA’s Handbook. 
Consequently, issuers who are currently reporting against the FMA’s Handbook, do not have 
to attempt to match their reporting under two different reporting requirements. Furthermore, 
the revised principles are highly consistent with the ASX’s (Australian Securities Exchange) 
principles, which essentially are the fundamental step towards international best practice. 
 
Figure 1: The Proposed Updated NZX Code - A Tiered Framework (NZX, 2017c, p. 4) 
 
 
The second element consists of the recommendations, which is slightly more prescriptive, and 
its purpose is to serve as the recommendations for each of the underlying principles under the 
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NZX Code. The NZX acknowledges that some principles may not be appropriated and suitable 
for some equity issuers in its Main Board to meet some of the reporting requirements; 
especially small- to medium-sized equity issuers. To provide a sufficient level of flexibility, 
the recommendations are therefore to be applied on a ‘comply or explain’ basis. In terms of 
this conceptual distinction, if the board of an issuer considers some of the recommendations 
are not appropriate for them to comply, then they must explain why it has not been reported. 
For example, if an issuer has decided not to comply with some of the proposed 
recommendations prescribed within the NZX Code, an equity issuer must issue a separate 
statement outlining why particular recommendations have not been adopted and what (if any) 
other arrangements/measures have been adopted in lieu of the recommendations during that 
reporting period. This is to assure equity issuers’ investors and other stakeholders are informed 
with “an appropriate level of information about the issuer’s governance arrangements” (NZX, 
2017b, p. 4) in order to make well-informed investment decisions (NZX, 2017b). Additionally, 
the approach of ‘comply or explain’ is highly consistent with other jurisdictions, as seen in 
Australia, the UK, the EU, and the US (Harper Ho, 2017). 
 
In contrast to the recommendations, the last element, commentary, does not need to satisfy with 
a ‘comply or explain’ basis. The core purpose of commentary is to guide how equity issuers 
can satisfy and meet the recommendations of each of the underlying principle of the NZX Code 
and outlines supplementary guidance in areas where the NZX considers the suggested 
commentary would reflect best practice. In this case, the GRI and the IR framework have been 
suggested as best practices for ESG reporting. Overall, these three elements of the tiered 
framework are of significant importance in and of themselves, but when they are collectively 
connected as a single framework, this results in an improvement to corporate governance 
standards among the NZX Main Board’s equity issuers.  
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2.3.3 The NZX’s Recommendation 4.3  
Given the focus of this study is to examine to what extent the NZX Code might induce the 
uptake of sustainability reporting among New Zealand’s listed organisations, the scope for 
review looks at Principle 4 (Reporting and Disclosure), specifically the Recommendation 4.3. 
This recommendation is interconnected with the provision of non-financial disclosure in 
relation to ESG reporting. The NZX’s recommendation 4.3 states as follows: 
“4.3 Financial reporting should be balanced, clear and objective. An issuer should provide 
non-financial disclosure at least annually, including considering material exposure to 
environmental, economic and social sustainability risk and other key risks. It should 
explain how it plans to manage those risks and how operational or non-financial targets 
are measured.” (NZX, 2017b, p. 20) 
The NZX acknowledges there has been a “demand” (NZX, 2017a) for more detailed non-
financial disclosure by listed issuers from investors and other stakeholders. In response to this 
demand, the recommendation has been considered as part of the revision to the NZX code. In 
the NZX’s own words, “the use of ESG disclosure is becoming more important in relation to 
investment decisions…Issuers can show investors that they are equipped for the long term, and 
are ready to respond to risks and take advantages of opportunities” (NZX, 2017c, p. 4). Clearly, 
this is to ensure listed issuers become more accountable for “the broad stakeholder views in 
New Zealand’s capital markets” (NZX, 2017c, p. 1). In the next section, the discussion and 
consultation submission papers from market participants during the review process will be 
manually analysed in order to seek key arguments ‘for’ and ‘against’ the provision of non-
financial disclosure, particularly Recommendation 4.3. 
2.3.4 The feedback on the proposed changes to the NZX code from market participants  
The NZX acknowledges that the proposed framework may not be appropriate for certain equity 
issuers, particularly SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises). To seek feedback on the 
appropriateness of the revision to the NZX Code, on November 2015, the NZX started a 
consultation process in order to identify levels of consensus and disagreement of the proposed 
tiered framework to the revised NZX Code. The review process comprised two stages: (1) 
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market participants to provide feedback on a review of the proposed changes to the NZX 
Code’s tiered framework. (2) market participants to similarly provide feedback on the proposed 
the NZX draft code after considering the feedback submitted by market participants from the 
first review process.  
 
Throughout the first review stage, the NZX received more than 45 formal submissions, 
submitted by a diverse range of interested parties, which included investors, equity issuers, 
sustainability groups, law firms, governance groups, accounting and auditing groups in New 
Zealand and from overseas. Through analysing the content of discussion submission papers by 
market participants, it is clear that the areas of concern were driven from organisations’ 
investors and stakeholders needs for non-financial information. For this reason, non-financial 
disclosure has been emphasised as part of the revision to the code. 
 
The feedback generated is strongly in agreement with the proposed updates to the NZX code 
for having ESG reporting prescribed as one of the recommendations, while only a select few 
objected to it. Arguments against were grounded on the view that such ‘sustainability reporting 
would not be value-added’ to organisations because investors can make their own investment 
decisions around the importance of ESG matters. One equity issuer asserted their view as 
follows:  
"Investors can make their own decisions about the importance of ESG matters and choose 
not to invest in issuers that do not satisfy the standard, or provide the level of disclosure 
on such matters, that an investor considers appropriate.” (Ryman Healthcare Limited, 
2016, p.2) - Equity Issuer 
 
However, in favour arguments were largely driven by transparency and the usefulness of non-
financial information, in a sense that an organisation will always be exposed to material risks 
that may directly and/or indirectly influence its operational activities. Hence, should these risks 
become material and available, investors and/or stakeholders must be spontaneously informed 
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about these risks in order to make well-informed investment decisions. Several participants 
have suggested, for instance, that: 
“Transparency on sustainability performance and impacts is vital to building trust among 
investors and issuers, and is critical to ensuring well-functioning, stable and resilient 
capital markets.” (GRI, 2016, p. 2) - Sustainability group 
 
“Those material risks are likely to be peculiar to individual issuers and more broadly to 
sectors in which they operate. Therefore, these risks should be required to report.” 
(Sustainability Matters, 2016, p. 4) - Sustainability group 
 
“…where issuers have identified there is a material business risk, that disclosure of that 
risk and the way in which it is managed should be disclosed to investors. This allows them 
to consider their investment.” (Meridian Energy Limited, 2016, p. 5) - Equity issuer 
 
 “The board should report on analysis of the environmental, social and governance 
considerations material to the company so that shareholders understand how the company 
managed those issues.” (New Zealand Corporate Governance Forum, 2016, p. 12) - 
Investor group 
 
“All board communications should present a balanced and understandable assessment of 
the company's position in order for shareholders to be able to assess the company's 
performance, business model, strategy and prospects.” (Devon Funds Management, 2016, 
p. 6) - Investor group 
 
Narrowly focusing on the concern of compliance costs, the NZX acknowledges the fact that 
the proposed updates to the NZX Code may impose, more or less, financial constraints on some 
small equity issuers. To ensure that these small equity issuers’ views are taken into account, 
the NZX commissioned a small research project, which comprised of 15 SMEs. The findings 
were mixed, suggesting that there is a resistance for non-financial disclosure in relation to ESG 
reporting, and the argument concerns compliance costs as well as the flexibility of the reporting 
requirements. 
 
As for the second stage, the NZX received more than 80 formal submissions (only 43 
submission papers were analysed), submitted by similarly a diverse range of interested parties. 
With an ongoing appetite for non-financial disclosure from investors and stakeholders, the 
NZX has chosen to focus on several areas of importance and one of the suggested areas is the 
provision of non-financial disclosure or ESG reporting. In the NZX’s own words, “ESG 
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reporting is now common place in many countries and others have pledged to produce guidance 
on ESG disclosure by the end of 2016” (NZX, 2016, p. 6).  
Similar to the first review process, the feedback received during the second stage is 
overwhelmingly in agreement with the proposed recommendations. Only a few organisations 
again spoke against it. The arguments are established on the ground of the appropriateness of 
the draft code for SMEs, particularly on the endorsement of having the ESG reporting to be 
prescribed as one of the recommendations. Several participants justified their views as follows:  
” Given the limited size of the New Zealand market and the financial constraints of many 
market participants, requiring ESG reporting (even under a ‘comply or explain’ regime) 
would create an undue financial and resource burden.” (Russell McVeagh, 2016, p.4) - 
Law Firm 
 
“…given the diversity of size and types of businesses listed on the NZX, issuers should be 
permitted to choose the manner in which they report on ESG matter” (SkyCity 
Entertainment Group Limited, 2016, p. 4) - Equity Issuer 
 
“[We] are encouraging non-financial reporting but not adopting specific recommendations 
in relation to ESG reporting.” (Chorus, 2016, p.2) - Equity issuer 
 
Arguments in favour of the proposed changes included: 
 
“…there is a strong demand from stakeholders to receive ESG information and that it is a 
critical part of some investors' investment decisions.” (PWC, 2016, p. 5) - Accounting and 
auditing groups 
 
“ESG strategy and performance is a significant area of interest for investors, stakeholders 
and communities.” (Z Energy, 2016, p. 1) - Equity issuer 
 
“Financial information alone does not tell the whole story, and scrutiny is extending 
beyond the bottom-line to examine what businesses are doing, how they are doing it, and 
their impact on the environment and society.” (Institute of Directors, 2016, p. 2) - 
Governance group 
 
Overall, to promote and encourage the uptake of sustainability reporting among New Zealand’s 
listed organisations, the revised NZX Code is extremely crucial. The code will act as a medium 
that indirectly enforces every listed equity issuer within the NZX Main Board to disclose non-
financial information in relation to ESG issues. But, given the NZX’s Recommendation 4.3 is 
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enacted on a ‘comply or explain’ regime, the effectiveness of the ‘comply or explain’ approach 
needs to be considered. 
2.3.5 The effectiveness of the ‘comply or explain’ regime under corporate governance codes 
There is extensive research that examines the effectiveness of corporate governance codes on 
an organisation’s disclosure and performance (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Aguilera & 
Cuervo‐Cazurra, 2009; Seidl et al., 2013; Senn, 2018; Shrives & Brennan, 2015; Thanasas et 
al., 2018). The ‘comply or explain’ approach is regarded as a “soft law” (Senn, 2018) or “rules 
of conduct which, in principle, have no legally binding force but which nevertheless may have 
practical effects” (Snyder, 1994, p. 2). Due to this non-legally binding obligation, an 
enforcement of the ‘comply or explain’ approach is generally left to the effectiveness of internal 
organisation bodies (i.e. the board of directors) and of external market forces (i.e. globalisation, 
emergence of powerful foreign investors, and recommendations on global best practices by 
transnational institutions) to ensure the effectiveness of the implementation of the corporate 
governance codes. Hence, the effectiveness of the ‘comply or explain’ approach has been called 
into question by numerous research scholars (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Aguilera & 
Cuervo‐Cazurra, 2009; Seidl et al., 2013; Senn, 2018; Shrives & Brennan, 2015; Thanasas et 
al., 2018). 
 
Aguilera & Cuervo‐Cazurra (2009) conducted an international review of the recent 
developments in the area of codes of good governance. Their findings on compliance and 
effectiveness of codes of good governance at the organisational level indicated that institutional 
investors prefer organisation’s compliance with code recommendations. However the codes’ 
impact on organisation performance is mixed. They further pointed out in their review that 
investors are willing to tolerate non-compliance towards the corporate governance code to the 
extent that the organisation is still performing well financially, and therefore organisations that 
are performing well financially may be excused for deviating from the Code’s provisions. 
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Even if compliance with code recommendations is traditionally voluntary or based on ‘comply 
or explain’, the extent to which ‘comply or explain’ offers good governance depends on the 
quality of the explanation. Shrives & Brennan (2015) conducted a longitudinal study on the 
UK Financial Times Stock Exchange 350 over two periods between 2004/5 and 2011/12 to 
explore the quality of explanations for non-compliance with UK corporate governance 
regulations. Their findings suggest that the quality of explanations is rather poor and 
uninformative, highlighting that organisations tend to follow the codes in a boilerplate manner, 
where organisations tend to duplicate their explanations from year to year in order to avoid the 
need to craft sound explanations. The inclusion of explanations can potentially draw attention 
to the fact of non-compliance and face increased scrutiny. Hence, organisations are more likely 
to state only what they are not complying, without providing a full explanation why not. 
 
Using a perspective framed by legitimacy theory, Seidl et al. (2013) conducted an exploratory 
study on the compliance statements and reports of 257 listed organisations in the UK and 
Germany to explore to what extent and in what way do these organisations make use of the 
“explain” option. Their findings indicated that various forms of explanations in terms of non-
compliance can be used as strategies to preserve the organisation’s legitimacy in society in 
which they operate. More specifically, the use of the “explain” option allows organisations to 
utilise the most effective way to explain why they deviate from the Code’s provisions while 
still retaining their legitimacy.  
 
In line with the above literature, Thanasas et al. (2018) conducted an exploratory study to 
investigate how and to what extent 162 Greek listed organisations make use of the ‘comply or 
explain’ model to deviate from Greek Corporate Governance Codes. Their findings indicated 
that 96 listed organisations (59.3 per cent) made use of an “explain” option to explain their 
deviations without stating the existing situation of their organisation in the statement of non-
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compliance, while other 66 listed organisations (40.7 per cent) comply. The study concludes 
that the majority of the organisations tend to use an “explain” option as a logical justification 
for non-compliance, and tend to imitate the explanations provided by larger organisations in 
order to maintain their legitimacy on issues relating to their deviations, although the researchers 
note that this phenomenon occurs mainly in small listed organisations.  
 
In a similar vein, Senn (2018) also conducted a longitudinal study to investigate the 
effectiveness of the ‘comply or explain’ model within France’s ‘Grenelle II’ (the law which 
requires every equity issuer on the French stock market to disclose environment accounting 
disclosures - EADs, or to put this into simple terms, financialised environment disclosures) 
over the period of 2009-2011 (before Grenelle II) and 2012-2014 (after Grenelle II). The study 
highlighted the explanations for the absence of EAD had significantly increased after the 
introduction of the Grenelle II and, additionally, no net positive effect on the number of 
organisations making EADs was indicated. The researcher concluded that the ‘comply or 
explain’ model could be perceived as a strategic tool for organisations to avoid making EADs, 
because the law allowed the explanation for the absence of non-disclosure to be seen as an 
acceptable justification for non-compliance.  
 
While the recommendation of ESG reporting may be enacted as a ‘comply or explain’ approach, 
the effectiveness of the approach is somewhat debateable. This view can be justified by the 
fact that the ‘comply or explain’ approach is a weak enforcement mechanism because 
organisations can make similar (‘boilerplate’) disclosures from year to year in which the 
recommendation can provide incentives for organisations to avoid making ESG disclosure. In 
part the code affords a loophole that allows an organisation the opportunity to use an “explain” 
option to explain why they deviate from the Code’s provisions, and provides the explanation 
for the absence of non-financial disclosure to be seen as an acceptable justification for non-
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compliance. Even if organisations complied with the recommendation, the quality of 
compliance is generally weak and uninformative. Given the ‘comply and explain’ approach is 
regarded as a “soft law” (Senn, 2018), further investigation on the effectiveness of the ‘comply 
or explain’ regime will be needed in the future, particularly in the New Zealand context.  
2.4 Theoretical Framework 
2.4.1 Transparency and Disclosure  
The environmental and social accounting literature suggests the most widely used theories are 
legitimacy, institutional, and stakeholder theories (Deegan & Unerman, 2006). However, it is 
worth mentioning “there is an almost infinite array of theories potentially available to social 
science research and social accounting in particular” (Gray, Owen, & Adams, 2009, p. 3). As 
a result, the choice of an appropriate theory in exploring sustainability reporting is crucial 
because theory is, essentially, a mental state (Gray et al., 2009); a framework, that guides a 
researcher, and most importantly, influences the way a researcher manifests the meaning of 
sustainability reporting. Because the scope of this study is situated on the presumption that the 
The NZX Code may both encourage but also not encourage some NZX listed members to 
undertake sustainability reporting, this study draws from a framework of corporate governance, 
transparency and sustainability disclosure literature. What is interesting is the kind of 
relationships the ideas of transparency and disclosure hold, and how they relate to corporate 
governance. In an attempt to answer this question intuitively, the concepts of transparency, 
disclosure and corporate governance are considered separately before linking them together at 
the end. 
2.4.2 Transparency 
“Secrecy means deliberately hiding your actions; transparency means deliberately revealing 
them” (Florini, 1998, p.50). In the transparency literature, transparency is seen as an essential 
constituent that organisations should and must uphold (Dubbink, Graafland, & Van Liedekerke, 
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2008) because it ensures management will not partake in any inappropriate activities that will 
jeopardise an organisation (Fung, 2014). At the same time, transparency ensures an 
organisation’s stakeholders are able to observe and make sense of the organisation’s activities 
(Fung, 2014), particularly when they do not have direct access to the information from within 
the organisation itself (Carroll & Einwiller, 2014). It is evident in the literature that the concept 
of transparency is highly correlated to the availability of specific organisational information to 
those outside of the organisation (Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2004). For instance, to be 
transparent, organisations must “make available publicly all legally reasonable information - 
whether positive or negative in nature - in a manner which is accurate, timely, balanced, and 
unequivocal” (Heise, 1985, p. 209). Thus, “transparent doesn’t mean being invisible. It means 
being more visible” (Rawlins, 2008, p.73).  
 
However, a further argument in the literature, (Carroll & Einwiller, 2014), claims that merely 
making specific organisational information publicly available in itself does not constitute 
transparency. The existence of transparency requires that interested parties have faith in the 
organisation that they are being told everything they need to know, and that failure to be 
perceived as transparent will have a detrimental effect on an organisation’s reputation (Gower, 
2006). With reference to the transparency literature, Balkin (1999) has further expanded the 
scope of the notion of transparency by introducing three types of transparency that “work 
together but are analytically distinct” (p. 393), namely; information, participatory and 
accountability. This means transparency is defined by having embraced these three distinct 
elements: information that is trustworthy, significant and useful; participating with 
stakeholders to identify their needs; and organisations that are being accountable for their 
actions, policies and practices (Rawlins, 2008). In this regard, the definition of transparency 
includes: “the purpose of enhancing the reasoning ability of publics and holding organisations 
accountable for their actions, policies and practices.” (Rawlins, 2008, p.75).  
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In the context of sustainability reporting, Carroll & Einwiller (2014) have narrowed down the 
notion of transparency by reinforcing it with the viewpoint of organisational communication. 
They denote the term as ‘transparency signalling’, a tool which an organisation utilises in order 
to signal its efforts to demonstrate transparency, such as participating in sustainability reporting 
activities. In terms of this conceptual distinction, the concept of transparency signalling can be 
positive and/or negative in nature. For example, taking into account of one’s message, 
specifying the information (who, what, when, where) and discussion of the positive and 
negative aspects would be considered to be positive signals that increase transparency, while 
negative signals that include uncertainty, embellishment and lack of focus would decrease 
transparency (Carroll & Einwiller, 2014). 
 
In brief, transparency is only meaningful when it improves the understanding of the users of 
information, rather than simply increasing the flow of information (Wall, 1996). It is common 
to assume that corporate social responsibility and transparency are often positively correlated, 
but then again that does not mean that an organisation with a sustainability report is 
automatically transparent and accountable for its actions (Carroll & Einwiller, 2014). This 
raises a question: what does? In the next section, the notion of disclosure is discussed, to 
illustrate the conceptual distinction between transparency and information.  
2.4.3 Disclosure  
As mentioned above, Carroll & Einwiller (2014) suggest that ‘transparency signalling’ occurs 
when an organisation aims to demonstrate transparency through actions, such as issuing a 
sustainability report. As organisations attempt to conform, they are contemporarily engaging 
in ‘disclosure alignment’. Disclosure alignment refers to a bold attempt by an organisation to 
align their disclosure practice with the expectations of their stakeholders, thereby signalling 
that they have taken their stakeholder’s needs into account (Carroll and Einwiller, 2014). In the 
current development of modern societies, the stakeholder needs for information have become 
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more sophisticated to the extent that they are rigorously demanding an organisation disclose 
non-financial information in relation to their operational activities, rather than what is provided 
within the traditional financial statements (Kolk & Pinkse, 2010; Popa et al., 2009).  
 
Carroll and Einwiller (2014) further stress that disclosure alignment is a useful tool that an 
organisation should embrace sincerely, particularly in the current environment of uncertainty 
(Fung, 2014), because it recognises that “organizational disclosure in and of itself is not 
sufficient unless organizations do so in ways that let their publics recognize, accept, and 
approve of, or take actions or make decisions in response to such demand” (p. 250). This 
conceptual distinction has given rise to the notion of ‘institutional plausibility alignment’, 
which is defined as an attempt by an organisation to adapt their language to the expectations 
of their stakeholders in a sense of becoming legitimate in the eyes of their stakeholders (Carroll 
& Einwiller, 2014). In the context of sustainability reporting, organisational disclosure is a 
powerful tool (Dingwerth & Eichinger, 2010) that affords an organisation the opportunity to 
shape the general perceptions of their stakeholders and, essentially, the general public (Carroll 
and Einwiller, 2014) because disclosure is a means to consciously change transparency 
(DeTienne & Lewis, 2005).  
 
But, Carroll and Einwiller (2014) also note, even if disclosure increases, it does not necessarily 
mean that transparency will increase. This can be reinforced with the earlier argument made 
by Rawlings (2008, p.74), where he notes that “disclosure, alone, can defeat the purpose of 
transparency. It can obfuscate, rather than enlighten.” For instance, by linking the concept of 
transparency to disclosure, transparency will only be meaningful to stakeholders when it 
enhances their understanding of organisational practices, rather than increasing the flow of 
disclosures in itself (Wall, 1996). Nevertheless, a wide consensus among academic scholars 
has illustrated that disclosure is indeed beneficial to organisations (Carroll & Einwiller, 2014; 
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DeTienne & Lewis, 2005; Dingwerth & Eichinger, 2010; Kolk & Pinkse, 2010; Popa et al., 
2009; Rechberg & Syed, 2013) and, therefore, organisations that fail to at least provide 
comprehensive disclosures toward operational accountability will be penalised accordingly by 
their influential non-financial stakeholders (Dhanani & Connolly, 2015). 
2.4.4 Sustainability Disclosure 
2.4.4.1 Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory is considered the most useful theory in explaining an organisation’s 
sustainability disclosure behaviour (Spence, Husillos, & Correa-Ruiz, 2010). As previously 
stated, the traditional concept of external corporate social responsibility (see Freidman, 1971) 
departed from the initial concept of “shareholders” to emphasise “stakeholders” (Ramanthan, 
1976; Estes, 1976; Freeman, 1984). Freeman (1976) explains stakeholder theory as 
organisations have social obligations to many individuals and groups who both affect and/or 
are affected by the organisation in the society in which they operate. These include shareholders, 
customers, local communities, government, and employees, among others (Roca & Scracy, 
2012). It appears that compliance with the norms of certain stakeholders enables organisations 
to preserve their “license to operate” (Kolk & Pinkse, 2010, p. 17) and receive continuous 
support from the society in which they operate (Clarkson et al., 2008, 2011).  
 
Past literature asserts organisations’ decisions to engage in sustainability reporting are largely 
influenced by external pressure from stakeholders (Perrini & Tencati, 2006). And one way that 
organisations can engage with stakeholders is to undertake sustainability reporting (Buhr, 
2010). Arguably, it is evident that the more salient the stakeholder to an organisation (Mitchell, 
Agle, & Wood, 1997), the greater the effort management of the organisation to meet the 
expectations and demands of those stakeholders (Deegan & Unerman, 2006). For instance, 
from the managerial standpoint of stakeholder theory, managers may put in place short-term 
policies that are favourable to shareholders, but which are detrimental to other stakeholder 
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groups (Charreaux & Desbrières, 2001). Whereas, some organisations could be coerced to 
adopt reporting practices that achieve specific desired outcomes, such as undertaking 
sustainability reporting that meets the “expectations and demands of its powerful stakeholder 
(while possibly ignoring the expectations of less powerful stakeholders) “ (Deegan, 2009, p. 
360). 
2.4.4.2 Legitimacy Theory 
One of the few key papers that establishes the development of legitimacy theory is Meyer & 
Rowan (1977). The paper argues, in modern societies, organisations are situated in a highly 
institutionalised context and, therefore, organisations do not necessarily make their 
organisational structures more efficient in terms of task-performing functions, rather 
organisations align the structures with their institutional contexts. Suchman (1995) defines 
legitimacy as: 
“a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, 
or appropriate with some socially constructed systems of norms, values beliefs, and 
definitions” (p. 574). 
 
As organisations attempt to become institutionalised in the social contexts in which they 
operate, they will deliberately try to mould their behaviours that are deemed socially acceptable 
in the eyes of a wider spectrum of stakeholders, thereby leading them to adopt rules and 
structures that enhance their legitimacy (Deephouse, 1996; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). By 
doing so, organisations are compensated “through increased legitimacy, resources, and survival 
capabilities” (Scott, 1987, p.498). Using a perspective framed by legitimacy theory, 
environmental and social disclosure can be an effective mechanism for organisations to shape 
the general perceptions of their stakeholders and, essentially, the general public (Carroll & 
Einwiller, 2014). For instance, organisations undertake sustainability reporting for strategic 
legitimacy reasons in order to gain and maintain their legitimacy (Higgins et al., 2015), and 
seek to repair it when their legitimacy is threatened (Tilling & Tilt, 2010). Hence, sustainability 
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reporting can sometimes be viewed as part of an organisation’s overall strategy that gains, 
maintains and repairs their legitimacy (O’Donovan, 2002). To illustrate, low-environmental 
impact organisations may pursue a sustainability-related strategy that is more stakeholder-
oriented, while high-environmental impact organisations with a high public visibility pursue 
such a strategy that is more sustainability/value-oriented for strategic legitimacy reasons 
(Higgins et al., 2018). Since different organisations experience different expectations from 
society, they may find it necessary to report specific performance indicators in order to be 
perceived as legitimate (Roca & Searcy, 2012). 
2.4.4.3 Institutional Theory  
Beyond stakeholder and legitimacy theories, institutional theory also explains an organisation’s 
sustainability reporting practice (Bebbington et al., 2009; Campbell, 2007; Higgins et al., 2018; 
Rahaman, Lawrence, & Roper, 2004). Carpenter & Feroz (2001) view institutional theory as:  
 “operating within a social framework of norms, values, and taken-for-granted assumptions 
about what constitutes appropriate or acceptable economic behaviour” (p. 565). 
 
Of significance, institutional theory views “the social world as significantly comprised of 
institutions - enduring rules, practices, and structures that set conditions on actions” (Lawrence 
& Shadnam, 2008, p. 2289). More specifically, Bell (2002, p. 1) suggests “it is best not to think 
an institution as a “thing’ but as a process or set of processes which shape behaviour”. This 
conceptual notion is significant in terms of explaining the social world, the world we 
collectively live in, because it is built into the social order, and directs the flow of social life. 
As organisations continue to experience institutional pressures, organisations are forced to 
adopt rules and structures that are deemed legitimately acceptable in the social contexts in 
which they operate (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Deephouse, 1996), and in return, they are 
rewarded with increased legitimacy, resources and, most importantly, survival capabilities 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1987; Suchman, 1995). 
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Given the weight of institutional pressures faced by organisations on multiple fronts, 
organisations are subconsciously forced to become isomorphic within their social contexts 
whereby organisations in similar positions in a similar field experience similar pressures and, 
consequently, they have a greater tendency to adopt similar rules and structures that reflect 
managers’ taken-for-granted beliefs (Heugens & Lander, 2009). Isomorphism explains the 
pressure underlying the tendency of organisations to become more homogeneous in structures 
regardless of different operating technologies (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). DiMaggio & Powell (1983) identify three types of forces toward isomorphism: these 
include: coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism and normative isomorphism. Each of 
these pressures is of significant importance in and of themselves, but when they are explained 
collectively, it can be used to explain various implications of how and why the changes in an 
organisation’s sustainability reporting practice might occur (de Villiers, Low, & Samkin, 2014). 
Each of these pressures is discussed and elaborated below in detail. 
2.4.4.3.1 Coercive Pillar 
Coercive pressure is understood to have regulative characteristics (such as rules, regulations, 
laws, and conditions of membership) that exert coercive pressure, and consequently, influence 
organisational behaviour because of the potential for reward and punishment (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). This pressure usually results from formal or informal pressures exerted on 
organisations by its influential stakeholders, which include shareholders, customers, local 
communities, government, employees, and the cultural expectations of the society in which 
they operate (Dillard, Rigsby, & Goodman, 2004; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1987). 
Cleary, this pressure is, somewhat, overlapped with legitimacy theory (Larrinaga, 2007). For 
example, to gain and maintain legitimacy, organisations may adopt new pollution control 
schemes in response to increased environmental regulations (Wangombe, 2013). 
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On the contrary, isomorphism can also be used to manage organisations’ powerful or critical 
stakeholders (upon whom an organisation is dependent), and therefore organisations could be 
coerced to adopt sustainability reporting in order to meet the “expectations and demands of its 
powerful stakeholder (while possibly ignoring the expectations of less powerful stakeholders) 
“ (Deegan, 2009, p. 360). It is evident that the process of coercive isomorphism may be 
associated with the managerial standpoint of stakeholder theory, which states that the more 
salient the stakeholder to an organisation (Mitchell et al., 1997), the greater the effort, 
management of the organisation to meet the expectations and demands of those stakeholders 
(Deegan, 2009). 
2.4.4.3.2 Normative Pillar 
Normative pressure influences values (when an organisation believes there are desirable things 
to do, or believes there to be socially acceptable things to pursue) and norms (when an 
organisation believes in desirable ways of acting, and being) (Bebbington et al., 2009). 
Characteristically, organisations have a tendency to pursue various ends and do so because of 
the expectations and demands from the society in which they operate. Normative isomorphism 
is often explained through common values to adopt particular institutional practices through 
social interactions and socialisation between professionals and senior managers (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). This process commonly takes place when organisations adopt values and norms 
that derive from the professionalization of a field and common background experiences, such 
as education from universities or professional bodies with similar ideals, goals, and programs 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Mizruchi & Fein, 1999; Suddaby & Viale, 2011). For instance, in 
the context of sustainability disclosure, organisations are likely to prepare their sustainability 
reports in accordance with professional sustainability disclosure guidance, such as the GRI 
guidelines, because they take-for-granted that this is the “right thing to do” (de Villiers et al., 
2014). 
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2.4.4.3.3 Mimetic Pillar  
On the other hand, mimetic isomorphism is characterised how one organisation may attempt 
to imitate and/or emulate another organisation’s behaviour. This ideal is situated on a 
presumption that such imitation may help one organisation to achieve a competitive advantage 
and/or legitimacy in the society in which they operate (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). It appears 
uncertainty is one of the contributing factors that encourages one organisation to imitate or 
emulate another (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Cyert & March (1963 cited in DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983) suggest that imitating another’s behaviours or practices may be an affordable 
response when organisations are confronted with problems without definite solutions. Whereas 
some organisations may imitate and/or emulate another organisation’s behaviour because it is 
a strategic response (Oliver, 1991), and “organisations which failed (at a minimum) to follow 
innovative practices and procedures adopted by other organisation in [the] same sector would 
risk losing legitimacy in relation to the rest of the sector” (Unerman & Bennett, 2004, p. 692).  
 
In the context of sustainability disclosure, DiMaggio & Powell (1983) further argue an 
organisation that is accountable to a broad spectrum of stakeholders, the stronger the pressure 
felt by the organization to provide the programs and services offered by other 
organizations…thus…encourage mimetic isomorphism” (p. 152). As illustrated in the 
literature by de Villiers et al. (2014), high-environmental impact organisations, such as mining 
organisations, are more likely to imitate the example of a large and profitable organisation, 
such as BHP Billiton, because the organisation is identified and benchmarked as the best 
practice. Nonetheless, mimetic isomorphism is described in accordance with past literature to 
be the most “subtle”, “complex”, and also “the most difficult to detect” (Hoffman, 1999, cited 
in Bebbington et al., 2009). Since “activities are enacted in relatively taken-for-granted ways, 
and for reason that may not be fully articulated” (Bebbington et al., 2009, p. 594). Hence, to 
gain and maintain legitimacy, organisations may imitate and/or emulate another organisation’s 
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behaviour because they are confronted with problems without definite solutions, while some 
may imitate or emulate as a strategic response. 
2.4.4.3.4 Decoupling  
While the key tenet of institutional theory is institutional isomorphism, another element that 
cannot be ignored is ‘decoupling’. This concept narrates to the separation between the external 
image of an organisation and its actual structures, procedures, and practices. According to 
(Moll, Burns, & Major, 2006), this separation, whether it’s an intentional and/or an 
unintentional action of an organisation, is referred to as decoupling. This conceptual distinction 
is defined as “the situation in which the formal organisational structure or practice is separate 
and distinct from actual practice” (Dillard et al., 2004, p. 510).  
 
To resonate the concept of decoupling with sustainability reporting, Deegan (2009) asserts: 
“decoupling can be linked to some of the insights from legitimacy theory, whereby social 
and environmental disclosures can be used to construct an organisational image that might 
be very different from the actual organisational social and environmental performance. 
Thus, the organisational image constructed through corporate reports might be one of 
social and environmental responsibility when the actual managerial imperative is 
maximisation of profitability or shareholder value” (p. 364).  
 
Consequently, due to institutional pressures faced by organisations, the organisations are 
forced to become isomorphic within their social contexts because it affords their legitimacy, 
financial resources, survival capabilities. To do so they may or may not seek to produce a 
genuine transparent organisational image. 
2.5 Summary and Conclusions  
This chapter has provided an overview of several theoretical perspectives. From conducting 
this literature review, it is clear that social and environmental accounting scholars may have 
found a variety of motives for why organisations undertake sustainability reporting (Milne & 
Patten; 2002; Scott & Christensen, 1995; Ball, 2005, 2007; Gray et al., 1996; Higgins et al., 
2015; Autry & Golicic 2010; Fombrun, 2005; Lougee and Wallace 2008) or remain non-
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reporters (Stubbs et al., 2013; Wright et al., 2016; Bebbington et al., 2009; Adams, 2002; Fifka, 
2011; Martin & Hadley, 2008; Mitchell & Hill, 2009). A recent study indicates that national 
governments and stock exchange authorities also play crucial roles in coercing the uptake of 
sustainability reporting (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2017). 
 
The research on the relationship between corporate governance and sustainability reporting is 
still relatively new and underexplored (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). The agenda of sustainability 
reporting has already become an extension of corporate governance (Elkington, 2006), and the 
reporting has certainly become an integral constituent of an organisation’s corporate 
governance structure (Chan, Watson, & Woodliff, 2014; Sharif & Rashid, 2014). Past literature 
indicated strong corporate governance offers the foundations of sustainability reporting 
practices, this creates value-enhancing relationships with different stakeholders (Welford, 
2007), and therefore is a pivotal element in promoting excellence in reporting at the 
organisational level (Shahin & Zairi, 2007). By connecting the concept of corporate 
governance with transparency and disclosure, good governance can result in higher levels of 
transparency and sustainability disclosure (Kolk & Pinkse, 2010), and potentially improve 
organisational financial performance (Chi, 2009).  
 
Given the NZX’s recommendation for ESG reporting is enacted on a ‘comply or explain’ basis, 
future research on the effectiveness of the ’comply or explain’ model is therefore needed, 
especially in New Zealand context to understand its potential to encourage and improve 
transparency sustainability reporting. More specifically, what is the likelihood of the proposed 
updates to the NZX Code further inducing the uptake of sustainability reporting among New 
Zealand’s listed organisations and how might this change their disclosure practices?  
  






This chapter will present details on the mixed methods approach that was used in this study 
and is structured as follows. First, it provides a brief overview of data sources, and subsequently, 
the process of identifying the research participants for semi-structured interviews. Next the 
process of data collection is presented, which includes quantitative content analysis and 
qualitative semi-structured interviews. The final section describes how the research findings 
are analysed with accordance with prior literature. 
3.2 Research Methodology 
A recent study indicates various accounting scholars have started to embrace the use of mixed 
methods research (Birchall, Murphy, & Milne, 2016). Mixed methods provide researchers with 
additional benefits as well as greatly enhancing their research findings, especially in the social 
accounting literature (Brown & Brignall, 2007). Every research method, however, will always 
be exposed to some form of limitations and, therefore, the usefulness of a mixed methods 
approach has also been criticised (Ahrens, 2008; Bryman, 2007; Kakkuri-Knuuttila, Lukka, & 
Kuorikoski, 2008; Parker, 2012; Parker & Northcott, 2016). The primary criticism lies in the 
proposition of “incommensurability”, which is defined as an attempt to unify two different 
viewpoints, quantitative and qualitative, as one, a view which is thought to be impossible to 
pursue (Birchall et al., 2016). Despite a wide range of criticisms, the application of both 
methodologies, quantitative and qualitative perspectives, can (still) present to a researcher 
“assessable statistical results as well as in-depth contextually grounded understanding of 
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underlying process and relationship” (Birchall et al., 2016, p. 1352). By utilising a mixed 
methods approach (quantitative content analysis and qualitative semi-structured interviews) as 
prescribed in the study of Birchall et al. (2016), this research study was able to provide insights 
concerning the uptake of sustainability reporting in New Zealand and how the new proposed 
updates to the NZX Code may or may not induce some of the largest listed organisations to 
undertake sustainability reporting or further improve it. Overall, mixed methods are 
appropriate because they eliminate the issue of validity and reliability of data, and allows the 
trustworthiness of data for the research findings to be accurately drawn (Birchall et al., 2016).  
3.3 Data Sources  
3.3.1 Organisations’ Annual Reports, Sustainability Reports and Websites  
Nowadays, a large proportion of organisations elect to disclose their non-financial information 
(including the information on sustainability reporting) in a different format or somewhere 
outside of their annual reports. To ensure extensive data collection, all sources of information 
must be taken into account and thereafter, a comprehensive view should become known of 
‘who is doing reporting’, ‘where their reporting is occurring’ and ‘who is not reporting at all’. 
 
The material often used to analyse the content of an organisation’s sustainability performance 
is the organisation’s annual report because the organisation commonly signals what they 
perceive as important through the reporting mechanism (Alnajjar, 2000; Gray et al., 1996; 
Guthrie & Abeysekera, 2006). Commonly, annual reports are perceived as the main source of 
financial and non-financial information for institutional investors, individual investors, 
environmental groups and/or governmental regulators ( de Villiers & van Staden, 2012; Epstein 
& Freedman, 1994; Higgins et al., 2018; Hutchins, 1994; Patten, 1992).  
 
More recently, the use of supplementary sources rather than organisations’ annual reports, such 
as the organisation website (Chong et al., 2016; Tagesson, Blank, Broberg, & Collin, 2009) 
and/or a stand-alone sustainability report, has been found to enhance the empirical evidence 
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obtained, and provide a better understanding of organisations’ sustainability practices (Guthrie 
& Abeysekera, 2006; Legendre & Coderre, 2013). Thus, this research is not just limited to 
organisations’ annual reports and/or any type of sustainability reports because validity of the 
research findings may be at risk. 
 
In this research study, the sources of information predominantly came from three main sources. 
First, the most recent set of organisations’ annual reports including financial, and all types of 
sustainability reports issued on the fiscal year between 2015 and 2016. This research prioritised 
the most recent organisations’ sustainability-related information released, which was 2016. 
However, if the information was not available or nowhere to be found, the information from 
the fiscal year of 2015 would be used instead. Second, many organisations’ sustainability-
related information is now easily assessable through their websites and it came under different 
titles or subtitles, such as strategies, environment, sustainability, society, community, 
employees, etc.; which may or may not be included in organisations’ annual reports. Hence, 
all of the aforementioned information was taken into account for this research study. 
3.3.2 Semi-Structured Interviews 
Aside from the document analysis, this research also employed semi-structured interviews. The 
primary motive of qualitative semi-structured interviews was to complement the quantitative 
findings. A semi-structured approach was chosen because of its flexibility (Bryman & Bell, 
2011), whereby it encourages for a free flow of conversation where interviewees are able to 
speak freely without specific boundaries and/or restrictions (Farneti & Guthrie, 2009). Most 
importantly, it provides a researcher with rich (Birn & Hague, 2000) and comprehensive 
(Creswell, 2013) data, and equips a researcher with lenses to explore new and emerging themes 
that may arise during an interview process. Ultimately, the interviews allowed for valuable 
insights and understanding (Birn & Hague, 2000) into how the revised NZX Code may or may 
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not induce some of the largest New Zealand’s listed organisations to undertake sustainability 
reporting or further improve it.  
 
The study prioritised and invited interviewees who at least hold a senior management position 
in each of the sampled organisations to participate in face-to-face interviews, specifically those 
directly responsible for the design and implementation of sustainability reporting programs, 
such as a ‘sustainability manager’, ‘environmental manager’ or someone from ‘investor 
relations’, within their respective organisations (Duarte, 2010; Higgins et al., 2015; Stubbs et 
al., 2013). Engaging with managers enhanced understandings of the nature of sustainability 
reporting, and the rationale behind it. In an attempt to locate a specific person who was 
responsible for the design and implementation of sustainability reporting in each sampled 
organisation, the researcher used publicly available information sources to find contact details, 
such as the annual reports or sustainability report itself, and/or a section of the organisation’s 
website. The researcher fully acknowledged that there were limitations in selecting an 
interviewee; while the aim was to speak with the sustainability manager and/or the person who 
was responsible for sustainability reporting, it was fairly difficult to identify the appropriate 
person (Stubbs et al., 2013). Thus, it was critical to be wise and circumspect in selecting an 
interviewee.  
 
In addition to a thoughtful process in selecting an interviewee, skill and care was also crucial 
during the collection of the qualitative data. To ensure that the derived data was academically 
sound and trustworthy (Broadbent & Unerman, 2011), the interviews were electronically 
recorded and professionally transcribed for the interviewees to verify (Lodhia, 2017). This 
greatly enhanced the credibility of the qualitative data and most importantly, provided “an 
authentic and plausible account of the phenomenon that is studied” (Parker, 2012; Parker & 
Northcott, 2016, cited in Lodhia, 2017, p. 6). 
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3.4 Sample Selection and Strategy  
The sample of this study consisted of all of the listed organisations within the New Zealand 
Stock Exchange, as at 31st December 2016. The data was retrieved from the Orbis’s database. 
The sample consists the total of 133 listed organisations. Based on this analysis, this 
investigation is able to confirm that the vast majority of New Zealand listed organisations do 
not actively engage in sustainability reporting, and do not attempt to meaningfully report their 
sustainability information. In Appendix 2, the Venn diagram comprises three distinct 
components, namely; sustainability report, website and annual report. As mentioned in the 
‘data sources’ section, organisations are now communicating their sustainability-related 
information outside of their traditional annual reports as it enables organisations to reach wider 
audiences, such as its influential stakeholders, but not limited to websites or standalone reports. 
Because of the various reporting mechanisms used by organisations, this study incorporated all 
of these data sources into account to warrant the credibility and validity of findings. 
 
To identify non-reporting organisations, a non-reporter would be an organisation who did not 
disclose any sustainability-related information in their annual report, nor produce a standalone 
report, and lastly, did not disclose any sustainability information on their website, while 
reporting organisations would be organisations who satisfied any one of the three criteria as 
mentioned previously. In terms of disclosure of sustainability-related information in an annual 
report, this study introduced the following criteria: a generous measure and a rigorous measure, 
to test if there was a significant difference in a number of reporting organisations. A generous 
measure was used when an organisation disclosed one or more pages of sustainability-related 
information in their annual report, whereas three consecutive or more pages constituted the 
rigorous measure. The investigation suggested that there was only a minimal difference 
between the two measures. For this reason, the rigorous measure was chosen for the 
identification of non-reporting organisations (see Appendix 2.1). The Venn diagram of a 
generous measure is displayed in Appendix 2.2. 
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To ensure the richness of data, the researcher decided to completely eliminate every 
organisation in the categories of ‘BOTTOM 100’ and ‘TOP 100 UNDER 50’, or the last 83 
organisations (from 51 to 133) from the sample. This rationale is situated on two premises. 
First, large organisations are more likely to be good reporters in respect to sustainability 
reporting (Kolk, 2003; KPMG, 2008, 2011, 2013, 2017; Patten, 1992; Vuontisjärvi, 2006). And 
second, large organisations are constantly subjected to greater public scrutiny from the society 
in which they operate, as well as pressure from its influential stakeholders, such as the 
government, other organisations, and the cultural expectations, to be socially and 
environmentally responsible for their activities (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Dillard et al., 
2004).  
 
As for the interview sample strategy, a total of 30 organisations from the ‘TOP 50’ were 
selected for the interviews (the sample). The sampled organisations could be partitioned into 
the two distinct groups: Group 1-reporters and Group 2-non-reporters. For Group 1, reporters, 
a random number generator from https://www.randomizer.org/ was employed to select the 
research sample. As for the second group, Group 2, non-reporters, the same strategy as in 
Group 1 was used to select the sample for this group. The list of sampled organisations can be 
seen in detail in Table 1 and Table 2 below. 
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Table 1: The list of sampled organisations in Group 1 - Reporters 
Organisation Name 




Fonterra Co-Operative Group Limited 9,119 0 
Fletcher Building Limited 5,942 0 
Contact Energy Limited 3,706 1 
Vector Limited 3,276 0 
Sky City Entertainment Group Limited 3,009 0 
Z Energy Limited 2,700 0 
Port Of Tauranga Limited 2,654 0 
Air New Zealand Limited 2,352 0 
Genesis Energy Limited 2,140 0 
New Zealand Refining Co Limited 1,157 0 
Sanford Limited 599 1 
Scales Corporation Limited 468 0 
T&G Global Limited 252 0 
Opus International Consultants Limited 188 0 
NZME Limited 116 0 
 
Table 2: The list of sampled organisations in Group 2 - Non-reporters 
Organisation Name 




Ryman Healthcare Limited 4,175 0 
Infratil Limited 1,844 0 
Chorus Limited 1,691 0 
A2 Milk Company Limited 1,324 0 
Freightways Limited 1,001 0 
Delegat Group Limited 617 0 
Synlait Milk Limited 501 0 
CBL Corporation Limited 483 0 
Comvita Limited 472 0 
Green Cross Health Limited 355 0 
Briscoe Group Limited 292 0 
Colonial Motor Company Limited 203 0 
Steel and Tube Holdings Limited 168 0 
Tower Limited 156 0 
Hallenstein Glasson Holdings Limited 155 0 
 
To conclude, 30 sampled organisations were selected for this research study, and were divided 
evenly between two distinct groups. 
3.4.1 Initial responses 
Initially, the main objective of this research was to invite 30 randomly selected organisations 
from the ‘TOP 50’ (the sample), among two distinct groups (Reporters and Non-reporters), to 
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participate in interviews. Out of 30 sampled organisations that were initially invited to 
participate in this research: four organisations accepted, 10 organisations declined with reasons 
(including messages passed-on but never returned), and 16 organisations did not respond to the 
invitation to participate in this research. Given the acceptance rate was only just 13.33%, to 
ensure validity and reliability of this research’s interview data was not jeopardised by a small 
sample size, the researcher then decided to take a reasonable step to extend the scope of 
research sample size to include every organisation within the ‘TOP 50’. To do this, 18 further 
invitation emails were sent out to the remaining organisations that were not originally included 
in the initial research sample. Out of 18 emails sent out, four organisations accepted, four 
organisations declined with reason (including messages passed-on but never returned) and ten 
organisations did not respond to the invitation to participate in this research. 
 
Graph 1: Total number of accepted, rejected and unresponded organisations to the 
invitation to participate in the research, which is expressed by reporters and non-reporters  
 
 
For organisations that declined to participate in this research, valuable insights can be gained 
by examining their logical reasons behind their rejections to not participate in the research. 
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organisation due to a fiscal year-end, straight rejections to participate in the research, 
confidentiality of information, and messages passed-on but never returned. Out of 15 
organisations that declined to participate in the research, nine organisations were non-reporting 
organisations, while the remaining organisations were reporting organisations, as summarised 
in Graph 1. Of those non-reporting organisations, unavailability of a suitable person appeared 
to be a popular choice of reasoning for why the organisations did not want to participate in the 
research. While at the same time, messages passed-on but never returned came second, and 
unavailability of the organisation came third. Based on the initial investigation of the current 
state of sustainability reporting by a researcher, it was clear that the lack of sustainability 
reporting among the listed organisations might have been a key driver behind the organisation’s 
decision to not participate in this research, for example they commented:  
“Thank you for your email but [we] respectfully declines to take part in your thesis.” (CBL 
Corporation Limited) 
 
“Sorry, we are unable to assist you in this regard.” (Freightways Limited) 
 
Although, one of the non-reporting organisations believed that their non-financial information 
was confidential, and it was something that they did not want to disclose to anyone outside 
their organisation, they commented: 
“The only information we have available is on our website as all other information remains 
confidential and not something we share with external parties.” (The A2 Milk Company 
limited) 
 
Moreover, one of the non-reporting organisations declined to participate because they were in 
the process of publishing their very first integrated report this year, suggesting that the NZX’s 
recommendation of ESG reporting, to some degree, might have a compelling effect on the 
organisation to take a reasonable step to engage in ESG reporting, they commented that:  
“[We] will be releasing our first integrated annual report this year. However, we are still 
working through what non-financial reporting we will be including in the report so we will 
have to pass on being involved with your project this year.” (Ryman Healthcare Limited) 
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A further observation included an organisation that is a foreign owned subsidiary that did not 
feel the same pressure as other NZ-listed organisations to comply. One of the reporting 
organisations declined to participate because they believed the changes to the NZX’s 
recommendation for ESG reporting would not have a detrimental impact on their organisation’s 
non-financial reporting. This is because the organisation is a foreign owned subsidiary, 
controlled by a German parent company and therefore, their stakeholders can always access 
the parent company’s website for the group sustainability report (T&G Global Limited). 
  
For organisations that agreed to partake in this research, they were relatively open and excited 
by the opportunity. To conclude, a total of eight organisations were then individually contacted, 
and scheduled for a meeting at arranged dates, with the interviews subsequently held in 
Christchurch, Wellington, and Auckland.  
3.4.2 Interview process  
The interview questions were focused on three different aspects; the first aspect focused on 
gathering background information about the interviewee, and the organisation. The second 
aspect focused on sustainability reporting, which focused on motivations and drivers of what 
might have inspired their organisation to undertake sustainability reporting, and barriers of 
what might have motivated organisations to not undertake sustainability reporting. And, the 
last aspect, which focused on the interviewee’s perception and attitude towards the current 
uptake of sustainability reporting among New Zealand’s listed organisations, and how much 
this might change their practices in the short-, medium- and long-term. 
 
To encourage a free flow of conversation, all names of interviewed participants and 
organisations were kept confidential. Table 3 presents the list of research participants, which 
displays the assigned code for each research participant, industry, industry risk (to align with 
past literature, the industry variation 1 was chosen) and position of interviewee. In a scenario 
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of the multiple interviewees, a numerical value would be assigned at the end of an identification 
code in brackets.  
Table 3: List of research participants 












High Risk Reporter Sustainability Co-ordinator 
C1(1) 
 
Consumer staples  
 
High Risk Reporter Director - Corporate Governance 
C1(2) 
 
Consumer staples  
 


































High Risk Non - Reporter General Manager - Responsible 
Management 
R1 Financial market 
regulator  
- - General Counsel; and Head of Policy 
and Legal 
 
3.5 Evidence Analysis 
3.5.1 Content analysis  
The first part of this study is based on a quantitative content analysis of the largest 50 
organisations listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange at 31st December 2016. The “top” 50 
(NZX50) is based on a size ranking of market capitalization. From the initial sample, two 
organisations were removed from the content analysis as one of the organisations had been 
delisted from the exchange, while another organisation was a Government Controlled 
Organisation and listed in the NZDX (NZX Debt Market). The finale sample for this content 
analysis comprised of 48 listed organisations. In order to gain an understanding and become 
familiar with the materials, all sources of information as mentioned in the “data sources” 
section must be thoroughly examined before any analysis could be undertaken. Hence, all 
 | P a g e  
 
68 
sources of information were carefully read in order to avoid any over and understatement of 
sampled organisations’ sustainability-related information.  
 
In the course of this content analysis, subjectivity was the main issue found during the data 
collection process and it was regarded as one of the major limitations in quantitative accounting 
research (Bryman & Bell, 2011). For instance, determining the extent to which disclosure 
requirements of each key performance indicator were covered by organisations’ sustainability 
reports and other supplementary data sources was not an easy task. Thus, a number of doubts 
did exist during this phase; however, the Sustainability Reporting Guidelines GRI G4 was 
applied to reduce these doubts. 
 
After all of the sampled organisations’ sustainability reports and other supplementary data 
sources were measured up against the constructed quantitative index (See Appendix 1), excel 
spreadsheet was then used to construct the exact aforementioned quality index, and document 
the presence and absence of key performance indicator items in accordance to the GRI 
guidelines G4 for all of the sampled organisations. An aggregated excel file for all sampled 
organisations was created and another copy was stored in ‘one drive’ as a back-up. For each 
sampled organisation, the presence and absence to each of the key performance indicators items, 
the corresponding evidence (statements, graphics, figures and extracted from three data sources) 
was cited in hand-written notes.  
4.5.1.1 Reliability checks  
For valid research findings to be drawn from the content analysis, a robust coding instrument 
must be constructed that will rigorously capture the content of sampled organisations’ 
sustainability-related information. To confirm this, the quality index template used in this study 
was constructed in accordance to the GRI guidelines G4. The use of GRI guidelines is 
appropriate because the latest KPMG Global CSR Survey figures, published in 2017, shows 
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75% of the G250 and 63% of the N100 have applied the GRI framework as part of their 
sustainability reporting practices. In addition, the GRI guidelines have been suggested, and 
prescribed within the revised NZX Code’s best practice commentary in relation to ESG 
reporting for New Zealand’s listed organisations to follow (NZX, 2017c). 
 
To ensure reliability, an independent coder was recruited. The independent coder’s task was to 
code six of the selected sampled organisations’ annual reports, but not limited to sustainability 
reports and websites. This was to ensure that the data was not jeopardised by a researcher’s 
subjectivity. In our first meeting, the researcher went through the quality index template (see 
Appendix 1) with the independent coder in detail. This step was crucial because it allowed the 
researcher to give a brief overview of the project and clarify any questions that the independent 
coder may have. Once all of the coder’s questions were clarified by the researcher, the coder 
was then instructed to independently code six selected organisations’ sustainability-related 
information before the second meeting. 
 
In our second meeting, the researcher started the session by examining the independent coder’s 
content analysis results, and the researcher found that the results were inconsistent when 
compared with the researcher’s results. For content analysis to be performed at a more 
consistent level, decision rules were developed by the researcher shortly after the second 
meeting (See Appendix 3). These decision rules were developed in light of poor levels of inter-
coder agreement. To ensure comparability of the content analysis results, the researcher and 
the coder came to an agreement to follow the decision rules and, recode the same six selected 
organisations’ annual and sustainability reports again before our next meeting. 
 
In our third and last meeting, the researcher started the session by comparing the independent 
coder’s results with the revised content analysis results and, surprisingly, the researcher found 
the levels of inter-coder agreement were much more aligned and consistent with the 
 | P a g e  
 
70 
researcher’s results. In fact, the levels of inter-coder agreement rose tremendously after the 
decision rules were taken into account, with the levels of agreement of the six sampled 
organisations being 92.31%, 97.80%, 94.51%, 96.70%, 87.91% and 83.51%. 80% or greater is 
suggested as an acceptable level of coder reliability (Hackston & Milne, 1996). 
 
Given the high levels of inter-coder reliability achieved, content analysis was then performed 
solely by the researcher using the quality index template and decision rules developed by the 
researcher during the pretesting process. As ranked by their market capitalisation, the full 
results of content analysis of the NZX50’s publicly available non-financial information, 
measured against the GRI G4 guidelines, for reporting and non-reporting organisations can be 
seen in detail in Appendix 4.1 and 4.2, respectively.  
3.5.2 Empirical Model - Hackston & Milne (1996) 
3.5.2.1 Dependent variable - GRI measures  
As alluded, this study aims to partially replicate and provide a 25 year update of the study of 
Hackston & Milne (1996). The quality index mainly focuses on the key performance indicators 
in relation with economic, environmental and social factors, and classifies each indicator into 
hard or soft disclosure items. In terms of GRI measures, this study used GRI G4 measures as 
dependent variables in the function of multivariate regression analysis.  
• TOTAL GRI % - total key performance indicators disclosed by each of the sampled 
organisations in two industries and expressed as % of total index, which is based on the GRI G4 
guidelines and past literature by Clarkson et al. (2011); 
• TOTAL HARD % - the total hard key performance indicators disclosed by each of the sampled 
organisations in two industries and expressed in %, which is based on the GRI G4 guidelines and 
past literature by Clarkson et al. (2011); 
• TOTAL SOFT % - the total soft key performance indicators disclosed by each of the sampled 
organisations in two industries and expressed in %, which is based on the GRI G4 guidelines and 
past literature by Clarkson et al. (2011); 
• TOTAL ENV % - the total environmental key performance indicators disclosed by each of the 
sampled organisations in two industries and expressed in %, which is based on the GRI G4 
guidelines and past literature by Clarkson et al. (2011); 
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• TOTAL ENV HARD % - the total hard environment key performance indicators disclosed each 
of the sampled organisations in two industries and expressed in %, which is based on the GRI 
G4 guidelines and past literature by Clarkson et al. (2011); 
• TOTAL ENV SOFT % - the total soft environment key performance indicators disclosed each 
of the sampled organisations in two industries and expressed in %, which is based on the GRI 
G4 guidelines and past literature by Clarkson et al. (2011); 
• TOTAL SOC % - the total social key performance indicators disclosed by each of the sampled 
organisations in two industries and expressed in %, which is based on the GRI G4 guidelines 
• TOTAL SOC HARD % - the total hard social key performance indicators disclosed by each of 
the sampled organisations in two industries and expressed in %, which is based on the GRI G4 
guidelines and past literature by Clarkson et al. (2011); and  
• TOTAL SOC SOFT % - the total soft social key performance indicators disclosed by each of 
the sampled organisations in two industries and expressed in %, which is based on the GRI G4 
guidelines and past literature by Clarkson et al. (2011).  
 
These measures are used to examine potential determinants of sustainability disclosure 
practices among New Zealand’s listed organisations and therefore, explain report quality (as 
per one of the GRI measures) when controlling for size, industry and profitability index. 
3.5.2.2 Independent variables - Size, Profitability Index and Industry  
The sustainability literature has identified that some variables, such as size, assurance, 
industries, assets, profitability and leverage, have an effect on the publication of sustainability 
reports ( Sierra, Zorio, & García‐Benau, 2013; Xiao, Yang, & Chow, 2004; Zorio, García‐
Benau, & Sierra, 2013) .  For this reason, firm size (as ranked by market capitalisation, sales 
and total assets), profitability (as measured by return on assets, average return on assets, return 
on equity and average return on equity) and industry background (a dummy variable) served 
as control variables in this multivariate analysis. These three variables are commonly 
acknowledged as contributing factors that influence the publication of the sustainability 
reports. 
3.5.2.2.1 Size  
Empirical evidence indicates that smaller organisations do not actively engage in socially 
responsible activities as much as larger organisations who have resources, and on which society 
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exerts higher pressure and expectations; although no confounding effect of firm size can be 
found using meta-analysis (Orlitzky, 2001; Wu, 2006). In spite of this, some researchers 
believe that size is still a significant factor in influencing the extensiveness of sustainability 
reports because larger organisations’ financial and non-financial information have larger 
pecuniary impacts to the market - due to broader users of such information (Cowen, Ferreri, & 
Parker, 1987; Jones, Frost, Loftus, & Laan, 2007).  
 
Past literature by Hackston & Milne (1996) suggests that size is significantly associated with 
the amount of disclosure, with the results further suggesting that the relationship between size 
and the amount of disclosure is more profound for high-profile industry than for low-profile 
industry. For this reason, firm size must be included as one of the control variables. SIZE is 
codified in accordance to the sample organisations’ market capitalisation as at 31st December 
2016.  
3.5.2.2.2 Profitability Index  
In the context of sustainability reporting, in a much earlier study by Bowman & Haire (1976), 
the profitability index variable may prove to have an influence on non-financial disclosures as 
managers are led to believe that engaging in such disclosures is necessary to make an 
organisation profitable and, therefore, survive in today’s business environment (Atkinson, 
2000; Aver, Aaver, & Cadez, 2009; Cowen et al., 1987). This is because, if managed properly, 
sustainability reporting permits managers to meet the expectations of their non-financial 
stakeholders, and potentially, lead to improved financial performance (Aver et al., 2009). For 
example, satisfied employees will be motivated to work harder, satisfied customers will be 
more willing to make repeat purchases, and satisfied communities will not obstruct an 
organisation’s operational activities (Galant & Cadez, 2017). 
 
To ensure the comparability of research findings, this study has utilised the same procedures 
employed by Hackston & Milne (1996) in identifying the variable for profitability measures. 
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Profitability measures are measured using the single - year accounting-based ROE (return on 
equity - EBIT/total Equity) and ROA (Return on assets - EBIT/total assets) (2016), as well as 
over the period of five-year averages (2012 - 2016). With reference to past literature, utilising 
ROE or ROA over an extended period is proven to provide a more reliable measure of 
organisational performance than a single year (Hackston & Milne, 1996). Hence, 
PROFITABILITY INDEX is codified in accordance to the sampled organisations’ single-year 
ROE and ROA (2016) together with the period of five-year averages (2012 - 2016), and 
expressed as a percentage. 
3.5.2.2.3 Industry  
Controlling for industry background is crucial in this study. Past literature suggests that 
industry specific information and characteristics can significantly influence the type of report 
produced as well as CSP (corporate sustainability performance) (Graves & Waddock, 1994; 
Griffin & Mahon, 1997; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Higgins et al., 2015; Moore, 2001; Ruf, 
Muralidhar, Brown, Janney, & Paul, 2001; Simpson & Kohers, 2002). Further, Hackston & 
Milne (1996) claim that the classification of industries is significantly associated with the 
amount of non-financial disclosures and therefore, this could alter the type of report produced 
by organisations in order to meet the needs of their direct and indirect stakeholders (Dyllick 
and Hockerts, 2002). 
 
To ensure comparability of research findings, this study follows the same techniques employed 
in the literature of Hackston & Milne (1996) for industry classification. Hackston & Milne 
(1996) categorise industries into high-profile and low-profile: high-profile industries include 
industries that are subjected to “consumer visibility, a high level of political risk, or 
concentrated intense competition” (Roberts, 1992, cited in Hackston & Milne, 1996, p. 87) 
(consider for example; petroleum chemical, forest and paper, automobile, airline, oil industries, 
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agriculture, liquor and tobacco, and media and communications), whereas low-profile 
industries are those industries which are opposite to high-profile industries.  
 
This study has also established an assumption that organisations that operate in high-profile 
industries are expected to produce more extensive disclosures in relation to any one of the GRI 
measures, in contrast to organisations within low profile-industries. Hence, Industry is included 
as one of the control variables. INDUSTRY is a dummy variable that takes the binary value of 
(1) and (0): (1) when sampled organisations operated in high-profile industries, and (0) for low-
profile industries.  
3.5.2.3 Analytical procedure  
To examine these relationships and ensure findings are comparable, the same statistical 
methods and tests used in the study of Hackston & Milne (1996) were replicated. A multivariate 
regression analysis has also been constructed to provide more detailed analysis if an industry 
type (or any other independent factors) is a statistically significant factor in explaining report 
quality (as per one of the GRI measures) when size and profitability index are controlled, and 
vice-versa. A statistical analysis software package - SPSS v15 - is then used for analysis. To 
investigate for the multiple effect of the independent variables on the percentage of GRI G4 
non-financial disclosures, the following regression models were computed to examine which 
independent variables were a significant factor in explaining report quality (as per one of the 
GRI measures).  
1) 𝑻𝑶𝑻𝑨𝑳 𝑮𝑹𝑰 % =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝜀1 
2) 𝑻𝑶𝑻𝑨𝑳 𝑯𝑨𝑹𝑫 % = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝜀1 
3) 𝑻𝑶𝑻𝑨𝑳 𝑺𝑶𝑭𝑻 % =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝜀1 
4) 𝑻𝑶𝑻𝑨𝑳 𝑬𝑪𝑶% = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +  𝛽3𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 +  𝜀1 
5) 𝑻𝑶𝑻𝑨𝑳 𝑬𝑪𝑶 𝑯𝑨𝑹𝑫 % = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝜀1 
6) 𝑻𝑶𝑻𝑨𝑳 𝑬𝑪𝑶 𝑺𝑶𝑭𝑻% = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝜀1 
7) 𝑻𝑶𝑻𝑨𝑳 𝑬𝑵𝑽 % = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +  𝛽3𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 +  𝜀1 
8) 𝑻𝑶𝑻𝑨𝑳 𝑬𝑵𝑽 𝑯𝑨𝑹𝑫 % = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝜀1 
9) 𝑻𝑶𝑻𝑨𝑳 𝑬𝑵𝑽 𝑺𝑶𝑭𝑻 % = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝜀1 
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10) 𝑻𝑶𝑻𝑨𝑳 𝑺𝑶𝑪 % = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝜀1 
11) 𝑻𝑶𝑻𝑨𝑳 𝑺𝑶𝑪 𝑯𝑨𝑹𝑫 % = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +  𝛽3𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 +  𝜀1 
12) 𝑻𝑶𝑻𝑨𝑳 𝑺𝑶𝑪 𝑺𝑶𝑭𝑻 % = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝜀1 
3.5.3 Semi-Structured Interviews  
The second part of this study is based on qualitative semi-structured interviews with sampled 
organisations within the NZX50. Since various themes appeared during the initial investigation 
of all the listed organisations within the NZX and, more specifically, the quantitative content 
analysis of the NZX50’s sustainability disclosures; a number of questions were contextualised 
from the patterns that emerged from the first part of this study and from existing sustainability 
reporting literature. These covered the following areas: 
• A description of sustainability-related reporting practices among sampled listed 
organisations within the NZX; 
 
• Exploring how the revised NZX Code will further induce the uptake of sustainability 
reporting, and what constitutes organisations to be ‘for or against’ the practice in New 
Zealand context; and 
 
• Examining managerial perceptions and attitudes of ‘reporting’ and ‘non-reporting’ 
organisations toward the revised NZX Code, especially the NZX’s recommendation 
for ESG reporting, and how might this change their practices in the short-, medium- 
and long-term goals.  
 
Soon after all the interview transcripts were verified by corresponding interviewees, the 
interview transcripts were then coded, via NVivo Pro - a qualitative research software package, 
for a qualitative analysis to draw out common emerging themes (Stubbs et al., 2013). To 
comprehend and interpret the narratives of all conducted semi-structured interviews, a coding 
system was developed for this research with an intention to draw out every key theme incurred 
during the interviews. The analysis of interview transcripts started with the coding procedure 
described by (O'Dwyer, 2004), and the process consisted of data reduction, data display and 
data interpretation. By utilising this analytical procedure, the interview transcripts were 
condensed from approximately 80,000 transcribed words from nine interviews to 30,000 words.  
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In the next phase, the coding procedure as prescribed in the study of Stubbs et al. (2013) was 
applied. The coding procedure consisted of creating a provision ‘start list’ of codes from 
existing sustainability reporting literature in order to find common incurring themes from the 
interview data. More specifically, Stubbs et al.’s (2013) researched into the motivations for 
why organisations do not undertake sustainability reporting, and Bansal & Roth (2000) 
researched into the motivations for why organisations undertake corporate greening behaviours. 
These were used to help identify codes to understand, to what extent, and how the revised NZX 
Code may or may not induce some of the largest organisations to undertake sustainability 
reporting or further improve it. 
 
The interview questions were also used as an interview guide to aid the findings and analysis 
in order to address the research questions. The emerging themes, an interpretation of 
participants’ perceptions and attitudes (Stubbs et al., 2013), were described narratively with 
participant responses (O’Dwyer, 2004). Ultimately, findings are the participants’ perspectives 
interpreted by the researcher seeking to explain: what constitutes the lack of sustainability 
reporting in New Zealand; how will the revised NZX Code induce the uptake of sustainability 
reporting among New Zealand’s listed organisations; and how might this change their practice 
in the short-, medium- and long-term goals. Given that every interviewed organisation is well 
established within their respective industry, the researcher fully acknowledged that these 
themes were derived from the limited sample of interview data and therefore, the derived 
themes may not do justice in representing the point of view of small- to medium-sized 
organisations together with larger non-reporting organisations. 
3.5.3.1 An Interview Guide 
Because the human brain is not designed to be a supercomputer, as a result our brains have a 
tendency to forget things and thus, forgetting has consciously become “a central feature of our 
lives” (Bannon, 2006, p. 6). Moreover, Bannon (2006) simply views forgetting as a normal 
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occurrence within the human brain, “the erasure of a specific memory, or the loss of the link 
to a memory location (an encoding or decoding problem) “ (p. 6). Hence, forgetting is regarded 
as an example of the fragility of the human mind, whereby our mind is incapable of retaining 
information forever. In order to overcome this impediment imposed on the human mind, this 
research used an interview guide as a blueprint to guide the researcher when conducting 
interviews. In terms of this conceptual notion, an interview guide, within the world of 
qualitative literacy research, is often referred to as “the brief list of memory prompts of areas 
to be covered…or questions to be asked in semi-structured interviewing” (Bryman and Bell, 
2011, p. 473).  
 
To prepare for an interview guide, the interview questions were largely contextualised from 
the patterns emerged from the initial investigation of the current uptake of sustainability 
reporting in New Zealand, the content analysis, and lastly, existing sustainability reporting 
literature. In order to achieve a comprehensive understanding, the majority of questions were 
consisted of various implications on ‘how, what and why’ the changes to the NZX Code might 
further induce the uptake of sustainability reporting among New Zealand’s listed organisations, 
and what is the likelihood of the revised NZX Code will actually make a difference their 
disclosure practices. See Appendix 5 for the interview guide.  
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3.6 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter discussed the rationale for why a mixed methods approach is appropriate to 
explore the research questions as mentioned in earlier chapters. Data collection was extensive 
and verifiable including an in-depth quantitative content analysis of the NZX50’s publicly 
available non-financial information measured against the GRI G4 Guidelines, and qualitative 
semi-structured interviews with sampled organisations in which the interview questions were 
contextualised from the patterns that emerged from the quantitative dataset and from existing 
sustainability reporting literature. Data analysis was then conducted using methods relevant to 
each dataset for data interpretation. This sets the scene for Chapter four and Chapter five which 
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Chapter Four  
Quantitative Results and Analysis  
4.1 Overview 
This chapter will unpack the first research question: “What is the current quantity and quality 
of non-financial disclosure among the largest 50 New Zealand listed organisations?” The 
chapter will provide a combination of quantitative and qualitative perspectives, to provide 
insights concerning of the current state of reporting. With quantitative statistical analysis, it 
examines plausible relationships between organisational characteristics and the percentage of 
GRI G4 non-financial disclosures. This partially replicates the study of Hackston & Milne 
(1996). 
4.2 Introduction  
As previously stated, the GRI G4 guidelines have four different sections. The first section looks 
at general disclosure guidance which examines disclosure items like the CEO statement, 
corporate profile and governance structure of a reporting organisation as well as its stakeholder 
engagement. The other three sections are divided into four different sets of performance 
indicators: economic, environmental, social and product responsibility performance. As for the 
performance indicators, the economic dimension of sustainability reporting, concerns the 
impact of an organisation’s financial performance. The economic performance indicators 
include economic supply chain performance of the organisation, market presence, community 
involvement, and indirect economic impacts. There are nine items in total in the guidelines 
ranging from EC1-EC9. The environmental dimension of sustainability concerns an 
organisation’s impacts on natural systems and its environmental performance. The 
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environmental indicators look at material, energy, water, emissions, waste and biodiversity 
aspects. There are 34 items in total in the guidelines ranging from EN1-EN34. The last section 
of the GRI guidelines, social performance indicators, are divided into four sections as follows; 
labour practice, human rights, society, and product responsibility aspects. There are 48 items 
in total in the guidelines ranging from LA1-LA16, HR1-HR12, SO1-SO11 and PR1-PR9. 
 
This research fully acknowledges that the use of the GRI guidelines to access the quality of 
reporting, let alone the level of transparency of disclosure, is not sufficient to distinguish 
quality of sustainability disclosure made by listed organisations (Clarkson et al., 2008; Milne 
& Gray, 2013). To overcome this concern raised by numerous researchers, this thesis has 
constructed a quality index based on Clarkson et al. (2008). They assert that it is feasible to 
distinguish quality of reporting by closely examining a ratio of hard to soft disclosure items by 
listed organisations’ sustainability information. Table 4 shows the overall number of hard and 









Graph 2 shows a snapshot of the current uptake of the NZX50’s sustainability disclosure 
behaviours in comparison to the total GRI G4 index. 
 
 
Table 4: Number of Hard and Soft Disclosures of the GRI G4 guidelines 
 GRI G4 
Hard Disclosure Items 75 
Soft Disclosure Items 16 
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Graph 2: The Current Uptake of Sustainability Reporting among New Zealand's listed organisations  
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T H E  C U R R E N T  U PT A K E  O F SU ST A I N A B I I T Y  R E PO R T I N G  B Y  N Z X 5 0
AS AT 3 1 ST O F  D E C E M B E R  2 0 1 6
Total Disclsoure
 | P a g e  
 
82 
4.2.1 The Most and Least Disclosed GRI items by the NZX50  
Further insights into the NZX50’s sustainability disclosure behaviours can be gained from 
examining the most and least disclosed items from the GRI guideline by focusing on the whole 
sample, and by examining the reporting behaviour on each section (e.g., economic, 
environmental, and social items). Table 5 presents the overall results, based on the content 
analysis of each listed organisation’s report, when the quality of disclosure standard is set at 
“rigorous” measure (in which only reasonable disclosure classification is taken into account). To 
complement this table, full results of the content analysis for reporting and non-reporting can be 
seen in detail in Appendix 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. A score of 48 for an item would indicate all 
48 organisations disclosed on the item to a level of rigorous measure. From the results presented 
in Table 5, no item comes anywhere near this score, except for issues in which social accounting 
scholars consider minimum staples “in a stakeholder reporting diet” (Chapman & Milne, 2003, 
p. 46): for example, economic performance (EC1), indirect economic impacts (EC7 and 8), local 
communities (SO1), employment (LA1 and 2), occupational health and safety (LA6), and 
diversity and equal opportunity (LA12). These eight disclosure items (top five hard disclosure 
items and top three soft disclosure items) were disclosed at what might be considered to be a 
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Table 5: The Most and Least Disclosed GRI Items 
Disclosure Indicator Hard Disclosure item Score 
Economic Performance G4-EC1 - Direct Economic Value generated  48 
Diversity and Equal 
Opportunity 
G4-LA12 - Composition of senior management and 
breakdown of employees (age/gender/ethnicity)  
40 
Local Communities 
G4-SO1 - Community engagement, impact assessment 
development programs and practices 
26 
Employment G4-LA1 - Workforce statistics  18 
Occupational Health and 
Safety 
G4-LA6 - Injuries, absentee rates and work-related fatalities 17 
Emissions G4-EN19 - GHG emission reduction initiatives  14 
Emissions G4-EN15 - Managing impacts of biodiversity 10 
Emissions G4-EN16 - Direct GHG emissions (Scope 1) 9 
Compliance  G4-EN29 - Fines for environmental non-compliance  9 
Energy G4-EN6 - Conservation of energy efficiency  8 
Economic Performance G4-EC2 - Financial implications of climate change 8 
Public Policy G4-SO6 - Contribution to political parties  7 
Economic Performance G4-EC3 - Coverage of pension obligations  7 
Economic Performance G4-EC4 - Financial assistance received from government 7 
Products and Services 
G4-EN27 - Initiatives at mitigate environmental impacts of 
P&Ss 
6 
Emissions G4-EN17 - Indirect GHG emissions (Scope 2) 6 
Effluents and Waste G4-EN23 - Non-processing waste disposal  6 
Energy G4-EN3 - direct energy consumption 5 
Training and Education 
G4-LA11 - % employee receiving regular performance and 
career development reviews, by gender and by employee 
category 
4 
Emissions G4-EN18 - Other indirect GHG emissions (Scope 3) 4 
Customer Privacy G4-PR8 - Customer privacy 4 
Customer Health and Safety 
G4-PR1 - % of significant product and service, which health 
and safety impacts are assessed  
4 
Customer Health and Safety G4-PR2 - Non - compliance with product safety regulations  4 
Training and Education G4-LA9 - Training hours by employee category  3 
Supplier Human Rights 
Assessment 
G4-HR10 - % of new suppliers that were screened using 
human rights criteria  
3 
Occupational Health and 
Safety 
G4-LA5 - Employees covered by collective bargaining 
agreements / trade union representation, and coverage of total 
workforce in health and safety committees  
3 
Compliance  
G4-PR9 - Monetary value of fines for non-compliance with 
laws and regulations concerning use of products and services  
3 
Water G4-EN8 - Water use  2 
Supplier Human Rights 
Assessment 










G4-EN33 - Negative environmental impacts in the supply 
chain and actions taken 
2 
Supplier Assessment for 
Impacts on Society 
G4-SO9 - % of new suppliers were screened using criteria for 
impacts on society  
2 
Expenditures  
G4-EN31 - Environmental protection expenditures and 
investments or environmental protection expenditures  
2 
Equal remuneration for 
Women and Men 
G4-LA13 - Ratio of basic salary of men to women by 
employee category  
2 
Energy G4-EN7 - Reduction in energy requirements of P&Ss 2 
Employment 
G4-LA3 - Return to work and retention rate after parental 
leave  
2 
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Effluents and Waste G4-EN22 - Water discharge  2 
Effluents and Waste 




G4-SO8 - Significant fines for non-compliance with laws and 
regulations 
2 
Water G4-EN9 - Water source affected by withdrawal of water 1 
Supplier Assessment for 
Labor Practices  
G4-LA14 - % of new suppliers that were screened using Labor 
practices criteria 
1 
Supplier Assessment for 
Impacts on Society 
G4-SO10 - Negative impacts on society in the supply chain 
and actions taken 
1 
Product and Service Labeling G4-PR4 - Non-compliance regarding product labelling  1 
Marketing Communications 
G4-PR7 - Non-compliance regarding marketing 
communications  
1 
Market Presence G4-EC5 - Ratio of entry level to minimum wages 1 
Local Communities G4-SO5 - Confirmed incidents of corruption, and actions taken 1 
Energy G4-EN5 - Energy intensity  1 
Effluents and Waste G4-EN25 - Total weight of transported waste 1 
Water G4-EN10 - % water conversion, reuse and recycle  0 
Transport 





G4-EN34 - Number of grievances about environmental 
impacts filed, addressed, and resolved through formal 
grievance mechanisms  
0 
Supplier Assessment for 
Labor Practices  
G4-LA15 - Negative Labor practices in the supply chain and 
actions taken 
0 
Products and Services G4-EN28 - % of recycled products and their packing materials 0 
Procurement Practices G4-EC9 - Payments to locally-based suppliers  0 
Non-discrimination G4-HR3 - Incidents of discrimination and actions taken  0 
Materials G4-EN1 - Materials used  0 
Materials G4-EN2 - % of used that are recycled inputs materials 0 
Marketing Communications G4-PR6 - Sale of banned or disputed products 0 
Market Presence G4-EC6 - Local hiring of senior management positions  0 
Local Communities 
G4-SO3 - Corruption analysis - proportion of business nits 
analysed for risks of corruption  
0 
Local Communities G4-SO4 - Anti-corruption training  0 
Labor Practices Grievance 
Mechanisms 
G4-LA16 - Number of grievances about Labor practices filed, 
addressed, and resolved through formal grievance 
mechanisms.  
0 
Investment  G4-HR1 - Human rights and investment agreement  0 
Indigenous Rights 
G4-HR8 - Total number of incidents of violating involving 
rights of indigenous people and actions taken  
0 
Human Rights Grievance 
mechanisms 
G4-HR12 - Number of grievances about human rights filed, 
addressed, and resolved through formal grievance mechanisms 
0 
Freedom of Association and 
Collective Bargaining 
G4-HR4 - freedom of association  0 
Forced and Compulsory 
Labor 
G4-HR6 - Forced labour  0 
Energy G4-EN4 - Indirect energy consumption  0 
Emissions G4-EN20 - Ozone-depleting substances by weight  0 
Emissions G4-EN21 - NOx, SOx and other airborne emissions by weight  0 
Effluents and Waste 
G4-EN26 - Significant environment impacts of water sources 
by waste discharges and spills  
0 
Child Labor G4-HR5 - Child labour  0 
Biodiversity G4-EN11 - land use in protected areas 0 
Assessment 
G4-HR9 - % and total number of operations that have been 
subject to human rights reviews 
0 
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Anti-Competitive Behaviour G4-SO7 - Legal actions for anti-competitive behaviour  0 
   
Disclosure Indicator Soft Disclosure item Score 
Indirect Economic Impacts G4-EC8 - Indirect economic impacts  43 
Employment G4-LA2 - Benefits provided to full-time employees 27 
Indirect Economic Impacts G4-EC7 - Infrastructure development  18 
Product and Service Labeling G4-PR5 - Customer satisfaction 14 
Training and Education 
G4-LA10 - Programs for skills management and lifelong 
learning that support the employability of employees and assist 
them in managing career endings 
11 
Product and Service Labeling G4-PR3 - Principles and measures related to product labelling 7 
Biodiversity G4-EN12 - Areas significantly impacted by biodiversity  3 
Biodiversity G4-EN13 - Protection and restoration of habitats 3 
Biodiversity G4-EN14 - IUCN red listed species  1 
Labor/Management Relations 
G4-LA4 - Minimum notice periods regarding operational 
changes  
1 
Occupational Health and 
Safety 
G4-LA7 - Workers with high incidence or high-risk of 
diseases related to their occupation 
1 
Occupational Health and 
Safety 
G4-LA8 - Trade unions and safety and health 1 
Local Communities 
G4-SO2 - Operations and associated communities with 
significant potential or actual negative impacts  
1 
Investment  
G4-HR2 - Employee training concerning aspects of human 
rights  
0 
Security Practices G4-HR7 - Security personnel and human rights training  0 
Grievance Mechanisms for 
Impacts on Society 
G4-SO11 - Number of grievances about impacts on society 






EC1 - EC9 Economic Performance Indicators  
EN1 - EN34 Environmental Performance Indicators 
 Social Performance Indicators  
LA1 - LA16  Labour Practice Performance Indicators 
HR1 - HR12  Human Rights Performance Indicators 
SO1 - SO11  Society Performance Indicators  
PR1 - PR9  Product Responsibility Performance Indicators  
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Table 5 further reveals that the general level of disclosure is not extensive. By narrowly focussing 
on other aspects within the GRI guidelines, the fact is that less than one fifth of the organisations 
sampled could provide specific disclosures about environmental aspects - such as, energy (EN3, 
6, and 7), water (EN8 and 9), emissions (EN15, 16, 17, and 18), biodiversity (EN12, 13, and 14), 
effluents and waste (EN22, 24, and 25), and compliance (EN29) - and social aspects - such as, 
training and education (LA11), equal remuneration for women and men (LA13), local 
communities (SO2 and 5), product responsibility dimensions (PR1-4, and 7), and issues 
concerning suppliers assessments (EN32; LA14 and 15; HR10 and 11; and SO9 and10) and 
grievances (EN33, LA16, HR12, and SO11). More specifically, almost no organisations could 
provide detailed disclosure items in respect to human rights (HR1-12), society (SO3, 4, and 7) 
nor some of the detailed environmental disclosure items - such as materials (EN1 and 2), effluents 
and waste (EN26), emissions (EN20 and 21) and biodiversity (EN11). Evidently, the results 
suggested that many of the sustainability issues prescribed within the GRI guidelines were largely 
not reported; or discussed, targeted, measured and managed by the vast majority of the NZX50.  
4.2.2 The Most and Least Disclosed GRI items by themes  
Individual section analysis shows that the majority of disclosure items disclosed by most 
organisations come from the GRI’s “economic” indicators. At least one third of the organisations 
disclosed economic performance indicators related to economic performance (EC1) and indirect 
economic impacts (EC7 and 8), whereas less than one fifth of the organisations could provide 
more specific environmental performance indictors related to financial implications of climate 
change (EC2), coverage of pension obligations (EC3), and financial assistance from government 
(EC4). The issues related to local hiring of senior management positions (EC6) and payments to 
locally-based suppliers (EC9) also did not get reported by organisations. 
 
Disclosure on the GRI’s “environmental” performance indicators section is patchy. At least one 
fifth of the organisations could provide detailed environmental performance indicators related to 
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management of biodiversity impacts (EN15) and GHG emissions reductions initiatives (EN19). 
But less than one fifth of the organisations could provide more specific environmental disclosure 
in relation to energy (EN3, and 5-7), water (EN8-10), biodiversity (EN12-15), emissions (EN16-
20), effluents and waste (EN22-25), products and services (EN27 and 28), environmental 
protection expenditures (EN31), and supplier environmental assessment (EN32 and 33). The rest 
of environmental performance indicators did not at all mention by any listed organisations. 
 
Disclosure on the GRI’s “social” performance indicators section is also patchy. As regards the 
GRI’s “Labour practice” performance indicators, at least one quarter of the organisations could 
provide what are perceived to be generic performance indicators, include workforce statistics 
(LA1), benefits provided to full-time employees (LA2), health and safety statistics (LA6), 
training and education for management and employees (LA10), and composition of senior 
management (LA12). In contrast, less than one tenth of the organisations could provide 
disclosure of what is considered to be topical in relation to labour practices, which include issues 
related to retention rate after parental leave (LA3), minimum notice periods regarding operation 
changes (LA4), workers with high-risk of disease to their occupation (LA7), trade unions for 
health and safety (LA8), training hours by employee category (LA9), ratio of basic salary of men 
and women by employee category (LA13), and supplier assessment for labor practices (LA15).  
 
Almost no organisations could provide detailed disclosure on the majority of the GRI’s “human 
rights” performance indicators. Two organisations, however, did provide disclosure on issues 
related to percentage of new suppliers that were screened using human rights criteria (HR10), 
and negative human rights in the supply chain and actions taken (HR11).  
 
With respect to the GRI’s “society” performance indicators section, unsurprisingly, more than 
half of the organisations did provide disclosure of what is considered to be one of the “most 
common items” (Chapman and Milne, 2003, p. 46); community engagement (SO1). But less than 
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one fifth of organisations could provide detailed disclosure on other society aspects, such as 
operations with negative impacts on local communities (SO2), confirmed incidents of corruption 
(SO5), contribution to political parties (SO6), non-compliance with laws (SO8), and supplier 
assessment for impacts on society (SO9) and actions taken (SO10). The rest of society 
performance indicators did not at all get mentioned. 
 
Finally, as regards the GRI’s “product responsibility” performance indicators, more than one 
fifth of the organisations could provide detailed product responsibility performance indicators, 
in particular customer satisfaction (PR5). However, less than one tenth of the organisations could 
provide specific product responsibility indicators in relation to % of products and services in 
which health and safety impacts are assessed (PR1), non-compliance with product safety 
regulations (PR2), non-compliance regarding product labelling (PR4) and market 
communications (PR7), and monetary value for non-compliance with product safety regulations 
(PR9).  
 
When the level of disclosure quality is relaxed to a “generous” measure (in which reasonable and 
partial disclosures are taken to account), the level of quality of disclosure between two measures 
remains relatively unchanged. However, issues that are related to environmental aspects - such 
as, emissions (EN3, 6), water (EN8), and effluent and waste (EN23) - and social aspects - such 
as, employment (LA1), occupational health and safety (LA6), local communities (SO1), and 
customer health and safety (PR1) - see a marginal increase. But these issues mainly increased 
because the level of disclosure was set to include partial disclosure items.  
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4.2.3 Benchmarking New Zealand’s best reporters  
Additional insights can also be gained by examining selected individual reports on each section. 
To do this, New Zealand’s seven best sustainability reporters were handpicked for this analysis. 
The rationale for cherry picking these seven organisations lies on the presumption that much can 
be gained by examining the reporting extensiveness of sustainability information disclosed by 
these organisations. Table 6 presents the seven reporters included in this analysis. 
 
Table 6: New Zealand's Seven Best Sustainability Reporters 
Organisation Industry Industry Risk Period 
Fonterra Co-operative Group Limited 
Agriculture/Consumer 
Staples 
High risk 2016 
Auckland International Airport Limited Transportation High risk 2016 
Z Energy Limited Energy High risk 2016 
The Warehouse Group Limited Retailing High risk 2016 
Sanford Limited Agriculture/Fishing High risk 2016 
Kathmandu Holdings Limited 
Apparel and 
Textiles/Retailing 
High risk 2016 
Contact Energy Limited Energy High risk 2016 
 
A snapshot view of the sustainability disclosure behaviours by the New Zealand’s seven best 
sustainability reporters can be seen in detail in graph 3. This graph presents the number of 
indicators disclosed against the total GRI performance indicators by these organisations per 
theme. To complement this graph, table 7 presents the actual GRI performance indicators 
disclosed per theme by these organisations. Appendix 6 presents the results, based on the content 
analysis of each organisation’s report, when the quality of disclosure standard is set at “rigorous” 
measure (in which only reasonable disclosure classification is taken into account). A score of 
seven for an item would indicate all seven organisations disclosed on the item to a level of 
rigorous measure. Similar to the previously presented results, no item comes anywhere near this 
score, except for issues in which many sustainability reporting scholars would consider 
“minimum staples in a stakeholder reporting diet” (Chapman and Milne, 2003, p. 46), namely: 
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NUMBER OF GRI PERFORMANCE INDICATORS PER THEME 
DISCLOSED BY NEW ZEALAND'S SEVEN BEST REPORTERS
Number of Disclosed Indicators Number of Undisclosed Indicators
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Table 7: Actual GRI performance indicators disclosed per theme by New Zealand’s best 
reporters 
  




Economic Indicators EC1, EC2, EC4, EC7, EC8 EC3, EC5, EC6, EC9 
Environmental Indicators EN6, EN7, EN8, EN12, EN33  
EN1, EN2, EN3, EN4, EN5, EN9, EN10, EN11, EN13, EN14, EN15, 
EN16, EN17, EN18, EN19, EN20, EN21, EN22, EN23, EN24, EN25, 
EN26, EN27, EN28, EN29, EN30, EN31, EN32, EN34 
Labour Practice Indicators LA6, LA12 
LA1, LA2, LA3, LA4, LA5, LA7, LA8, LA9, LA10, LA11, LA13, 
LA14, LA15, LA16 
Human Rights Indicators None 
HR1, HR2, HR3, HR4, HR5, HR6, HR7, HR8, HR9, HR10, HR11, 
HR12 
Society Indicators SO1 SO2, SO3, SO4, SO5, SO6, SO7, SO8, SO9, SO10, SO11 





Economic Indicators EC1, EC2, EC3, EC7, EC8 EC4, EC5, EC6, EC9 
Environmental Indicators 
EN3, EN5, EN18, EN19, EN23, 
EN24, EN29 
EN1, EN2, EN4, EN6, EN7, EN8, EN9, EN10, EN11, EN12, EN13, 
EN14, EN15, EN16, EN17, EN20, EN21, EN22, EN25, EN26, EN27, 
EN28, EN30, EN31, EN32, EN33, EN34 
Labour Practice Indicators LA2, LA11, LA12 
LA1, LA3, LA4, LA5, LA6, LA7, LA8, LA9, LA10, LA13, LA14, 
LA15, LA16 
Human Rights Indicators None 
HR1, HR2, HR3, HR4, HR5, HR6, HR7, HR8, HR9, HR10, HR11, 
HR12 
Society Indicators SO1, SO2 SO3, SO4, SO5, SO6, SO7, SO8, SO9, SO10, SO11 
Product Responsibility Indicators PR5 PR1, PR2, PR3, PR4, PR6, PR7, PR8, PR9 
Z ENERGY 
LIMITED 
Economic Indicators EC1, EC7 EC2, EC3, EC4, EC5, EC6, EC8, EC9 
Environmental Indicators 
EN3, EN15, EN16, EN19, EN23, 
EN29 
EN1, EN2, EN4, EN5, EN6, EN7, EN8, EN9, EN10, EN11, EN12, 
EN13, EN14, EN17, EN18, EN20, EN21, EN22, EN24, EN25, EN26, 
EN27, EN28, EN30, EN31, EN32, EN33, EN34 
Labour Practice Indicators 
LA1, LA2, LA3, LA5, LA6, LA7, 
LA10, LA11, LA12, LA13 
LA4, LA8, LA9, LA14, LA15, LA16 
Human Rights Indicators None  
HR1, HR2, HR3, HR4, HR5, HR6, HR7, HR8, HR9, HR10, HR11, 
HR12 
Society Indicators SO1, SO8 SO2, SO3, SO4, SO5, SO6, SO7, SO9, SO10, SO11 
Product Responsibility Indicators PR5, PR7, PR8 PR1, PR2, PR3, PR4, PR6, PR8 
CONTACT 
ENERGY LIMITED 
Economic Indicators EC1, EC7, EC8 EC2, EC3, EC4, EC5, EC6, EC9 
Environmental Indicators 
EN8, EN12, EN13, EN15, EN19, 
EN22, EN27, EN29 
EN1, EN2, EN3, EN4, EN5, EN6, EN7, EN9, EN10, EN11, EN14, 
EN16, EN17, EN18, EN20, EN21, EN23, EN24, EN25, EN26, EN28, 
EN30, EN31, EN32, EN33, EN34 
Labour Practice Indicators LA1, LA6, LA10, LA12, LA13 LA2, LA3, LA4, LA5, LA7, LA8, LA9, LA11, LA14, LA15, LA16 
Human Rights Indicators None 
HR1, HR2, HR3, HR4, HR5, HR6, HR7, HR8, HR9, HR10, HR11, 
HR12 
Society Indicators SO1 SO2, SO3, SO4, SO5, SO6, SO7, SO8, SO9, SO10, SO11 
Product Responsibility Indicators PR2, PR5, PR8, PR9 PR1, PR3, PR4, PR6, PR7, PR7, PR8, PR9 
THE WAREHOUSE 
GROUP LIMITED 
Economic Indicators EC1, EC7, EC8 EC2, EC3, EC4, EC5, EC6, EC9 
Environmental Indicators 
EN3, EN6, EN15, EN16, EN17, 
EN18, EN19, EN32, EN33  
EN1, EN2, EN4, EN5, EN7, EN8, EN9, EN10, EN11, EN12, EN13, 
EN14, EN20, EN21, EN22, EN23, EN24, EN25, EN26, EN27, EN28, 
EN29, EN30, EN31, EN34 
Labour Practice Indicators LA2, LA10, LA11, LA12  
LA1, LA3, LA4, LA5, LA6, LA7, LA8, LA9, LA13, LA14, LA15, 
LA16 
Human Rights Indicators HR10, HR11 HR1, HR2, HR3, HR4, HR5, HR6, HR7, HR8, HR9, HR12 
Society Indicators SO1, SO6, SO9, SO10 SO2, SO3, SO4, SO5, SO7, SO8, SO11 
Product Responsibility Indicators PR3, PR5, PR8 PR1, PR2, PR4, PR6, PR7, PR9 
SANFORD 
LIMITED 
Economic Indicators EC1, EC2, EC4, EC8 EC3, EC5, EC6, EC7, EC9 
Environmental Indicators 
EN3, EN6, EN12, EN14, EN15, 
EN16, EN17, EN24 
EN1, EN2, EN4, EN5, EN7, EN8, EN9, EN10, EN11, EN13, EN18, 
EN19, EN20, EN21, EN22, EN23, EN25, EN26, EN27, EN28, EN29, 
EN30, EN31, EN32, EN33, EN34 
Labour Practice Indicators LA1, LA6, LA8, LA9, LA10, LA12 LA2, LA3, LA4, LA5, LA7, LA11, LA13, LA14, LA15, LA16 
Human Rights Indicators None 
HR1, HR2, HR3, HR4, HR5, HR6, HR7, HR8, HR9, HR10, HR11, 
HR12 
Society Indicators SO1 SO2, SO3, SO4, SO5, SO6, SO7, SO8, SO9, SO10, SO11 




Economic Indicators EC1, EC2, EC7; EC8 EC3, EC4, EC5, EC6, EC9 
Environmental Indicators EN16, EN17, EN18, EN19, EN27  
EN1, EN2, EN3, EN4, EN5, EN6, EN7, EN8, EN9, EN10, EN11, 
EN12, EN13, EN14, EN15, EN20, EN21, EN22, EN23, EN24, EN25, 
EN26, EN28, EN29, EN30, EN31, EN32, EN33, EN34 
Labour Practice Indicators 
LA1, LA2, LA3, LA6, LA10, LA11, 
LA12 
LA4, LA5, LA7, LA8, LA9, LA13, LA14, LA15, LA16 
Human Rights Indicators HR10, HR11 HR1, HR2, HR3, HR4, HR5, HR6, HR7, HR8, HR9, HR12 
Society Indicators SO1 SO2, SO3, SO4, SO5, SO6, SO7, SO8, SO9, SO10, SO11 
Product Responsibility Indicators PR1, PR2, PR8 PR3, PR4, PR5, PR6, PR7, PR9 
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economic performance (EC1), emissions (EN19), local communities (SO1), employment 
(LA2), training and education (LA10), occupational health and safety (LA6), and diversity and 
equal opportunity (LA12). Of these seven disclosure items were disclosed at what might be 
considered to be a reasonable level of quality by more than two thirds of the organisations 
sampled. 
4.2.3.1 Section analysis 
Section analysis by organisations shows that the most frequently used GRI’s “economic” 
indicators were EC1 (direct economic value generated), EC2 (financial implications of climate 
change), EC7 (infrastructure development) and EC8 (indirect economic impacts). While, the 
least frequently used economic indicators were EC3 (coverage of pension obligations) and EC4 
(financial assistance received from government). EC5 (ratio of entry level to minimum wages), 
EC6 (local hiring of senior management positions), and EC9 (payments to locally-based 
suppliers) were not at all reported. 
 
The GRI’s “environmental” performance indicators section, arguably the section that relates 
environmental aspects to organisational performance metrics, is patchy. For the organisations 
that did report on environmental aspects, the most frequently used environmental indicators, 
the EN19 (GHG emission reduction initiatives) was mentioned by five organisations. While 
the EN3 (direct energy consumption), EN6 (conservation of energy efficiency), EN15 
(managing impacts of biodiversity) and EN16 (direct GHG emissions - scope 1) were 
mentioned four times by three different sets of organisations. The least frequently used 
indicators were reported by one organisation. These indicators were EN5 (energy intensity), 
EN7 (reduction in energy requirements of P&Ss), EN22 (water discharge), and EN32 (new 
suppliers that were screened using environmental criteria). Although the EN12 (areas 
significant affected by withdrawal of water), EN24 (total number of environmental spills from 
waste discharges), and EN33 (negative environmental impacts in the supply chain and actions 
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taken) were mentioned by two organisations. The analysis also shows that 14 out of 34 
environmental indicators were not at all reported by any organisation in this sample. These 
indicators were environmental that related to materials (EN1 and EN2), energy (EN4), water 
(EN9 and EN10), biodiversity (EN11), Emissions (EN20 and EN21), effluents and waste 
(EN25 and 26), products and services (EN28), transportation (EN30), environmental protection 
expenditure (EN31), and supplier mechanisms (EN34). Overall, there was a lack of balance 
among the GRI’s environmental indicators reported by these organisations, with the majority 
of reported environmental indicators occurring in energy and emissions; whereas topical 
environmental issues in relation to water, biodiversity, effluents and waste, product and 
services, and supplier environment assessment received much lesser attention. 
 
Disclosure on items in the overall GRI’s “social” performance indicators is also patchy. In 
respect to the GRI’s “labor practice” performance indicators, every organisation appeared to 
report LA12 (composition of senior management and breakdown of employees). The most 
frequently used labor practice indicators could be seen in LA6 (injuries, absentee rates and 
work-related fatalities) and LA 10 (programmes for skills management and lifelong learning), 
which mentioned by five organisations. In contrast, the least frequently used indicators were 
reported by one organisation. These indicators were LA5 (employees covered by collective 
bargaining power), LA7 (workers with high incidence or high-risk of diseases related to their 
occupation), LA8 (trade unions), and LA 9 (training hours by employee category). The analysis 
further shows labor practice issues such as labor/management relations (LA4), suppliers 
assessments for labor practices (LA14 and LA15), and Labor practice grievance mechanisms 
(LA16) were not at all reported by any organisation in this sample. Z energy, however, provides 
an example of best practice from this section. Overall, the coverage of labor practice indicators 
was not well covered by the majority of these organisations, therefore, there is a room for 
further improvement.  
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As regards to the GRI’s “human rights” performance, almost no organisations have made an 
attempt to report on these indicators. The Warehouse and Kathmandu, however, reported on 
HR10 (% of new suppliers that were screened using human rights criteria) and HR11 (negative 
human rights in the supply chain and actions taken). Overall, there are no examples of best 
practices from this section, and the analysis recognises this as an area for improvement. 
 
Of those related to the GRI’s “society” performance indicators, every organisation reported on 
an indicator in which is considered to be one of the “minimum staples in a stakeholder reporting 
diet” (Chapman and Milne, 2003, p. 46) such as community engagement (SO1). Among these 
organisations’ sustainability reports, there were no specific society performance indicators that 
were used frequently. On the other hand, topical social issues that related to corporate 
governance, such as anti-corruption (SO3-5), anti-competitive behaviour (SO7), compliance 
(SO8), supplier assessment on society (SO9-10), and grievance mechanisms for impact on 
society (SO11) were largely not reported. With the exception of the Warehouse, the coverage 
of society indicators reported by the rest of the organisations was inconsistent, where the 
majority of organisations tended to emphasis on a generic society indicator such as the SO1, 
rather than wider social issues. 
 
The last section examines the GRI’s “product responsibility” performance indicators. There 
was no specific product responsibility performance indicators that were used frequently. 
Nonetheless, the most used frequently disclosed product responsibility indicator, PR5 
(customer satisfaction), was mentioned by six organisations. Overall, with the exception of 
Sanford, the coverage of product responsibility indicators by the rest of the organisations was 
generally poorly covered, where the organisations tended to put an emphasis on a generic 
product responsibility indicator such as PR5; whereas more topical product responsibility 
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issues such as PR1 (% of significant product and service, which health and safety impacts are 
assessed) and PR3 (principles and measures related to product labelling) were barely discussed. 
4.3 Replicating the study of Hackston & Milne (1996) 
Previous empirical evidence indicated that there was an overlap between the amount of non-
financial disclosure and organisational characteristics (Hackston & Milne, 1996) - such as firm 
size (Jones et al., 2007; Hackston & Milne, 1996), industry background (Griffin & Mahon, 
1997; Graves & Waddock, 1994, Hackston & Milne, 1996), organisational profitability index 
(Hackston & Milne, 1998) and overseas listing(s) (Hackston & Milne, 1996). To make sense 
of these meaningful relationships, this study partially replicates the study of Hackston & Milne 
(1996) with the intention to understand the effects of organisational characteristics on the 
quality of non-financial disclosures by the NZX50 in 2017. 
4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 8 represents the descriptive statistics for the continuous independent variables of size, 
profitability index, and the twelve dependent variables of the GRI measure. The table shows 
the minimum, maximum, mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis. Due to a breach of 
the normality assumption, three of the size measures have been transformed using their natural 
log, while the four profitability measures, expressed as percentages, satisfied the assumption 
of normality and, therefore, they have been left unadjusted. The twelve GRI measures have 
also been left unadjusted as they represent the actual percentage of total non-financial 
disclosures made by the NZX50.  
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics for continuous variables 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 





Independent variables:          
Size measures          
Market Capitalisation 
($M NZD) 
48 100.00 9119.00 2018.10 2225.56 1.546 0.343 1.865 0.674 
Nat Log of Market 
Capitalisation 2016 
48 18.42 22.93 20.76 1.26 -0.106 0.343 -1.131 0.674 
Total Sales ($M NZD) 48 218.05 17199.00 1666.10 2900.29 3.921 0.343 18.070 0.674 
Nat Log of Sales 2016 48 19.20 23.57 20.52 1.07 0.934 0.343 0.322 0.674 
Total Assets ($M NZD) 48 78.63 17118.00 2487.74 3195.02 2.460 0.343 8.298 0.674 
Nat Log of Total Assets 
2016 
48 18.18 23.56 20.90 1.27 0.130 0.343 -0.959 0.674 
Profitability measures 
         
Return on Assets (using 
EBIT) 2016 
48 -7.39% 25.29% 9.39% 6.94% 0.237 0.343 0.946 0.674 
Average Return on 
Assets (using EBIT) 
2012-2016 
48 -3.93% 27.26% 9.14% 6.15% 0.772 0.343 1.096 0.674 
Return on Equity (using 
EBIT) 2016 
48 -17.65% 55.84% 18.27% 13.20% -0.174 0.343 1.415 0.674 
Average Return on 
Equity (using EBIT) 
2012-2016 
48 -9.93% 40.86% 18.12% 11.56% 0.202 0.343 -0.162 0.674 
Dependent Variable: 
         
GRI measures 
         
Total GRI % 48 2.20% 27.47% 10.26% 7.09% 0.978 0.343 -0.046 0.674 
Total Hard % 48 1.33% 25.33% 8.78% 6.97% 0.975 0.343 -0.219 0.674 
Total Soft % 48 0.00% 43.75% 17.19% 10.03% 0.621 0.343 -0.043 0.674 
Total Eco % 48 11.11% 55.56% 30.55% 10.87% 0.676 0.343 -0.050 0.674 
Total Eco Hard % 48 14.29% 57.14% 21.13% 10.20% 1.539 0.343 2.284 0.674 
Total Eco Soft % 48 0.00% 100.00% 63.54% 30.49% -0.211 0.343 -0.512 0.674 
Total Env % 48 0.00% 26.47% 6.19% 8.65% 1.098 0.343 -0.247 0.674 
Total Env Hard % 48 0.00% 29.03% 6.32% 8.78% 1.078 0.343 -0.288 0.674 
Total Env Soft % 48 0.00% 66.67% 4.86% 15.36% 3.287 0.343 10.344 0.674 
Total Soc % 48 0.00% 29.17% 9.33% 7.26% 1.222 0.343 1.111 0.674 
Total Soc Hard % 48 0.00% 29.73% 8.50% 7.23% 1.328 0.343 1.334 0.674 
Total Soc Soft % 48 0.00% 36.36% 12.12% 10.33% 0.659 0.343 -0.025 0.674 
Valid N (listwise) 48         
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Table 9 represents the classification of the NZX50 by industry. In this table, two industry 
variations were included. For the first industry variation (industry variation 1), partitioning the 
high- and low-profile industry classification on a basis of Hackston & Milne (1996) resulted in 
35 high-profile cases, and 13 low-profile cases. Because of an imbalance of the industry 
classification within industry variation 1, a further amendment to this industry variation was 
therefore needed. To adjust for this, ACS (Accommodation and food service activities) and 
WST (Wholesale and retail trade) industries were exempted from the high-profile industry 
classification, and these industries were reclassified into the low-profile industries. The logical 
explanation of cherry-picking these two industries lies on the assumption that these industries 
do not typically experience greater public pressures for compliance than other high-profile 
industries in this sample. Hence, the second industry variation (industry variation 2) consisted 
of 25 high-profile cases and 23 low-profile cases as shown in Table 9.  
 







Table 9: Classification of organisations by industry 
Note: ACS = Accommodation and food service activities; ADS = Administrative and support service activities; AER = Arts, 
entertainment and recreation; AGS = Agriculture, forestry and fishing; ELE = Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning; FIN = 
Financial and insurance activities; HUM = Human health and social work activities; INC = Information and communication; MAN 
= Manufacturing; OTR = Other service activities; PST = Professional, scientific and technical activities; TRS = Transportation and 
storage; WST = Wholesale and retail trade. Industry classification = (1) high profile, and (0) low profile. 
 
  











20 Reporter SANFORD LIMITED AGS 1 1 
21 Reporter SCALES CORPORATION LIMITED AGS 1 1 
42 Non-Reporter PGG WRIGHTSON LIMITED AGS 1 1 
48 Non-Reporter RUBICON LIMITED AGS 1 1 
3 Reporter MERIDIAN ENERGY LIMITED ELE 1 1 
7 Reporter MERCURY NZ LIMITED ELE 1 1 
8 Reporter CONTACT ENERGY LIMITED ELE 1 1 
9 Reporter VECTOR LIMITED ELE 1 1 
13 Reporter TRUSTPOWER LIMITED ELE 1 1 
15 Reporter GENESIS ENERGY LIMITED ELE 1 1 
1 Reporter FONTERRA CO-OPERATIVE GROUP LIMITED MAN 1 1 
5 Reporter FLETCHER BUILDING LIMITED MAN 1 1 
6 Reporter FISHER & PAYKEL HEALTHCARE CORPORATION LIMITED MAN 1 1 
18 Reporter NEW ZEALAND REFINING CO LTD MAN 1 1 
24 Reporter TEGEL GROUP HOLDINGS LIMITED MAN 1 1 
34 Non-Reporter THE A2 MILK COMPANY LIMITED  MAN 1 1 
37 Non-Reporter DELEGAT GROUP LIMITED MAN 1 1 
38 Non-Reporter SYNLAIT MILK LIMITED MAN 1 1 
40 Non-Reporter COMVITA LIMITED MAN 1 1 
45 Non-Reporter STEEL & TUBE HOLDINGS LIMITED MAN 1 1 
2 Reporter AUCKLAND INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT LIMITED TRN 1 1 
12 Reporter PORT OF TAURANGA LIMITED TRS 1 1 
14 Reporter AIR NEW ZEALAND LIMITED TRS 1 1 
31 Non-Reporter INFRATIL LIMITED TRS 1 1 
35 Non-Reporter FREIGHTWAYS LIMITED TRS 1 1 
22 Reporter RESTAURANT BRANDS NEW ZEALAND LIMITED ACS 1 0 
11 Reporter Z ENERGY LIMITED WST 1 0 
19 Reporter THE WAREHOUSE GROUP LIMITED WST 1 0 
23 Reporter KATHMANDU HOLDINGS LIMITED WST 1 0 
25 Reporter T&G GLOBAL LIMITED WST 1 0 
29 Non-Reporter EBOS GROUP LIMITED WST 1 0 
36 Non-Reporter BRISCOE GROUP LIMITED WST 1 0 
41 Non-Reporter GREEN CROSS HEALTH LIMITED WST 1 0 
44 Non-Reporter COLONIAL MOTOR COMPANY LIMITED  WST 1 0 
47 Non-Reporter HALLENSTEIN GLASSON HOLDINGS LIMITED WST 1 0 
17 Reporter MAINFREIGHT LIMITED ADS 0 0 
43 Non-Reporter TOURISM HOLDINGS LIMITED ADS 0 0 
10 Reporter SKY CITY ENTERTAINMENT GROUP LIMITED AER 0 0 
39 Non-Reporter CBL CORPORATION LIMITED FIN 0 0 
46 Non-Reporter TOWER LIMITED FIN 0 0 
28 Non-Reporter RYMAN HEALTHCARE LIMITED HUM 0 0 
4 Reporter SPARK NEW ZEALAND LIMITED INC 0 0 
27 Reporter NZME LIMITED INC 0 0 
30 Non-Reporter SKY NETWORK TELEVISION LIMITED INC 0 0 
32 Non-Reporter TRADE ME GROUP LIMITED INC 0 0 
33 Non-Reporter CHORUS LIMITED INC 0 0 
16 Reporter KIWI PROPERTY GROUP LIMITED OTR 0 0 
26 Reporter OPUS INTERNATIONAL CONSULTANTS LIMITED PST 0 0 
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4.3.2 Association tests  
This study used multivariate regression analysis to examine potential determinants of 
sustainability disclosures among the NZX50. However, before any further investigations could 
take place, it was crucial to validate each of the testing variables. This was to ensure robustness 
of the relationships between different continuous dependent and independent variables for 
further analysis. In terms of association tests, six statistical tests were conducted. An illustration 
of these tests can be seen in Figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 2: Association tests 
 
 
4.3.2.1. 1st Association test - Industry and Size 
The first association test is between INDUSTRY and SIZE. An independent-samples t-test was 
conducted to compare the size of the sample organisations in high and low-profile industry 
conditions, to see whether there is a significant difference between condition means.  
 
Industry variation 1 
The results illustrated that there were no significant associations between sizes in high- and 
low-profile industry conditions (𝜌 > 0.05), implying that there is a similar amount of relatively 
large and small organisations within high- and low-profiles industries. 
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Table 10: t-tests for the effect of industry variation 1 on size measures 
Note: Industry 1 is partitioned into high-profile (35 cases) and low-profile (13 cases) 
 
Overall, the results were highly consistent with the study of Hackston & Milne (1996), 
indicating that high-profile industry organisations are not significantly larger than low-profile 
industry organisations (𝜌 < 0.05). High-profile industries do appear to have a larger market 
capitalisation, but it is only marginal at the 10% level of significance (𝜌 < 0.1) when the industry 
classification has been adjusted as per industry variation 2 (See appendix 7.1.1). 
4.3.2.2. 2nd Association test - Size and Profitability Index  
The second association test is between SIZE and PROFIABILITY INDEX. The Pearson’s 
correlation coefficients were computed to assess the relationship between the profitability 












t-value Two-tailed p  
Dependent Variable       
Size:       
Nat Log of 2016 Sales 20.66 20.16 0.499 0.344 1.451 0.154 
Nat Log of 2016 total assets 2016 20.87 20.99 -0.125 0.417 -0.300 0.766 
Nat Log of 2016 market capitalization 20.78 20.69 0.087 0.414 0.210 0.835 
  
Nat Log of 
2016 Sales 
Nat Log of 
2016 market 
capitalization 


















Nat Log of 2016 
market capitalization 
Pearson Correlation .548**      
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000      
Spearman Correlation  .496**      
Nat Log of 2016 total 
assets 2016 
Pearson Correlation .663** .837**     
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000     
Spearman Correlation  .600** .834**     
Return on Assets 
(using EBIT) 2016 
Pearson Correlation -0.038 0.062 -.348*    
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.800 0.677 0.015    
Spearman Correlation  -0.048 -0.044 -.411**    
Average Return on 
Assets (using EBIT) 
2012-2016 
Pearson Correlation -0.121 -0.011 -.386** .775**   
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.412 0.939 0.007 0.000   
Spearman Correlation  -0.126 -0.041 -.379** .852**   
Return on Equity 
(using EBIT) 2016 
Pearson Correlation 0.186 0.141 -0.138 .862** .590**  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.207 0.339 0.350 0.000 0.000  
Spearman Correlation  0.132 -0.017 -0.278 .858** .701**  
Average Return on 
Equity (using EBIT) 
2012-2016 
Pearson Correlation 0.067 0.075 -0.149 .564** .818** .646** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.651 0.612 0.313 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Spearman Correlation  0.131 0.030 -0.152 .660** .848** .755** 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Table 11: Pearson correlation coefficients for size and profitability measures 
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The results indicated that almost none of the four profitability measures were significantly 
correlated with the three size measures (𝜌 > 0.05). There were negative correlations shown 
between the natural log of total assets and the return on assets measures, return on assets (r = -
0.348, n = 48, p = 0.015) and average return on assets (r = -0.386, n = 48, p = 0.007). Perhaps 
it is not surprising since total assets are essentially the components of the return on assets 
measures. Overall, the results were highly consistent with the study of Hackston & Milne (1996), 
where size measures appear to be not associated with profitability of the sampled organisations. 
4.3.2.3. 3rd Association test - Industry and Profitability Index 
The third association test is between INDUSTRY and PROFITABIITY INDEX. An 
Independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the profitability of listed New Zealand 
organisations in high and low-profile industry conditions, to see whether there is a significant 
difference between Industry and profitability index.  
 
Industry variation 1 
The results illustrated that there were no significant differences between the four profitability 
measures of listed New Zealand organisations in high and low-profile industry conditions (𝜌 > 
0.05). At the 10% level of significance, the single-year return on assets for 2016 became 
marginally significant for high-profile industry (M = 10.462%, SD = 6.773%) and low-profile 
industry (M = 6.505%, SD = 6.792%) conditions; t(46), p = 0.079.  
Table 12: t-tests for the effect of industry variation 1 on profitability measures 
Note: Industry 1 is partitioned into high-profile (35 cases) and low-profile (13 cases) 









t-value Two-tailed p  
Independent variable        
Profitability:        
Return on Assets (using EBIT) 
2016 
10.46% 6.51%  3.96%  2.20% 1.797  0.079 
Average Return on Assets 
(using EBIT) 2012-2016 
9.44% 8.34%  1.10%  2.01% 0.547  0.587 
Return on Equity (using EBIT) 
2016 
20.18% 13.16%  7.02%  4.21% 1.668  0.102 
Average Return on Equity 
(using EBIT) 2012-2016 
17.51% 19.76%  2.25%  3.78% -0.594  0.555 
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These results were consistent with the study of Hackston & Milne (1996), where they found the 
relationship between industry and profitability measures to be of no significant difference. 
Similarly, the results did not change much after variation industry 2 was taken into account, 
except one of the profitability measures of listed New Zealand organisations (the average return 
of equity 2012-2016) for high-profile industry (M = 14.102%, SD = 9.255%) and low-profile 
industry (M = 22.484%, SD = 12.403%) conditions; t(40.557), p = 0.012 (See Appendix 7.1.2). 
The results imply that the sampled organisations that operated in the high-profile industries are 
not capable of producing a higher return on equity than the sampled organisations within the 
low-profile industries across a five-year period. To conclude, perhaps, it is not surprising that 
this study mainly focuses on large multinationals, such as the NZX50 (the largest 50 New 
Zealand’s listed organisations), as ranked by their market capitalisation. Regardless of whether 
the organisation operates in a high-profile industry or not, these listed organisations will always 
produce higher profitability returns for their investors. 
4.3.2.4. 4th Association test - GRI measures and Industry  
The forth association test is between GRI MEASURES and INDUSTRY. An Independent-
samples t-test is used to compare GRI measures in high- and low-profile industry conditions, 
to see whether there is a significant difference between condition means.  
 
Industry variation 1 
The results indicated that there were almost no signs of significant associations between GRI 
measures in high and low-profile industry conditions ( 𝜌  > 0.05), however there was a 
significant difference in the Total Eco Hard % for the high-profile industry (M = 22.859%, SD 
= 11.0638%) and low-profile industry (M = 16.487%, SD = 5.363%) conditions; t(46), p = 
0.011. In addition, there was also a significant difference in the Total Env Soft % for the high-
profile industry (M = 6.667%, SD = 17.713%) and low-profile industry (M=0.000%, SD = 
0.000%) conditions; t(46), p = 0.033. Overall, this suggests that the sampled organisations 
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within the high-profile industries are more likely to report a greater volume of the soft 
environmental key performance indicators than organisations within low-profile industries, and 
a similar explanation applies to the hard economic key performance indicators. The overall 
results indicate that high-profile industry organisations do not generally disclose significantly 
more non-financial information than low-profile industry organisations.  
Table 13: t-tests for the effect of industry variation 1 on GRI measures 
Note: Industry 1 is partitioned into high-profile (35 cases) and low-profile (13 cases) 
 
Similar to the results displayed in the industry variation 1, the results indicated that there were 
almost no signs of significant associations between GRI measures in high and low-profile 
industry conditions (𝜌  > 0.05) after the industry variation 2 was taken into account (See 
Appendix 7.1.3), although there was a significant difference in the Total Eco Hard % for high-
profile industry (M = 24.573%, SD = 12.036%) and low-profile industry (M = 17.384%, SD = 
6.022%) conditions; t(46), p = 0.012. Besides, there was also a significant difference in the 
Total Env Soft % for high-profile industry (M = 9.333%, SD = 20.458%) and low-profile 
industry (M=0.000%, SD = 0.000%) conditions; t(46), p = 0.032. Overall, both industry 
variations show a general lack of relationship with GRI disclosure performance. But these 






Mean diff SE of diff t-value Two-tailed p 
Dependent Variable       
GRI Measures:       
Total GRI % 10.86% 8.62% 2.24% 2.31% 0.972 0.336 
Total Hard % 9.49% 6.87% 2.61% 2.26% 1.158 0.253 
Total Soft % 17.32% 16.83% 0.50% 3.29% 0.150 0.881 
Total Eco % 31.43% 28.20% 3.22% 3.54% 0.911 0.367 
Total Eco Hard % 22.86% 16.49% 6.37% 2.39% 2.667 0.011 
Total Eco Soft % 61.43% 69.23% -7.80% 9.94% -0.785 0.437 
Total Env % 7.06% 3.85% 3.21% 2.45% 1.312 0.200 
Total Env Hard % 7.10% 4.22% 2.88% 2.85% 1.010 0.318 
Total Env Soft % 6.67% 0.00% 6.67% 2.99% 2.227 0.033 
Total Soc % 9.70% 8.33% 1.37% 2.37% 0.577 0.567 
Total Soc Hard % 8.96% 7.28% 1.68% 2.36% 0.712 0.480 
Total Soc Soft % 12.21% 11.89% 0.32% 3.39% 0.094 0.925 
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may possibly lie in the rigorous assessment of non-financial information disclosure used in this 
study, and the relatively lack of non-financial disclosure by the NZX50. 
4.3.2.5. 5th Association test - GRI measures and Size 
The fifth association test is between GRI MEASURES and SIZE. The Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients were computed to assess the relationship between the GRI measures and size 
measures. These are show in Table 14 on the next page. 
 
At a 5% level of significance (𝜌 < 0.05), three of the size measures (Nat log of sales 2016, Nat 
log of market capitalisation 2016, and Nat Log of assets 2016) were marginally correlated with 
Total GRI %, Total Hard %, Total Env % and Total Env Hard %. Furthermore, the results 
likewise displayed positive correlations between Total Soft % and size, when measured by Nat 
Log of market capitalisation 2016 and Nat log assets 2016. While, at a 10% level of significance; 
Total Eco Soft %, Total Env Soft %, Total Soc %, and Total Soc Hard % became marginally 
significant when measured with Nat Log of Assets 2016. To alleviate any concerns over the 
non-normality of dependent variable measures, Spearman’s rank correlations are also reported. 
Unsurprisingly, the results closely resembled what the researcher found in Pearson’s 
correlations. 
 
Based on the results, firm size does have a limited influence on the extensiveness of non-
financial information disclosures, especially the total key performance indicators (Total GRI%), 
the total hard key performance indicators (Total Hard %), the total environmental key 
performance indicators (Total Env %), and the total hard environmental key performance 
indicators (Total Env Hard %). In an attempt to investigate these associations further, 
multivariate regression analysis was used to analyse these associations in more detail in a later 
section. 
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Table 14: Pearson’s correlation coefficients for GRI measures and Size 
  
Nat Log of Sales 
2016 
Nat Log of Total 
Assets 2016 




Total GRI % Pearson Correlation .339* .397** .383** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.019 0.005 0.007 
Spearman Correlation  .333* .480** .464** 
Total Hard % Pearson Correlation .344* .372** .375** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.017 0.009 0.009 
Spearman Correlation  .318* .448** .445** 
Total Soft % Pearson Correlation 0.241 .387** .319* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.099 0.007 0.027 
Spearman Correlation  0.220 .374** .345* 
Total Eco % Pearson Correlation 0.134 0.266 0.244 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.362 0.067 0.095 
Spearman Correlation  0.084 0.231 0.249 
Total Eco Hard % Pearson Correlation 0.074 0.111 0.101 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.617 0.451 0.495 
Spearman Correlation  -0.020 0.119 0.108 
Total Eco Soft % Pearson Correlation 0.129 .296* 0.273 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.383 0.041 0.061 
Spearman Correlation  0.112 0.248 0.275 
Total Env % Pearson Correlation .413** .417** .431** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.004 0.003 0.002 
Spearman Correlation  .320* .460** .486** 
Total Env Hard % Pearson Correlation .400** .399** .429** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.005 0.005 0.002 
Spearman Correlation  .309* .452** .484** 
Total Env Soft % Pearson Correlation 0.272 .306* 0.214 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.061 0.035 0.145 
Spearman Correlation  .293* .363* 0.281 
Total Soc % Pearson Correlation 0.242 .310* 0.278 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.098 0.032 0.056 
Spearman Correlation  .291* .471** .410** 
Total Soc Hard % Pearson Correlation 0.247 .291* 0.270 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.091 0.044 0.064 
Spearman Correlation  .310* .475** .419** 
Total Soc Soft % Pearson Correlation 0.161 0.263 0.218 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.275 0.070 0.137 
Spearman Correlation  0.168 0.262 0.223 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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4.3.2.6. 6th Association test - GRI measures and Profitability  
The sixth association test is between and GRI MEASURES and PROFITABILIYTY INDEX. 
The Pearson’s correlation coefficients was computed to assess the relationship between the 
profitability of listed New Zealand organisations and GRI measures. These are shown in Table 
15. The results illustrated that almost none of the four profitability measures was significantly 
correlated with the GRI measures (𝜌 >  0.05). Again, to alleviate any concerns over the non-
normality of the dependent variable measures, Spearman’s rank correlations were also reported. 
Again, the results closely resembled what the researcher initially found in Pearson’s 
correlations, indicating that the profitability of very largest listed New Zealand organisations 
appears to be unrelated to the non-financial information they disclose.  


















Total GRI % Pearson Correlation -0.151 -0.097 -0.075 -0.079 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.307 0.513 0.613 0.592 
Spearman Correlation -0.186 -0.158 -0.216 -0.143 
Total Hard % Pearson Correlation -0.099 -0.049 -0.030 -0.044 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.503 0.740 0.841 0.767 
Spearman Correlation -0.119 -0.088 -0.142 -0.077 
Total Soft % Pearson Correlation -0.283 -0.230 -0.205 -0.177 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.051 0.116 0.163 0.230 
Spearman Correlation -0.236 -0.218 -0.276 -0.206 
Total Eco % Pearson Correlation -0.125 -.285* -0.158 -.373** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.398 0.049 0.283 0.009 
Spearman Correlation -0.139 -0.199 -0.174 -.306* 
Total Eco Hard % Pearson Correlation 0.032 -0.244 0.002 -.344* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.828 0.095 0.991 0.017 
Spearman Correlation -0.041 -0.212 -0.022 -0.274 
Total Eco Soft % Pearson Correlation -0.238 -0.173 -0.256 -0.196 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.103 0.241 0.079 0.181 
Spearman Correlation -0.181 -0.063 -0.266 -0.167 
Total Env % Pearson Correlation -0.140 -0.049 -0.083 -0.027 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.342 0.742 0.573 0.857 
Spearman Correlation -0.163 -0.070 -0.142 -0.019 
Total Env Hard % Pearson Correlation -0.119 -0.017 -0.061 0.007 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.421 0.909 0.679 0.960 
Spearman Correlation -0.155 -0.055 -0.137 -0.008 
Total Env Soft % Pearson Correlation -0.193 -0.212 -0.171 -0.214 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.188 0.148 0.246 0.143 
Spearman Correlation -0.232 -.304* -0.155 -0.220 
Total Soc % Pearson Correlation -0.126 -0.058 -0.024 -0.020 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.394 0.694 0.870 0.892 
Spearman Correlation -0.222 -0.169 -0.273 -0.137 
Total Soc Hard % Pearson Correlation -0.081 -0.014 0.004 -0.002 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.582 0.926 0.981 0.990 
Spearman Correlation -0.171 -0.103 -0.218 -0.076 
Total Soc Soft % Pearson Correlation -0.194 -0.146 -0.083 -0.057 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.187 0.322 0.576 0.700 
Spearman Correlation -0.197 -0.195 -0.237 -0.159 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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4.4 Regression Analysis  
4.4.1 1st Regression model - Hackston & Milne (1996) 
To validate the association tests’ results, the OLS multiple regression is used to examine 
multiple effects of the independent variables on the quality of the non-financial information 
disclosures of the NZX50. 
 
Industry variation 1 
Total GRI % = 𝑎1 + 𝑏1𝑁𝑎𝑡 log 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 2016 +  𝑏1𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦1 + 𝑏1𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 2016 
 
The equation is a direct replication of that found in Hackston & Milne (1996), still the regression 
results shown in the table 16 do not entirely depict the same results as shown in their study. A 
minor adjustment with the study here is that the amount of non-financial information 
disclosures is measured in terms of total key performance indicators disclosed by each of the 
sampled organisation in two industry groups and, is expressed as % of the total GRI G4 index, 
whereas Hackston & Milne (1996) used the amount of social disclosure measured in actual 
pages to nearest one-hundredth of a page.  
 
The regression model is calculated to predict Total GRI % based on size (Nat log of sales 2016), 
Industry (1) and profitability (return on assets 2016). As shown in Table 16, an insignificant 
regression equation was found (F(3,44) = 2.523, P < 0.07), with 𝑅2 of 0.147. Statistically, this 
regression model appears to be a bad model and does not fit the New Zealand sample as the 
controlled variables, Industry 1 and Return on Assets 2016, may not be able to accurately 
predict the Total GRI % or reporting extensiveness disclosed by each of the sampled 
organisations since it only explains 8.86% of the variation (Adjusted R-squared = 0.0886). 
Nevertheless, the regression model indicates firm size, as measured by Nat Log of Sales 2016, 
is still a significant variable in explaining the amount of non-financial information disclosures. 
.  
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Table 16: Regression results - Nat log of sales 2016 + Industry variation 1 + Return on assets 2016 
  B SE B Beta t Sig t 
Nat Log of Sales 2016 2.03157 0.94679 0.30699 2.14575 0.03745 
Industry (1) 1.91543 2.33618 0.12126 0.81990 0.41669 
Return on Assets (using EBIT) 2016 -0.17387 0.14801 -0.17001 -1.17467 0.24644 
Constant -31.20197 19.29522 0.00000 -1.61708 0.11301 
 
Regression measures  ANovA DF  Sum of Squares  Mean squares 
Multiple R= 0.38300  Regression 3   347.16243   115.72081 
R Square = 0.14679  Residual 44   2017.87000   45.86068 
Adjusted R = 0.08862     F= 2365.03243  F= 0.0700 
Standard error = 0.06772          
  
Note: B = regression coefficient; SE B = standard error of regression coefficient; Beta = standardized regression 
coefficient; Industry = industry classification - dummy variable with 1 = high profile, 0 = low profile, n = 48. 
Industry 1 is partitioned into high-profile (35 cases) and low-profile (13 cases) 
z 
In a similar manner, an insignificant regression equation was found (F (3, 44) = 2.265, P < 
0.094) after an adjustment to the industry variation had been made (e.g., industry variation 2) 
(See Appendix 7.2.1), with 𝑅2 of 0.134. Statistically, this regression model also appears to be 
a bad model and does not fit the New Zealand sample because the controlled variables, Industry 
2 and Return on Assets 2016, may not be able to accurately predict the Total GRI % or reporting 
extensiveness disclosed by each of the sampled organisations as it only explains 7.47% of the 
variation (Adjusted R-squared = 0.0747). Overall, the reporting extensiveness or the quality of 
sustainability reporting among the NZX50 was driven primarily by firm size, rather than 
industry and profitability.  
 
Because mixed relationships were found between firm size and industry variations from the 
previous regression analysis and association tests, further investigations into the size-industry-
disclosure relationship are essential. Given the objective of this study is to examine the quality 
of non-financial information disclosed by the NZX50, the list of GRI measures were narrowly 
focused on hard data, such as Total GRI%, Total Hard %, Total Eco Hard %, Total Env Hard % 
and Total Soc Hard %. To examine these relationships in detail, the same correlation matrix 
used in the study by Hackston & Milne (1996) was applied, where the Pearson’s correlation 
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was computed to assess the relationship between the GRI measures and industry, on the separate 
sub-samples rather than the entire sample. 
 
Industry variation 1 
Table 17: Pearson’s correlation coefficients for size and GRI measure variables by 
industry group - Industry variation 1 
      High-profile industry organisations (n = 35)   Low-profile industry organisations (n = 13) 

























Hard %         
Nat Log of 
Sales 2016 
Pearson Correlation 0.383* 0.380* 0.029 0.433** 0.296  0.002 0.032 -0.075 0.162 -0.116 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.023 0.024 0.867 0.009 0.084  0.996 0.917 0.806 0.597 0.706 
Spearman Correlation  0.394* 0.340* 0 0 0.377*  -0.033 0.142 -0.057 0.178 0.04 




Pearson Correlation 0.419* 0.420* 0.082 0.536** 0.257  0.269 0.232 0.2 0.092 0.338 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.012 0.012 0.64 0.001 0.135  0.374 0.446 0.513 0.765 0.259 
Spearman Correlation  0.496** 0.470** 0 0.609** 0.411*  0.426 0.358 0.114 0.134 0.379 
Nat Log of 
Total Assets 
2016 
Pearson Correlation 0.435** 0.416* 0.091 0.494** 0.288  0.251 0.214 0.452 0.004 0.36 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.009 0.013 0.602 0.003 0.093  0.408 0.482 0.121 0.991 0.227 
Spearman Correlation  0.545** 0.515** 0 0.581** 0.499**  0.343 0.313 0.456 0.151 0.379 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Based on the correlation results show in Table 17, the results pointed out that being a larger 
organisation (in terms of sales, market capitalisation and assets) is quite advantageous, and is 
likely to indicate a larger amount of hard key performance indicator disclosures, if the 
organisations operated in a high-profile industry. Whereas, for a low-profile industry, relative 
size is not a good proxy of non-financial information disclosure amount. Once again, after the 
industry variation had been adjusted, the results remained unchanged (See Appendix 7.2.2).  
 
Following Hackston & Milne (1996), several runs of the 1st regression models were carried out 
using the different profitability measures (average return on assets 2012-2016, return on equity 
2016, and average return on equity 2012-2016) and size measures (Nat log of market 
capitalisation 2016 and Nat log of total assets 2016). The regressions indicated that none of the 
four profitability measures and industry measures even approach significance, however the 
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model marginally improved when it substituted Nat log of sales 2016 with Nat log of market 
capitalisation 2016. To save space, the full results are not reported here.  
 
Overall, the results were moderately consistent with the study of Hackston & Milne (1996), 
demonstrating that being a larger organisation (in terms of sales, market capitalisation and 
assets) is likely to result in a larger percentage of GRI G4 non-financial disclosures, regardless 
of whether the organisation operates in a high-profile industry or not. While, for a low-profile 
industry, relative size is not really a good proxy for measuring the amount of non-financial 
information disclosures. The logical explanations are rested upon two premises. First, the low-
profile industry organisations do not experience greater public pressures for compliance than 
other high-profile industry organisations (Higgins et al., 2015; Higgins et al., 2018). Second, 
the low profile-industry organisations may not have robust sustainability management systems 
in place to keep track of such information and therefore, they have limited influence on the 
extensiveness of non-financial disclosures (Stubbs et al., 2013). 
4.4.2 2nd Regression model - Overseas listings  
In addition to investigating the possible relationship of size and industry with disclosure amount, 
this study also examined the possible relationship of overseas (multiple) stock exchange listings 
on disclosure amount. This is an attempt to gain an insight into understanding of whether the 
New Zealand listed organisations who are listing on overseas stock exchanges are disclosing 
more GRI G4 non-financial information than only New Zealand listed organisations.  
 
As shown in Table 18, the sampled organisations were partitioned into three distinct groups, 
namely: overseas listing, overseas listing 1 and overseas listing 2. First, overseas listing is for 
those New Zealand listed organisations with dual listings on North America (USA and Canada) 
stock exchanges. Second, overseas listing 1 is for those New Zealand organisations with dual 
listing on North America and Europe stock exchanges. Finally, overseas listing 2 is for those 
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New Zealand listed organisations with multiple listing on North America, Europe and Australia 
stock exchanges. Thus, overseas stock exchange listing was introduced as a dummy variable 
that takes the binary value of (1) and (0) in the “size-industry-GRI measures” regression 
previously presented. 
Table 18: Overseas stock exchange listings 






 New Zealand, Australia, Europe and North America     
2 AUCKLAND INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT LIMITED 1 1 1 
3 MERIDIAN ENERGY LIMITED 1 1 1 
4 SPARK NEW ZEALAND LIMITED 1 1 1 
6 FISHER & PAYKEL HEALTHCARE CORPORATION LIMITED 1 1 1 
14 AIR NEW ZEALAND LIMITED 1 1 1 
30 SKY NETWORK TELEVISION LIMITED 1 1 1 
34 THE A2 MILK COMPANY LIMITED 1 1 1 
 New Zealand, Europe and North America     
16 KIWI PROPERTY GROUP LIMITED 1 1 1 
18 NEW ZEALAND REFINING CO LIMITED 1 1 1 
22 RESTAURANT BRANDS NEW ZEALAND LIMITED 1 1 1 
48 RUBICON LIMITED 1 1 1 
 New Zealand, Australia and Europe     
5 FLETCHER BUILDING LIMITED 0 1 1 
7 MERCURY NZ LIMITED 0 1 1 
8 CONTACT ENERGY LIMITED 0 1 1 
10 SKY CITY ENTERTAINMENT GROUP LIMITED 0 1 1 
11 Z ENERGY LIMITED 0 1 1 
15 GENESIS ENERGY LIMITED 0 1 1 
24 TEGEL GROUP HOLDINGS LIMITED 0 1 1 
31 INFRATIL LIMITED 0 1 1 
32 TRADE ME GROUP LIMITED 0 1 1 
33 CHORUS LIMITED 0 1 1 
39 CBL CORPORATION LIMITED 0 1 1 
46 TOWER LIMITED 0 1 1 
 New Zealand and Europe     
9 VECTOR LIMITED 0 1 1 
12 PORT OF TAURANGA LIMITED 0 1 1 
13 TRUSTPOWER LIMITED 0 1 1 
17 MAINFREIGHT LIMITED 0 1 1 
19 THE WAREHOUSE GROUP LIMITED 0 1 1 
21 SCALES CORPORATION LIMITED 0 1 1 
28 RYMAN HEALTHCARE LIMITED 0 1 1 
35 FREIGHTWAYS LIMITED 0 1 1 
36 BRISCOE GROUP LIMITED 0 1 1 
40 COMVITA LIMITED 0 1 1 
42 PGG WRIGHTSON LIMITED 0 1 1 
43 TOURISM HOLDINGS LIMITED 0 1 1 
45 STEEL & TUBE HOLDINGS LIMITED 0 1 1 
47 HALLENSTEIN GLASSON HOLDINGS LIMITED 0 1 1 
 New Zealand and Australia     
23 KATHMANDU HOLDINGS LIMITED 0 0 1 
27 NZME LIMITED 0 0 1 
29 EBOS GROUP LIMITED 0 0 1 
38 SYNLAIT MILK LIMITED 0 0 1 
 New Zealand only     
1 FONTERRA CO-OPERATIVE GROUP LIMITED 0 0 0 
20 SANFORD LIMITED 0 0 0 
25 T&G GLOBAL LIMITED 0 0 0 
26 OPUS INTERNATIONAL CONSULTANTS LIMITED 0 0 0 
37 DELEGAT GROUP LIMITED 0 0 0 
41 GREEN CROSS HEALTH LIMITED 0 0 0 
44 COLONIAL MOTOR COMPANY LIMITED 0 0 0 
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Industry variation 1 
Table 19: Regression results - Nat log of sales 2016 + Industry variation 1 + Overseas listing 
 Overseas listing B SE B Beta t Sig. 
Nat Log of Sales 2016 2.14705 0.95306 0.32444 2.25279 0.02931 
Industry (1) 0.86108 2.33110 0.05451 0.36939 0.71361 
Overseas listing 1.47913 2.41153 0.08857 0.61336 0.54280 
(Constant) -34.77482 19.31035 0.00000 -1.80084 0.07858 
 
Regression measures  ANovA DF  Sum of Squares  Mean Squares  
Multiple R= 0.35700  Regression 3   301.52463   100.50821 
R Square = 0.12749  Residual 44   2063.50781   46.89790 
Adjusted R = 0.06800     F= 2365.03243  F= 0.1080 
Standard error = 0.06848          
 
Note: B = regression coefficient; SE B = standard error of regression coefficient; Beta = standardized regression 
coefficient; Industry = industry classification - dummy variable with 1 = high profile, 0 = low profile; Overseas 
listing = overseas listing classification - dummy variable with 1 = US or Canadian listings, 0 = others; n = 48 
 
Table 20: Regression results - Nat log of sales 2016 + Industry variation 1 + Overseas listing 1 
 Overseas listing 1 B SE B Beta t Sig. 
Nat Log of Sales 2016 2.03138 0.94718 0.30696 2.14465 0.03754 
Industry (1) 0.93304 2.25952 0.05907 0.41294 0.68166 
Overseas listing 1 2.73566 2.35283 0.16380 1.16271 0.25121 
(Constant) -34.22320 19.09766 0.00000 -1.79201 0.08001 
 
Regression measures  ANovA DF  Sum of Squares  Mean Squares  
Multiple R= 0.38200  Regression 3   345.91853   115.30618 
R Square = 0.14626  Residual 44   2019.11391   45.88895 
Adjusted R = 0.08805     F= 2365.03243  F= 0.0710 
Standard error = 0.06774          
 
Note: B = regression coefficient; SE B = standard error of regression coefficient; Beta = standardized regression 
coefficient; Industry = industry classification - dummy variable with 1 = high profile, 0 = low profile; Overseas 
listing 1 = overseas listing classification - dummy variable with 1 = US, Canada or Europe listings, 0 = others; n 
= 48 
 
Table 21: Regression results - Nat log of sales 2016 + Industry variation 1 + Overseas listing 2 
Overseas listing 2 B SE B Beta t Sig. 
Nat Log of Sales 2016 2.19297 0.94471 0.33138 2.32131 0.02496 
Industry (1) 0.77828 2.27915 0.04927 0.34148 0.73437 
Overseas listing 2 3.16527 2.80673 0.15915 1.12774 0.26554 
(Constant) -38.02168 19.36707 0.00000 -1.96321 0.05596 
 
Regression measures  ANovA DF  Sum of Squares  Mean Squares  
Multiple R= 0.35300  Regression 3   295.14191   98.38064 
R Square = 0.12479  Residual 44   2069.89052   47.04297 
Adjusted R = 0.06512     F= 2365.03243  F= 0.1150 
Standard error = 0.06859           
 
Note: B = regression coefficient; SE B = standard error of regression coefficient; Beta = standardized regression 
coefficient; Industry = industry classification - dummy variable with 1 = high profile, 0 = low profile; Overseas 
listing 2 = overseas listing classification - dummy variable with 1 = US, Canada, Europe or Australia listings, 0 = 
others; n = 48 
 | P a g e  
 
113 
From the regression results reported in Tables 19 - 21, the regression models were calculated 
to predict Total GRI % based on size (Nat log of sales 2016), Industry (1) and overseas listings 
(overseas listing, overseas listing 1, and overseas listing 2). Hackston & Milne (1996) found an 
overseas listing variable to be a significant factor in influencing the amount of non-financial 
disclosure because some dual-listed organisations were required by law and regulations, both 
legislation and the stock exchange, to report non-financial information. However, this study’s 
replicated regression analysis of all three overseas listings rejected the aforementioned assertion, 
indicating that overseas listings are not directly associated with the amount of non-financial 
information disclosures made by New Zealand organisations. In comparison to the regression 
results reported in Table 16, the results suggest that firm size of the sampled organisations is 
the common variable in explaining the amount of non-financial information disclosure, 
regardless of whether an organisation is a single, dual, or multiple listing. 
 
In order to avoid unreasonable statistical conclusions that size is the only significant variable, 
several runs of this model were carried out using the different size measures (Nat log of market 
capitalisation 2016 and Nat log of total assets 2016), profitability measures (average return on 
assets 2012-2016, return on equity 2016, and average return on equity 2012-2016) and GRI 
measures. Unsurprisingly, none of the measures even approach significance. However, the 
model marginally improved when substituted with Nat log of market capitalisation 2016, while 
other variables remained relatively insignificant (see Table 22). This shows the additional 
explanation gained from using the market capitalisation measure in place of the sales measure 
is quite marginal. Regardless it appears firm size is still a significant factor in influencing the 
percentage of GRI G4 non-financial disclosures.  
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Table 22: Regression results - Nat log of Market capitalisation 2016 + Industry variation 1 + 
Overseas listing 
Overseas listing B SE B Beta t Sig. 
Nat Log of Market Capitalisation 2016 2.10935 0.77474 0.37546 2.72265 0.00925 
Industry (1) 1.84698 2.22842 0.11693 0.82883 0.41167 
Overseas listing 1.01111 2.36023 0.06054 0.42839 0.67045 
(Constant) -35.10708 16.12981 0.00000 -2.17653 0.03493 
 
Regression measures  ANovA DF  Sum of Squares  Mean Squares  
Multiple R= 0.40900  Regression 3   395.35326   131.78442 
R Square = 0.16717  Residual 44   1969.67917   44.76544 
Adjusted R = 0.11038     F= 2365.03243  F= 0.0430 
Standard error = 0.06691          
 
Note: B = regression coefficient; SE B = standard error of regression coefficient; Beta = standardized regression 
coefficient; Industry = industry classification - dummy variable with 1 = high profile, 0 = low profile; Overseas 
listing = overseas listing classification - dummy variable with 1 = US or Canadian listings, 0 = others; n = 48 
 
Similarly, the researcher expects there to be significant statistical outcomes to overseas listing 
variables, especially once the industry variation measure has been adjusted. The replicated 
regression results rejected all three of the overseas listing measures, and found size to be the 
only significant factor in influencing the percentage of GRI G4 non-financial disclosures made 
by New Zealand listed organisations. To save space, the full regression results for industry 
variation 2 can be viewed in detail in Appendix 7.3. 
  
 | P a g e  
 
115 
4.5 Summary and Conclusions  
This chapter presented findings which addressed the first research question for the study: “What 
is the current quantity and quality of non-financial disclosure among the largest 50 New 
Zealand listed organisations?”. The quantitative findings suggest firm size as a significant 
factor in influencing the percentage of GRI G4 non-financial disclosures, or the quantity of 
sustainability reporting among New Zealand’s listed organisations. More specifically, firm size 
is most influential among high-profile industry organisations, and less so among low-profile 
industry organisations. A result consistent with Hackston and Milne (1996). In addition, the 
study fails to capture and recognise the relationships of overseas (multiple) stock exchange 
listings and the amount of non-financial information disclosures, suggesting that New Zealand 
dual-listed organisations are not generally disclosing more non-financial information than the 
NZX-only listed organisations. As far as the quality of sustainability disclosure among the 
NZX50 is concerned, the quality of the reporting can be summarised as inadequate. By 
examining the most and least disclosed GRI items, it is clear that most organisations do well in 
areas that require basic quantitative and qualitative disclosures, and tend to do poorly in areas 
where more specific quantitative disclosures are required. Overall, in this study, firm size 








Qualitative Results and Analysis  
5.1 Overview  
This chapter will provide a descriptive account from the listed organisations’ perspectives of 
various implications regarding: the rationales behind ‘for and against’ engagement in 
sustainability-related reporting practices among New Zealand’s listed organisations; 
managerial perceptions and attitudes toward the revised NZX’s recommendation for ESG 
reporting; and how the changes may impact their organisation’s sustainability-related reporting 
practices in the short-, medium- and long-term. The richness of this data is not only from an in-
depth quantitative content analysis or qualitative semi-structured interviews with corporate 
managers, but the researcher was also fortunate enough to hold an interview with the person 
who was directly involved in the design and implementation of the revised NZX Code. This 
opportunity has not only allowed this study to gain insights from the market regulator’s 
perspective regarding the revised NZX Code, but this has further enhanced the 
comprehensiveness of this research data. Hence, the later part of this chapter will discuss what 
are some of the rationales behind the market regulator to revise the NZX Code, and the potential 
effectiveness of the code under the ’comply or explain’ regime.  
5.2 Perspectives of listed organisations - Motivations for organisations to engage in 
sustainability reporting  
In the following subsections, the key themes from the interviews are discussed and these include: 
culture that encourages sustainability reporting, sustainability reporting is a strategic tool, 
sustainability reporting assists an organisation’s financial success, sustainability reporting is 
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perceived as the right thing to do, and most importantly, sustainability is used to manage 
internal and external stakeholder pressure. 
5.2.1. Organisational characteristics /structure encourage sustainability reporting  
In the absence of mandatory sustainability reporting requirements, empirical evidence strongly 
suggests internal organisational characteristics play a crucial role in how sustainability 
reporting is viewed and understood at the organisational level (Stubbs et al., 2013; Adams, 
2002). For sustainability reporting to take place at the organisational level, the chain of 
commands to execute the reporting must be made at the top of the organisation, such as within 
the office of the Chief Executive (CEO) or senior management. Frankental (2001) suggests an 
indicator of the real value of sustainability is dependent on the location of the sustainability 
function within the organisational structure. For this reason, it is important to take a step back, 
and make sense of where the function of sustainability sits within the organisational structure, 
because it “needs a home” (T1). Two reporting organisations pointed out: 
“It sits within the office of the CEO. As a sustainable business, we would want to do 
sustainability reporting, decisions as to at what level we do it, what frameworks we follow 
and how aggressive we are in terms of the quality of that sustainability reporting, get made 
really at board level.” (E1-1) 
 
“it sits on executive level, but it is executed on a very decentralised level.” (S1) 
 
Frankental (2001) further notes that if the function of sustainability is located within external 
affairs, corporate affairs or community affairs, an organisation’s sustainability function is seen 
as an adjunct of public relations (PR), “a function of an organisation’s external relationships, a 
peripheral activity, not something that needs to be embedded across the organisation 
horizontally and vertically” (p.22). Arguably, the function of sustainability can be legitimately 
disguised as a form of PR, that can subconsciously alter the general public’s perceptions and 
mislead consumers in regard to its environmental practices (Chen & Change, 2013). One 
reporting organisation pointed out:  
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“it sits within…Corporate Affairs, but it’s embedded in the business as well, so it’s a quite 
complicated question to answer. So, sustainability team group social responsibility…sits 
within Corporate Affairs.” (C1-1) 
 
The sustainability reporting literature suggests that the internal organisational structure affects 
the nature and the quality of sustainability reporting (Stubbs et al., 2013), and further suggests 
that management attitudes are equally vital in how sustainability reporting is carried out 
(Bebbington et al., 2009). One apparel organisation pointed out that a well-defined 
sustainability function within the organisational structure “feeds into business development” 
(T1), which subsequently allows the organisation to produce higher quality sustainability 
information that will comply and satisfy stakeholders’ expectations of organisations. Along 
these lines, two reporting organisations agreed and believed the realisation and significance of 
CEO or senior management involvement in sustainability reporting are of utmost importance 
in driving the reporting at organisational level: 
“The only thing I would add would be that we had quite a forward-thinking CEO, and in a 
way the CEO and the board, at that time, determined that that was the right thing to do and 
I think, we are quite grateful for that” (E1-2) 
 
“if you were to talk to our CFO, our Chief Financial Officer, you know, he gets all the 
sustainability...and so does my CEO [Chief Executive Officer], who I report to.” (A1) 
 
Overall, as is evident, sustainability reporting can only have real significant value to an 
organisation when the reporting originates from strong sustainability leadership for being 
accountable for wider societal interests. 
5.2.2. Sustainability reporting is perceived as a strategic tool  
Academic scholars have illustrated that disclosure is indeed beneficial to organisations (Carroll 
& Einwiller, 2014; Dingwerth & Eichinger, 2010; DeTienne & Lewis 2005; Rechberg & Syed, 
2013; Popa et al., 2009; Kolk & Pinkse, 2010). And, one way that organisations can become 
transparent is to undertake sustainability reporting (Buhr, 2010). As a result, the majority of the 
organisations appear to have incorporated the value of sustainability as part of the way they 
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operate, and extended their culture norms to sustainability reporting (Stubb et al., 2013). Four 
reporting organisations justified their views as follows:  
“I think our organisation’s objectives and sustainability are pretty much the same thing” 
(E1-1) 
 
“…it’s part of the values in the company” (E2) 
 
“…embedded in our culture, we have values as well, but more broadly things that probably 
relate mostly to the culture around customer expectations, key stakeholder expectations, 
and also expectations of our people, and that comes out in different ways through the non-
financial reporting” (I1)  
 
“…they’re everywhere…sustainability is a core part to it, so in terms of the day-to-day, it’s 
really embedded into the business” (T1) 
 
On the other hand, several organisations acknowledge that being perceived as a sustainable 
organisation does have its perks. This permits organisations to distinguish themselves from the 
rest of their competitors. Given every interviewed organisation is well-established within their 
respective industry, the majority of the organisations seem to have recognised this value, and 
positioned themselves in a way that is deemed socially and environmentally responsible, via 
aligning the value of sustainability with the organisation’s business strategy. Two reporting 
organisations further suggested that: 
“…you know, [sustainability] is so much part of our strategy… it’s part of everything we 
do” (C1-1) 
 
“our overall strategy is based around this Business Excellence Framework, which is really 
all founded on the belief that sustainability overlays everything that we do and we have to 
look at the business, so, if we’re thinking about value creation, we have to think about it in 
a really holistic way. Value is not just about that bottom line dollar, it’s also about all the 
non-financials.” (A1)  
 
It is important to note that, nowadays, organisations are primarily driven by external market 
forces (Frankental, 2001) and, therefore, they are judged and criticised by markets in 
accordance to their financial performance (Galant & Cadez, 2017). Consequently, this 
pressurises organisations to come up with “new” and “active” business strategies that conform 
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with different stakeholders’ expectations (Arvidsson, 2010). And, one way to conform with the 
stakeholders’ expectations is to narrate positive ‘stories’ around the organisations to the general 
public, via sustainability reporting (Buhr, 2010). Three organisations justified this view as 
follows:  
“the reason you report is to tell your story” (E2) 
 
“…[sustainability reporting] was more telling the complete story of what we’re doing, 
really” (S1) 
 
“[sustainability reporting] was the right thing for New Zealand, but also that it 
resonated with customers and that it was a way for us to different in the marketplace and 
that, you know, it would be meaningful from a customer-facing point of view” (E1-1) 
 
By narrating positive stories about the organisation, sustainability reporting can be viewed and 
seen as a strategic tool that helps an organisation to get ahead of their competitors. In part 
disclosure is a powerful tool that affords an organisation the opportunity to signal its effort to 
demonstrate transparency (Dingwerth & Eichinger, 2010; Cho & Patten, 2008), whereby 
manipulating the general perceptions of their stakeholders (Chen, Cho, & Patten, 2014; Chen 
& Chang, 2013). One apparel organisation illustrated this example as follows: 
“if you were to look at an insurance company or a bank or something, their priority might 
be their staff, they might produce a sustainability report because their staff to feel like ‘hey, 
I’m working for an organisation who’s actually doing something’” (T1) 
 
Overall, several reporting organisations may have viewed sustainability reporting as part of the 
way they do business, and therefore it is part of their culture. For some of these organisations, 
a different logic prevails. Those that view sustainability reporting as ‘part of their culture’ tend 
to pursue sustainability reporting as strategic motives (Higgins et al., 2015), rather than 
accountability. This provides evidence that without a quantifiable level of public and 
stakeholder pressure and interest, it is naïve to assume certain organisations will take steps 
towards more “comprehensive and demanding forms of documenting the social impacts of its 
activities” (Dierkes & Antal, 1986, p. 112).  
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5.2.3. Sustainability reporting is the right thing to do, and contributes to an organisation’s financial 
success  
While the majority of the organisations acknowledge that sustainability reporting is a vital asset 
for their organisation, and potentially for their organisation’s future financial success, for some, 
sustainability reporting is ‘the right thing to do’. Four reporting organisations expressed their 
views as follows: 
“we felt that it was the right thing to do… there are sort of broader levers that determine 
the financial, ups and downs, and that you want to be transparent” (E1-1) 
 
“we’ve got a very strong values-based culture in regard to doing the right thing” (S1)  
 
“we have the responsibility not just for [international investors], but for those other groups 
of people, customers and employees, you know, to make sure that we are doing the right 
thing and making this information available” (I1)  
 
“the reason for actually participating in it, is actually to give transparency on how we’re 
thinking for the long term as an organisation, and how we’re going to demonstrate that 
we’re delivering not just on an economic basis, but also on a social and environmental basis” 
(C1-2) 
 
Not only do the majority of the organisations agree that sustainability reporting is ‘the right 
thing to do’, but such an investment also allows them to formulate the organisation’s business 
strategy that creates a long-term relationship with their stakeholders and preserves their “license 
to operate” (S1).One respondent further justified this view as follows: 
“You know, if you’ve got a pissed off community versus a community that really gets what 
you are doing and supports you...what’s going to cost the business more money to deal 
with?” (A1)  
 
Articulating this with a sustainability values-based strategy, as mentioned, organisations are 
primarily driven by external market forces (Frankental, 2001) and, therefore, they are judged 
and criticised by markets in accordance to their financial performance (Galant & Cadez, 2017). 
To understand how and to what extent are financial objectives associated with an organisation’s 
decision to engage in sustainability reporting. Every interviewed organisation was asked to 
justify their views on whether their organisation pursues sustainability reporting because of the 
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following financial objectives - such as, profit maximisation, cost leadership, market leadership 
and share price maximisation - and a fair amount of organisations do generally accept the fact 
that these objectives come into play and get taken into account in their organisation’s decision-
making process. Three reporting organisations went on to say, for example, that:  
“we probably don’t put it out as bluntly as that” (E2) 
 
“I mean, a business at the end of the day has to be a financially sustainable business, you 
know, that’s a kind of a no brainer, and yes, having being a listed business… profit 
maximisation is huge” (T1) 
 
“Absolutely… I guess from our perspective we do have a focus on delivering returns to our 
shareholders, and it is a long term goal and game, and so elements of that, yes, obviously, 
market share, stability, or growing in the required areas in order to continue to achieve 
that…, because it’s a very competitive environment… we ultimately are responsible to 
deliver to our investors, and so we absolutely need to make sure that we are growing in the 
areas that we need to grow in, whether that be market share, things like that, but also 
keeping costs absolutely under control in order to do that.” (I1) 
 
From the above responses, several reporting organisations view sustainability reporting as part 
of the way they do business, and therefore it is part of their culture. For some of these 
organisations, a different logic prevails. Those that view sustainability reporting as ‘part of their 
culture’ tend to pursue sustainability reporting as strategic motives (Barnett & Salomon, 2006). 
In part some stakeholders are led to believe that non-financial information is a better predictor 
of an organisation’s future financial success. This originates from a belief that an organisation 
with strong internal corporate sustainability strategies allow the organisation to have a clearer 
sense of its long-term performance and, therefore, risk management (Stephenson, 2009). One 
respondent from an energy organisation elaborated on this view as follows:  
“the guy [Larry Fink - Chairman and CEO of BlackRock] from BlackRock last year sent a 
letter to all of the companies… that they invest in and said…we want to see you reporting 
ESG stuff because we think that’s a better prediction of how you perform than your financial 
statements. Financial statements give us a very good picture of what your finances were at 
the end of the year, and they tell us what you did last year, but they don’t tell us how you’re 
going to, how well you are going to do into the future, and we think that your ESG, so 
environmental, social, governance, is a much better predictor of the future than your 
financial statements, so your financial statements aren’t, aren’t an indicator at all” (E2) 
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Another respondent from the telecommunication organisation further pointed out that 
“organisations that have a strategy in this area and make effort in this area from a non-financial 
perspective perform better” (I1). This is because sometimes the “value goes much wider than 
financial success” (A1), and “the financial results are dependent on more things than just 
money” (E1-1). Two reporting organisations further justified these views as follows: 
“it’s kind of a longer kind of pay back loop, whereas if you do that, you give off a reputation 
of being an authentic, and caring, and sensible, organisation that’s in it for the long haul 
and that you’re a safe investment” (E1-1) 
 
“Our CFO would say… it’s hundreds of millions of dollars that’s it’s benefited in terms of 
our bottom line, in terms of this whole sustainability journey, so he would see it as being 
absolutely fundamental to our business success” (A1) 
 
One respondent from the apparel organisation went on to say:  
“we don’t have many issues, or any issues, talking to shareholders about the work we’re 
doing in [sustainability reporting]. They see it as risk mitigation, they see it as brand 
awareness, they see it as raising awareness amongst our customer base, which in turn is a 
very strong case for feeding back into that sort of financial sustainability “ (T1) 
 
Overall, the sustainability reporting literature has shown that, without a quantifiable level of 
public and stakeholder pressure and interest, it is naïve to assume certain organisations will take 
reasonable steps toward more “comprehensive and demanding forms of documenting the social 
impacts of its activities” (Dierkes & Antal, 1986, p. 112). As a matter of fact, organisations that 
are operated in a high-environmental impact industry have greater incentives to disguise 
sustainability disclosure as a strategic tool (Cho & Patten, 2008), which they arguably use to 
manage their non-financial stakeholder pressure, and which serves instrumentally for an 
organisation’s financial success, or legitimacy for another word (Barnett & Salomon, 2006; 
Higgins et al., 2015).  
5.2.4. Sustainability reporting helps to manage external and internal stakeholder pressures  
It appears that compliance with the norms of certain stakeholders allow organisations to receive 
continuous support. And, one way that organisations can engage with their stakeholders is to 
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undertake sustainability reporting (Buhr, 2010). It seems that the majority of the organisations 
are aware that being a good corporate citizen is the key driver that preserves their ‘license to 
operate’, manage their stakeholder pressure, and appears to be socially and environmentally 
responsible in the society in which they operate. Three organisations justified their views as 
follows: 
“Communities and partnerships are also really important…if we don’t operate responsibly, 
we won’t secure the resource consents to operate those aquaculture farms. It is important 
to be in a really good position with the communities in which we operate, noting they can 
make submissions and, oppose, and complain, so we need to maintain a positive relationship, 
tread lightly and give back to the communities in which we operate… so you can’t not be a 
good corporate citizen, to operate.” (A1) 
 
“To be able to survive as a tourism company, you need to include the whole system that 
surrounds you, and that’s, it makes complete sense, you know, long term you have to think 
about it and that’s why, I mean, yeah, we wouldn’t be a company without looking at the 
whole picture” (S1) 
 
“…we’re kind of in this really interesting melting pot where we have an interest in the 
outdoors, plus we have a lot of customers interested in this kind of stuff [sustainability 
issues]... because we’re sort of in the outdoors sector, but also the apparels sector too. And 
the apparels sector gets hammered with questions on ethics.” (T1) 
 
Yet it also seems that Milton Freidman’s view is still relevant (Friedman, 2009). In this 
viewpoint, the pressure for organisations to engage in sustainability reporting predominately 
comes from the organisation’s financial stakeholders, and any parties with financial interests 
(de Villiers & Van Staden, 2012) - such as investors (this word gets mentioned a lot within the 
interview transcripts), international investors, global investments firms, New Zealand 
superannuation and governance groups. One reporting telecommunication organisation 
accepted that one of their motivations to engage in sustainability reporting came from “global 
organisations that were tracking ESG or measuring us” (I1), and further commented that: 
“I think the other thing is that organisations at the top end, or organisations that do have 
dedicated, particularly investor relations people, that are talking to investors…it’s no secret 
that investors have been leading the charge of large companies…and they are very focused 
on this ESG space, and so, the organisations that are aware of that have got that investor 
pressure to provide this information” (I1) 
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Out of these views, the sustainability reporting literature has shown that reputation is perceived 
to be one of the most valuable intangible assets that an organisation must protect, as it provides 
the organisations with a competitive advantage (Roberts & Dowling, 2002; Schwaiger, 2004; 
Toms, 2002). Fombrun (1996, p. 57) defines reputation as an intangible asset that “produce 
tangible benefits: premium prices for products, lower costs for capital and labour, improved 
loyalty from employees, greater latitude in decision making, and a cushion of goodwill when 
crises hit”. Rather than focusing narrowly on the underlying economic benefits, an 
organisation’s reputation has become of utmost importance in which employees can distinguish 
“the difference between intentions without action and long term social responsibility” (Becker, 
2011, p. 22). Becker (2011) further suggests an organisation’s financial success is not only 
determined by managing their external stakeholder’s pressures, but also by managing its 
internal stakeholders (such as, employees). And, the majority of the organisations have largely 
acknowledged that being perceived as a sustainable organisation allows their organisation to 
capitalise this benefit, via attracting and retaining the right kind of employees (Barnett & 
Salomon, 2006). Three reporting organisations justified their views as follows: 
 “…one of the things that comes up from HR is how much ‘a hundred percent renewable’ 
gets mentioned by people joining as one of the reasons why they join the company, and I 
certainly have noticed that from leaving and coming back in, seeing all those different 
workplace cultures that I got to see as a consultant, how passionately held our 
environmental values are, along with a general culture of…, being good people and, you 
know, just generally being right sorts and doing the right thing, and getting along well, and, 
you know, that kind of good, kiwi mate-ship” (E1-1) 
 
“people come and work [for us] because we have this strong commitment to the environment, 
strong commitment to communities, strong commitment to diversity and inclusion, and 
strong commitment to health and safety, and people, that’s part of the culture, it’s really 
embedded, and that’s why people chose to work here. We have a good reputation for that 
stuff, and that’s why people chose to work here” (E2) 
 
“…value goes much wider than the financials, but having said that, a lot of that other value 
feeds into the financial success, so in the end it all contributes to that financial success, 
because like I said to you, if you get somebody working and they’re not productive, and they 
do a terrible job and that, you know, that has an impact on your bottom line, you know, if 
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you’ve got a bunch of not very productive people versus a bunch of really engaged people 
who are really innovative and looking for the next opportunity, who’s going to do better for 
you, financially?” (A1) 
 
This reckoning seems more apparent for organisations who operated in a high-environmental 
impact industry, as sustainability reporting is seen as a strategic tool that shapes the general 
perceptions of their stakeholders, and consequently, allows the organisation to subconsciously 
alter their employees’ perceptions about their organisation. One respondent from the energy 
organisation suggested as follows: 
“the reason you report is to tell your story, and why do you tell your story...you want your 
staff to believe in the company, because if they believe in the company, they work harder, 
they perform better” (E2) 
 
While this provides evidence that sustainability reporting is not only important for organisations, 
but such reporting allows the organisations to work towards satisfying their stakeholders’ 
expectations, both internally and externally. Thus, this enables organisations to create a long-
term relationship with their stakeholders, which is an essential element for the organisation’s 
long-term success (Barnett & Salomon, 2006).  
5.3 Perspectives of listed organisations - Motivations for organisations to not engage in 
sustainability reporting 
The Venn diagram (Appendix 2.1) illustrates the uptake of sustainability reporting by 
organisations on the NZX is sluggish, where approximately 71% of the New Zealand’s listed 
organisation do not actively engage in the reporting. To understand what might have motivated 
organisations to not undertake sustainability reporting, the interview questions were structured 
in ways that allowed this study to understand the research participants’ perspectives on the 
current uptake of sustainability reporting, and what might have motivated non-reporting 
organisations. The researcher acknowledges that these themes are derived from the limited 
sample of interview data, especially the perspectives of non-reporting organisations on what 
motivated them to not undertake sustainability reporting and additional, different, themes may 
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well emerge from interviews with a larger sample. In the following subsections, the key themes 
from the interviews are discussed and these include: the lack of general understanding regarding 
the value of sustainability reporting, the lack of resources to implement sustainability reporting, 
the lack of regulatory interventions to influence sustainability reporting, and the lack of demand 
for sustainability reporting. 
5.3.1. The lack of general understanding regarding the value of sustainability reporting 
A participant from a non-reporting organisation acknowledges sustainability reporting is indeed 
beneficial to their organisation, but this organisation is not interested in positioning their 
organisation in this way (Stubbs et al., 2013). In line with this statement, this is because “[their] 
vision and strategy is not around being green. Or it’s something [they] think about and focus 
on” (I2). This stems from a belief that the sustainability reporting sometimes does not offer 
much value to their shareholders, and the benefits associated with this type of reporting  do not 
outweigh the costs from that “extra reporting” (I2). To illustrate, he went on to say:  
“for us in assessing what value, what additional value would our shareholders, or other 
stakeholders, get from the extra reporting that we could do, we’ve formed a view that the 
benefit doesn’t outweigh the cost” (I2) 
 
Simply, without demonstrating quantified benefits received from that “extra reporting” (I2), it 
is naïve to assume many of these non-reporting organisations will meaningfully undertake 
sustainability reporting. One participant from the apparel organisation raised a similar point: 
“what’s off-putting, is the fact that people don’t really know how to do it and they just see 
it as an expense, as a cost, as a time thing and they don’t want to, you know, inundate the 
business with more work and things.” (T1). 
 
It is clear that a lack of clarity around the value of sustainability reporting can have a detrimental 
impact on its overall uptake. In part this is simply because managers may not consider that 
sustainability reporting is essential for achieving the business outcomes being pursued. Hence, 
if there is a lack of clarity around the value of sustainability reporting at the organisational level, 
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the importance of sustainability reporting is likely to sit relatively low within the organisation’s 
priority. Three reporting organisations expressed their views as follows: 
 “If you don’t have that moment of realisation that that’s the value you can get from it, it 
won’t happen without compliance” (E1-1) 
 
“In many respects, sustainability under the previous National government was not well 
understood and not really considered part of the value proposition” (A1) 
 
“I think it was maybe seen as another huge task… there’s maybe a smaller company, and 
they’re thinking like we’ve got five strategies to get done this year, one is expanding the 
business, and the other one is to cut staff cost, or employ people in these roles which we 
always wanted. The sustainability function on that list of priorities, will sit relatively low, 
so as businesses focus on these top four or five, these five priorities, they’re going to be 
really focused on completing one, two, three, maybe four, but that function, they don’t see 
it as big as a risk to the business as the other ones” (T1)  
 
One respondent from an apparel organisation went on to say: 
“I think that people may or may not have realised the importance and the potential for 
having it… I think like people probably haven’t quite realised what it can do, and maybe 
we’re still a little bit old school” (T1) 
 
 Overall, the value of sustainability reporting can be characterised on how the value of the 
reporting is perceived and understood by an organisation. Without a clear understanding 
towards the value of sustainability reporting, it is less likely that organisations, particularly non-
reporting organisations, will undertake the reporting 
5.3.2. The lack of resources to implement sustainability reporting 
The interviewees generally acknowledge that sustainability reporting could provide a 
competitive advantage to their organisation, however the non-reporting organisation is not 
interested in positioning their organisation this way (Stubbs et al., 2013). This is because 
sometimes the value achieved from sustainability reporting do not provide much tangible 
benefits, and generally do not outweigh the costs of undertaking it. One participant from energy 
organisation justified this view as follows: 
“most of these companies would have been doing something way better bang for buck by 
doing it in a marketing promotion that hits ten thousand people, than in an annual report 
that might get read by a thousand.” (E1-2)  
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Despite classifying the non-reporting organisation as ‘a non-reporter’, it is clear that this 
organisation has somewhat engaged in some types of communication platforms with their 
stakeholders in regard to sustainability issues. Although the coverage of sustainability issues is 
quite limited and not as extensive as disclosed by the reporting organisations, and it only covers 
the issues that they perceive to be key risks to their organisation. The non-reporting organisation 
respondent pointed out they only report on sustainability issues that they perceive to be absolute 
key risks to their organisation and, ultimately, what is significant and important to their 
stakeholders:  
“we try and identify what’s important to our investors and stakeholders in this space and 
report on that and from our perspectives” (I2).  
 
Further, one participant from the energy organisation exerted her experience as a consultant as 
follows: 
“For a lot of these [non-reporting] organisations, they have a peoples strategy, they take 
health and safety seriously, they probably do some community sponsorships, they probably 
do a tree planting, they’re probably looking at energy efficiency…For a lot of organisations, 
a sustainability report is a compliance exercise and a grudge kind of investment of time and 
effort to meet the FMA rules and listing rules and the requirement to be audited, to like just 
get it done, get it out the door, I don’t want to talk about it anymore as someone who used 
to sell reporting services, it’s like pushing shit uphill with a lot of companies” (E1-1) 
 
In line with earlier discussions, one of the most recurring theme has to do with the compliance 
costs associated with sustainability reporting. While the majority of the interviewed 
organisations believe that ‘a lack of general understanding’ around the value of sustainability 
reporting has further contributed to the lack of uptake of reporting practices in New Zealand. 
In a similar vein, the majority of the organisations agree with the non-reporter’s perspective on 
‘limited resources’, such as firm size, as a potential determinant for why non-reporting 
organisations forgo sustainability reporting. This aligns with the quantitative findings, where 
the researcher argues that the amount of the non-financial disclosures among the NZX50 is 
primarily driven by firm size. Several reporting organisations went on to say, for example, that:  
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“it might be cost for some entities” (C1-1) 
 
“the who do what we would consider good ESG reporting, and certainly since the NZX 
brought in their requirement, are ones who have discretionary income to essentially to fire 
off into a world of sustainability” (E1-2) 
 
“you’ll probably find that some of the organisations probably, like I said, as you start to 
work your way down the [NZX50], aren’t producing as much of this information, maybe not 
because they don’t want to, but the resources… there is quite a big difference in size and 
resource of the organisation from a sustainability or ESG perspective for the top ten and 
the bottom end of the fifty” (I1)  
 
Out of these views, a participant from the non-reporting organisation had a different view in 
mind, and believed that, without demonstrating a tangible value around the sustainability 
reporting, it is naïve to assume many of non-reporting organisations will meaningfully 
undertake the reporting (Stubb et al., 2013): 
“if someone turned up tomorrow and said ‘if you report fully against GRI, then these are 
the tangible differences, your share price will increase by x.’ If you can demonstrate hard 
evidence that it does actually make a difference, but otherwise I think it’s about issuers 
identifying what’s relevant and important in their own businesses… what’s important for 
their investors and their stakeholders and focusing on that” (I2) 
 
Overall, this provides evidence for the cost-benefit proposition of resources to undertake 
sustainability reporting, and the motivation for why non-reporting organisations forgo 
sustainability reporting. The lack of uptake of sustainability reporting in New Zealand can be 
largely branded by “a traditional view of business and society that privileges shareholder 
interests” (Stubbs et al., 2013, p. 462), or by how the value of the reporting is being perceived 
by the organisations (Higgins et al., 2018), and therefore, the importance of sustainability 
reporting in achieving the business outcome being pursued (Stubbs et al., 2013).  
5.3.3. The lack of regulatory interventions to influence sustainability reporting 
The majority of the interviewed organisations share a similar view that the ‘lack of regulation’ 
in New Zealand is the key reason why New Zealand’s listed organisations fall behind with the 
rest of the world regarding sustainability reporting. Three reporting organisations expressed 
their concerns as follows:  
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“the jurisdictions where sustainability reporting is more prevalent, are those where there 
are compulsory requirements to do sustainability reporting” (E1-1)  
 
“I think that one of the main things is around lack of regulatory impetus” (A1)  
 
“I actually think the fact that there was no requirement under the NZX listing rules to do 
any of that reporting has meant New Zealand is lagging” (E2) 
 
Two reporting organisations also believe that the ‘lack of regulation’ is one half of the formula, 
while the other half is rested upon the destination of its primary economic activity, non-
stakeholder pressures and interests, and their brand strategy. By engaging in sustainability 
reporting, it allows organisations to demonstrate their transparency of operation(s), removing 
information asymmetry between international non-financial stakeholders and organisations, 
and complying with stakeholders’ expectations, through non-financial disclosures in order to 
maintain an organisation’s reputation and, ultimately, enabling business survival. 
“those that have a more international presence have done more in that space, and those 
that have it tied into their brand” (A1)  
 
“it’s probably going to be a combination of where they’re selling the product to, and the 
interest from their stakeholders” (C1-2) 
 
The regressions, however, suggests otherwise, it indicates that there is no relationship between 
the level of non-financial disclosures and overseas listing variables (see Table 19-21), 
highlighting that firm size of the sampled organisations is the only variable in explaining the 
amount of non-financial information disclosures. It also appears that large organisations that do 
operate internationally are more likely to engage in sustainability reporting as part of an 
organisation’s defensive strategy to depressurise their non-financial stakeholder pressure, and 
retain its ‘license to operate’. Overall, this view highlights the understanding that a regulation 
intervention towards sustainability reporting would likely enhance the uptake of reporting and, 
consequently, help organisations become more accountable for their actions. 
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5.3.4. The lack of demand for sustainability reporting 
As previously mentioned, the majority of the organisations are aware that there has been a 
‘demand’, a ‘shift’ and a ‘trend’ towards sustainability information by end-users. Consequently, 
emerging organisations are now working tirelessly toward satisfying their stakeholders’ 
expectations by demonstrating its accountability, via incorporating the value of sustainability 
as part of the way they do business. In spite of this, the ‘lack of demand’ for sustainability 
reporting is found to be a potential determinant for why some organisations have selected to 
not undertake sustainability reporting. Two reporting organisations justified their views as 
follows:  
“I think everybody was just like ’meh, we’ll do it when we do it, when we need to, but for 
now we’ll just leave it” (S1)  
 
“you know, the organisations that are aware of that have got that investor pressure to 
provide this information, whereas some of the smaller companies may not sort of be under 
that same pressure, even though they’re listed, again, they just might not have that same 
pressure” (I1) 
 
It appears that the lack in general awareness around the value of sustainability reporting has 
also further imputed to the lack of demand in this area of reporting. More specifically, one 
respondent from the energy organisation believes that New Zealand investors’ narrow mind-
sets toward short-term financial gains are the reason why there has been further delays in the 
demand for sustainability reporting:  
“the New Zealand investors are, this is a personal opinion, still very narrow-mindedly 
focused on short term financial gain, and so that’s what companies have been reporting, 
because that’s what they’re interested in” (E2) 
 
She went on to say: 
“with the NZX code…hopefully soon investors in the New Zealand market will wake up to 
what … a lot of the other investors around the rest of the world know is that actually 
sustainability factors are a better prediction of future success than financial statements.” 
(E2) 
 
Overall, the lack of demand for sustainability reporting in New Zealand is two-fold. First, 
without a clear understanding towards the value of sustainability, it is less likely the reporting 
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will happen at the organisational level. Second, investor’s narrow mindsets toward short-term 
financial gains are the reason why there has been further delays in the demand for sustainability 
reporting. This means, without changing investors’ narrow mindsets toward sustainability 
reporting, it is less likely that organisations will undertake the reporting.  
5.4 Perspectives of listed organisations - The recommendation 4.3 of ESG reporting 
The NZX acknowledges there has been a call for more detailed non-financial disclosure among 
New Zealand’s listed organisations from different stakeholders. To address this concern, the 
recommendation for ESG reporting has been considered as part of a revision to the NZX Code. 
This is to ensure that New Zealand’s listed organisations become accountable for “the broad 
stakeholder views in New Zealand’s capital markets” (NZX, 2017c, p. 1). Given the scope of 
this revision, valuable insights and understanding can be gained by examining managerial 
perceptions and attitudes of the ‘reporting’ and ‘non-reporting’ organisations toward the revised 
NZX Code. 
5.4.1. The view from listed organisations - Opinions on the Recommendation of ESG reporting 
The majority of the organisations generally agree with the NZX’s recommendation for ESG 
reporting, including the participant from the non-reporting organisation. They generally 
acknowledge that the NZX’s recommendation will help to align the code with current 
international best practice, and keep listed organisations accountable to different stakeholders, 
as well as improving the overall transparency, disclosure and consistency of sustainability 
reports produced by the NZX’s listed organisations. Five participants expressed their views as 
follows: 
“…the recommendation has landed is about right, so it pretty closely aligns with the ASX 
one, so I think it gives scope for issuers to focus their non-financial reporting on what they 
think is important, so I think that...some issuers might choose to report more fully on what 
they’re doing in the environment space.” (I2) 
 
 “it’s good to finally…like you said before, before people weren’t reporting on it, and 
because of that people are going to be forced to. And I think, unfortunately, I mean it would 
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have been nicer if people did it intrinsically, if people had just done it already, but because 
that’s not happening, I think it’s a great thing.” (S1) 
 
“we absolutely agree with the recommendation. I think it is very sound and it very much 
brings the NZX Code into line with global best practice around this” (C1-1)  
 
“yeah…ultimately, we all should be reporting on non-financial information and if ESG is 
important to our key stakeholders both internally and externally, then absolutely we should 
be demonstrating the activity that we are doing towards these goals, and these strategies, 
right? like I say, ultimately, it’s about the long-term sustainability of the business, not E, S 
and G, but delivering for all key stakeholders, whether they be customers, or whether 
they’re investors” (I1)  
 
“I agree because if you don’t understand how an organisation is managing its human 
capital and natural capital and reputational capital, then you do not understand the future 
financial prospects of that organisation and whether it’s comprehensively managing its 
risks.” (E1-1) 
 
However, one participant believes that the NZX’s recommendation for ESG reporting “should 
have been stronger and that it should have been, you just have to do it, rather than report or 
explain” (E1-1)This view can be explained and justified by the sustainability reporting literature, 
where researchers argue that “reporting has only been achieved so far when mandated by law” 
(Dierkes & Antal, 1986, p. 113). One participant from the agriculture organisation illustrated 
this point in reference to integrated reporting: 
“If you compare this to South Africa, for example, where integrated reporting is mandatory, 
the take-off of integrated reporting there has been huge compared to New Zealand.” (A1) 
 
According to the sustainability reporting literature, in some of the world’s most regulated 
financial markets, the ‘comply and explain’ approach can have a compelling effect on the rate 
of sustainability reporting, even when applied as a voluntary instrument (Bartlles, Fogelberg, 
Hoballah, & Van der Lugt, 2016). Two respondents acknowledged that the NZX’s 
Recommendation ESG reporting is a reasonable first step, and expressed their views as follows: 
 “you want [the Recommendation 4.3 of ESG reporting] to be mandatory so you have to 
report on your ESG… maybe this is the first step for New Zealand” (T1)  
 
“I wish it was mandatory as opposed to voluntary, but it is definitely a positive step forward.” 
(A1) 
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Of significance, the argument is grounded on the ideal that organisations should not be able to 
use an “explain” option to explain why they are not reporting on its ESG impacts, and therefore 
“be able to duck out” (E1-1) from the reporting. While the NZX’s recommendation for ESG 
reporting may be enacted on a ‘comply or explain’ basis, listed organisations should not turn a 
blind eye, and forgo sustainability reporting for the sake of compliance costs with the reporting. 
Even if the NZX’s recommendation for ESG reporting is enacted as a ‘comply or explain’ basis, 
there is a strong incentive for an organisation to comply. The reason is that “companies in 
general don’t want to write an ‘explain why I’m not reporting’ statement” (E1-1) because 
today’s stakeholders no longer just evaluate an organisation from a financial point of view, but 
also by its non-financial performance (Popa et al., 2009; Kolk & Pinkse, 2010; Eccles et al., 
2011) and, therefore, failure to be perceived as transparent will have a detrimental effect on an 
organisation’s reputation (Gower, 2006). Two reporting organisations went on to comment:  
“obviously, [the NZX listed members] now have to do it, otherwise they’re going to stand 
out that they’re not” (S1) 
 
I think there won’t be so much ‘explain’. [The NZX listed members] don’t want to explain 
if they don’t have to, why they didn’t comply, right? Thon the whole will comply, because 
you don’t want to explain why you couldn’t and that makes you look bad” (E2) 
 
5.4.2. The view from listed organisations - Impacts of the Recommendation of ESG reporting 
When asked about “How do you think the changes to the NZX code (especially the 
recommendation 4.3 on ESG reporting) will impact your organisation’s non-financial 
reporting?”. The majority of the organisations’ responses can be summarised as “no major 
changes”. For example, three reporting organisations justified their views as follows: 
“I think we’ll just continue to go from strength to strength, I think all it does is reinforce 
that the journey that we’re on it the right journey” (A1) 
 
“I think that we’ve been on the journey for a while, so I think for us, what has been proposed 
isn’t going to have a huge amount of impact just because we’ve already been doing this for 
quite some time, but I just think it will help us tick the boxes in the sense of making sure that 
we’re meeting their requirements” (I1) 
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 “Not at all, and the reason I think that is because I think we’d already met that benchmark. 
There’ll be a few little tweaks, but you always make changes going forward, and to be honest, 
I don’t think there’s anything in there, so the ESG one in particular, there’s nothing in that 
space that we haven’t reported before… if any, we will comply totally with no problem.” 
(E2)  
 
Since the majority of the organisations are well established within their respective industries, it 
is easy to assume many of these organisations have already positioned themselves in a way that 
are deemed socially and environmentally responsible. Well, that is how they would see 
themselves, and how they want to appear to be seen in the eyes of their stakeholders. This view 
is further supported by the given responses to the follow-up question, when asked “without a 
stock exchange intervention, would your organisation have engaged in sustainability 
reporting?”. Most of responses could be summarised as ‘Yes’. In contrast, for the other two 
organisations who have published their very first standalone sustainability report, an 
understanding can be gained by examining their rationale for the organisation’s decision to 
engage in sustainability reporting. When asked: “Is the New Zealand Stock Exchange regulation 
the main driver of your organisation to publish your very first sustainability report?”. They 
commented as follows:  
“We were already doing it even before we knew about the announcement [the 
Recommendation 4.3 of ESG reporting]” (S1) 
 
“No, no, no…We were already on track to release a sustainability report, at the point where 
we were having the discussions around it and getting the feedback on the NZX Code, so the 
Code itself didn’t cause us to generate the sustainability report” (C1-2) 
 
Overall, the majority of the organisations are aware that being a good corporate citizen is a key 
driver that preserves its ‘license to operate’, manages stakeholder pressure, and appears to be 
socially and ethically responsible to a wide spectrum of stakeholders. This fact seems to have 
become more apparent for larger organisations as their organisations’ financial and non-
financial information have larger pecuniary impacts on the market, and therefore create the 
incentives for doing it (Jones et al., 2007; Cowen et al., 1987).  
 | P a g e  
 
137 
5.4.3. The view from listed organisations - impacts of the NZX’s recommendation and the future of 
sustainability reporting 
As one participant from a tourism organisation pointed out, “we’ve stuck our heads in the sand 
for a very long time” (S1); without reforming the perspectives of non-reporting organisations 
toward sustainability reporting, it is less likely that many of these non-reporting organisations 
will meaningfully engage in the reporting. To investigate the next best alternative solution that 
would encourage the uptake of sustainability reporting, and consequently, provide a valuable 
input to a future policy-making process, the research participants were asked to express their 
personal opinions on “Instead of a stock exchange intervention, what else could have been 
done differently to promote and encourage the uptake of sustainability reporting in NZ?”. The 
responses were mixed. However, the most recurring recommendations were “having the ESG 
reporting regulated at a stock exchange and/or a government level”. Three reporting 
organisations expressed their views as follows:  
“I think everything else that could have been tried was tried, and the stock exchange is the 
place where it has to happen to get more people reporting. If you don’t make it compulsory, 
it’s not going to happen.” (E1-1) 
 
“I just think that making it mandatory as much as anything, may be some of the provisions 
in there, there could be more in there, but I think as much as anything it should be 
mandatory” (A1) 
 
“you needed some type of regulatory intervention…stock exchange is good, and like I said, 
it lifts the bar for even privately-held or non-listed companies because they look to that as 
a benchmark, but the other option I guess would’ve been government regulation” (E2) 
 
One participant further pointed out that “if the government was to have more influence” (T1), 
the government could have positively uplifted the interest of sustainability reporting among 
New Zealand’s listed organisations. A meaningful dialogue with organisations would have also 
helped the government to create an awareness around the value of sustainability at an 
organisational level and, essentially, this would jumpstart the organisations to become more 
aware of the social and environmental impacts of its activities. One participant believed: 
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“if that discussion could have been started a lot earlier than it had, and for government to 
participate in it... I think that would have helped businesses to start that discussion and to 
participate in it as well” (S1) 
 
Overall, this view can be reinforced with the earlier discussion on the “the lack of regulatory 
interventions to influence sustainability reporting”, the findings argue that a regulation 
intervention is a crucial component in further inducing the uptake of sustainability reporting 
and, consequently, helping organisations become more accountable for their actions.  
5.4.3.1 How will the changes impact an organisation’s short-, medium- and long-term goals ? 
Sustainability reporting is a vital asset for an organisation’s future financial success, but such 
an asset also permits stakeholders to have a clear sense of direction of how the organisation is 
intending to operate in the short-, medium- and long-term, and most importantly, it allows them 
to make well-informed investment decisions (Daub, 2007; Legendre & Coderre, 2013; NZX, 
2017b). As stated, an organisation with a strong internal corporate sustainability strategy allows 
the organisation to have a clearer outlook of its short-, medium- and long-term organisational 
goals. This view is derived from the fact that an organisation with a strong internal corporate 
sustainability strategy affords the organisation the opportunity to plan-for and mitigate risks 
associated with uncertainties in respect to its operational activities (Stephenson, 2009). As a 
result, this helps the organisation to formulate a strategy that creates a long-term relationship 
with their stakeholders that feeds into the organisation’s financial success, and retains their 
license to operate. 
 
To shed light on this issue, all research participants were asked to express their opinions on 
“How the changes in the NZX code (especially the Recommendation 4.3 on ESG reporting) will 
impact your organisation’s short-, medium- and long-term organisational goals.” Most 
responses were mixed. However, the recurring responses could be summarised as “no major 
changes”.  
“it will have zero impact on what we were already doing” (E1-2) 
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“I don’t think that they will have any impact because I think our reporting is at such a level 
that its well in excess of our Code obligations as we’ve touched on earlier in the 
conversation…this is so much part of our strategy…it’s part of everything we do, it’s not 
about complying with the Code” (C1-1)  
 
“I don’t think the reporting necessarily has any further impact on that, it’s just more that 
our, our sustainability understanding and thinking in general… will have matured in the 
long, medium to long term.” (S1) 
 
“probably nothing, really, because I think we have had that view in our planning for a while 
and especially integrated reporting which is a framework we have been using particularly 
focuses you on short, medium and long-term value creation” (E2) 
 
As is shown, sustainability-conscious organisations with a strong internal sustainability strategy 
are more likely to have a well-defined view of their organisation’s future outlook that enables 
them to exactly pinpoint their organisation’s short-, medium-, and long-term sustainable 
development goals. However, of all the interviewed organisations, only two of organisations 
were able to clearly explain this. To illustrate, one reporting organisation suggested that:  
“Short term, we’ve had to rethink how we do our reporting around corporate governance. 
We’ve also had to implement some additional policies to reflect the breadth of requirements 
around the new code. An example is ethical behaviour and diversity. Medium term, we’ve 
set the objective next year of achieving full compliance with the code. Long term, I think it 
really gives a frame of reference, and reinforcement of the link between corporate 
governance and sustainability.” (A1) 
 
Overall, the findings could be summarised as the changes in the NZX code (the NZX’s 
recommendation for ESG reporting) may perhaps not have a significant impact to many of these 
reporting organisations’ short-, medium- and long-term goals, apart from extending the scope 
of their organisation’s current reporting. For some these reporting organisations, the NZX’s 
Recommendation for ESG reporting can be seen as:  
“ it’s just another good tool to reinforce the value on the stock exchange and in investors’ 
eyes around the non-financials and their contribution to value creation” (A1)  
 
This view can be reinforced by the fact that the majority of these organisations have already 
positioned themselves in such a way, via integrating the value of sustainability as part of the 
way they do business (Stubbs et al., 2013). 
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5.5 A Perspective of a market regulator - The recommendation 4.3 of ESG reporting 
The researcher was fortunate enough to interview the person who was directly involved in the 
design and implementation of the revised NZX Code. The interview guide used in this interview 
can be seen in detail in Appendix 5.3. The main objective of this interview was to gain an 
understanding of the rationale behind the revised NZX Code and the perceived effectiveness of 
the ‘comply and explain’ regime, from the market regulator’s perspective. To demonstrate 
accountability, the market regulator commented: “as the operator of a regulated market we 
have the opportunity to set rules which are binding on listed companies in terms of reporting 
rule” (R1). It is important to note that the revised NZX code was the first substantial update 
since 2003, and the market regulator acknowledged that “corporate governance practices had 
evolved since then” (R1). 
 
When asked about “what were the drivers behind the NZX’s decision to integrate ESG reporting 
into the revised corporate governance code,” the response could be summarised as: 
“A big theme behind the Code is about trying to help companies to help themselves and 
present the best picture they can of their company to investors.” (R1)  
 
In line with the earlier findings, from the market regulator’s perspective, the lack of 
sustainability reporting in New Zealand can be attributed to the ‘lack of awareness’ around the 
value of the reporting, which has further contributed to the ‘lack of demand’ for the reporting, 
respectively: 
“what was clear from our review was that [sustainability reporting] was quite new to them 
and they didn’t…have an awareness of it.” (R1) 
 
 “for overseas there’s been a push for this type of reporting for a while now, and obviously 
there’s been great take up…and also strong demand from investors. We’re only really 
recently seeing that emerge in New Zealand.” (R1) 
 
Without question, the provision of non-financial disclosure appears to be one of the most 
prominent aspects within the NZX Code the market regulator is intent to fortify. This is 
important because it ensures that listed organisations become accountable to a wider spectrum 
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of stakeholders, not just financial stakeholders. In response to this demand, the recommendation 
has been considered as part of a revision to the NZX Code. In the NZX’s own words, “the use 
of ESG disclosure is becoming more important in relation to investment decisions…Issuers can 
show investors that they are equipped for the long term, and are ready to respond to risks and 
take advantages of opportunities” (NZX, 2017c, p. 4). To capitalise on this opportunity, the 
market regulator has to take a reasonable step to “show leadership” (R1); and implemented the 
regulations that would reflect international best practices, and are beneficial to the domestic 
financial market: 
“[The] recommendation, the way it is drafted, is toward non-financial reporting, and that 
should include consideration of material ESG factors…we introduced this particular 
recommendation and specifically referred to ESG... because of the demand for it from 
investors, [and] the other thing for us which was important is, I think it can be a strategic 
advantage for the local market…those were the drivers behind introducing this Code. It was 
really about responding to feedback, keeping up with international best practice and 
looking for ways that local New Zealand companies can perform well on the international 
stage.” (R1) 
5.5.2. The view from a Market Regulator - The effectiveness of ‘comply or explain’ approach  
As noted earlier, the ‘comply and explain’ approach is regarded as a “soft law”, and the 
effectiveness of the ‘comply or explain’ regime has been called into question (Senn, 2018). 
Snyder (1994) defined soft laws as “rules of conduct which, in principle, have no legally 
binding force but which nevertheless may have practical effects” (p. 2), or as explained by the 
market regulator: 
“[the] recommendation, the way it is drafted, is toward non-financial reporting, and 
that should include consideration of material ESG factors. So, it’s not to say that every 
company must report ESG, so it asks them to think about it, if it is material for them, 
consider providing disclosure, and as you know, the recommendation is comply or 
explain. So, it’s been introduced softly, we don’t think this is appropriate for strict black 
letter law, saying ‘you must do this’” (R1) 
 
Due to this non-legally binding obligation, the effectiveness of the ‘comply or explain’ approach 
is somewhat debatable. Given the ESG reporting “was the first time [the market regulator] had 
really tackled the issue” (R1), a further question concerns: “how the New Zealand Stock 
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Exchange will enforce the code in order to improve the listed organisations’ non-financial 
disclosure behaviours?”. The market regulator responded as follows:  
“We’re not going to make it a one-off, just release the Code and then forget about it. It will 
be about observing how companies respond to the updated Corporate Governance Code 
and to see how disclosure practices evolve. You need some time to see that, a couple of 
reporting cycles probably, to get a good data set…that will allow us to obviously analyse 
some data, make some observations, if we need to deploy some further resources in the form 
of guidance or whatever it might be...but we think that [the comply or explain regime] is the 
right way to do it at this stage.” (R1) 
 
In line with past literature, Patten (2005) illustrates that an increase in disclosures can only be 
attributed to rising regulatory pressure. The researcher further probed the market regulator with 
a follow-up question: “If the NZX’s objective is to promote and encourage the uptake of 
sustainability reporting among the listed organisations, would it make more sense to have the 
recommendation of ESG reporting regulated, rather than having it on a comply or explain 
basis?”. The market regulator expressed his view as follows: 
“This is always an interesting question of balance…how much do you create binding 
obligations. There’s some key principles underpinning corporate governance, and that is 
one size doesn’t fit all.” (R1)  
 
In light of the revised NZX code, the nature of the code is to recognise that “one size doesn’t fit 
all” (R1), while attempting to gently raise an awareness around ESG issues, and potentially 
stimulate an overall uptake of sustainability reporting among New Zealand’s listed 
organisations. Even if the ‘comply or explain’ basis is seen as an ineffective enforcement 
mechanism, as stated by the market regulator, one way that a listed organisation can maintain 
a good reputation with their stakeholders is to demonstrate “transparency” (R1) and to achieve 
this, they must disclose and communicate “better information for the market and investor to 
make better informed decisions” (R1). The market regulator went on to say: 
“even though, it’s comply or explain, it’s not mandatory, it’s actually a compelling form 
of regulation, because companies need to say they’ve chosen not to do it and explain 
that to their shareholders, and they find that quite difficult.” (R1). 
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As argued by Ioannou & Serafeim (2017), while the mandatory sustainability reporting 
requirements may impose compliance costs on some organisations, the researchers seem to 
suggest otherwise, they find the effect of the mandatory regulation of ESG on organisations has 
been “value-enhancing rather than value-destroying” (p. 6). Of significance, this view can be 
justified by the fact that good governance practices can result in higher levels of transparency 
and disclosure, which afford organisations a long-term relationship with their stakeholders that 
facilitate value creation (Chi, 2009; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2017). Since, the ‘comply or explain’ 
regime is seen as an ineffective enforcement mechanism, based on the corporate governance 
literature, it is anticipated that the effectiveness of the ‘comply or explain’ will exert little 
pressure on the uptake of sustainability reporting in New Zealand. In part, the ‘comply or 
explain’ regime affords a legal loophole which allows the explanation for the absence of non-
financial disclosure to be seen as an acceptable justification for non-compliance. Nonetheless, 
the regulator and several organisations suggested it might be difficult to ‘opt-out’ explain why 
the code is not being followed.  
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5.6 Summary and Conclusions  
This chapter presented some descriptive findings which addressed various implications 
regarding: the rationales behind ‘for and against’ engagement in sustainability-related reporting 
practices among New Zealand’s listed organisations; managerial perceptions and attitudes 
toward the revised NZX’s recommendation for ESG reporting; and how the changes may 
impact their organisation’s sustainability-related reporting practices in the short-, medium- and 
long-term goals. 
 
Findings highlight that the lack of sustainability reporting in New Zealand can be largely 
attributed to the lack of general understanding around the value of sustainability reporting; the 
lack of resources to implement the reporting; the lack of regulatory interventions to influence 
the reporting; and the lack of demand for the reporting. The rationales for organisations that do 
report include: an internal organisational structure that encourages sustainability reporting; 
sustainability reporting is perceived being a strategic tool; sustainability reporting assisting an 
organisation’s financial success; and sustainability reporting is used to manage external and 
internal stakeholder pressure. 
 
The majority of the organisations generally agreed that the NZX’s recommendation for ESG 
reporting would likely further induce the uptake of sustainability reporting among New 
Zealand’s listed organisations. Some organisations believed that the NZX’s recommendation 
for ESG reporting should have been mandated rather than prescribing it as a ‘comply or explain’ 
basis. Nonetheless, from the listed organisations’ point of views, the NZX’s recommendation 
for ESG reporting was a reasonable first-step taken by the NZX to further accelerate 
sustainability reporting in New Zealand.  
 
As regards to how the revised NZX code may impact their organisation’s sustainability-related 
reporting practices in the short-, medium- and long-term goals, the findings could be 
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summarised as the changes in the NZX code (the NZX’s recommendation for ESG reporting) 
may perhaps not have a significant impact, apart from extending the scope of their 
organisation’s current reporting. The reason is that many of these reporting organisations have  
already positioned themselves as such, and are fully committed to reporting non-financial 
information. 
 
From the market regulator’s perspective, “[a] big theme behind the Code is about trying to help 
companies to help themselves and present the best picture they can of their company to 
investors.” (R1) and “even though, it’s comply or explain, it’s not mandatory, it’s actually a 
compelling form of regulation” (R1).Whether the ‘comply or explain’ regime will be effective 
remains to be seen. Non-reporters may remain so by making use of an ‘explain’ option to 
provide explanations why they deviate from the Code’s provisions, rather than complying with 
it. Both the regulator and several reporters thought this would not be easy. But the regulator 
suggests it will take at least a couple of years to determine. A case of ‘watch this space’.  
  




Discussion and Analysis  
6.1 Overview  
This chapter is divided into two key sections. The first section will discuss the quantitative 
research concerning the current state of the quality of reporting among New Zealand’s listed 
organisations and its potential determinants. The second section discusses the qualitative 
research concerning the rationales behind ‘for and against’ sustainability-related reporting 
practices, and managerial perceptions and attitudes toward it. Using theoretical perspectives 
framed by legitimacy, institutional, and stakeholder theories, it enables this study to speculate 
and draw various implications regarding: how and to what extent the revised NZX Code may 
or may not improve sustainability reporting in New Zealand.  
6.2 Quantitative Discussion and Analysis 
6.2.1 The potential determinants of sustainability reporting in New Zealand  
In the context of sustainability reporting, profitability measures are proven to have a positive 
relationship with the level of non-financial disclosures and organisational profitability because 
managers are led to believe that engaging in such disclosures are necessary to make an 
organisation profitable (Galant & Cadez, 2017) and, therefore, differentiate itself and survive 
in today’s competitive business environment (Cowen et al., 1987; Atkinson, 2002; Porter & 
Van der Linde, 1995). However, the study failed to validate this relationship and recognise the 
profitability measures as one of the potential determinants in explaining the extensiveness of 
non-financial disclosures. The result mirrored what Hackston & Milne (1996) found in their 
study, suggesting the amount of non-financial information disclosed by the NZX50 is not 
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directly and/or indirectly associated with organisational profitability. This is explained by the 
fact that sustainability disclosure may be perceived as a cultural practice (or legitimacy for 
another word) that organisations arguably use to manage their non-financial stakeholder 
pressure (Higgins et al., 2015), rather than investment decisions because investors have been 
willing to accept risk and invest with the minimal amount of disclosure ever since stock 
exchange appeared a couple of hundred years ago. 
 
On a side note, the sustainability reporting literature has identified industry as one of the most 
significant determinants for why organisations may want to undertake sustainability reporting 
(Graves & Waddock, 1994; Griffin & Mahon, 1997; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Moore, 2001; 
Ruf et al., 2001; Simpson & Kohers, 2002). This understanding can be traced back to an early 
discussion around the notion of public visibility, where the researchers argue high-profile 
organisations, with a high public visibility, are expected to display greater concern to improve 
their corporate image (Higgins et al., 2015). In part many of these high-profile organisations 
are highly visible in the society in which they operate, and consequently, the environmental and 
social impacts of their activities attract media attention from a wider range of non-financial 
stakeholders. And, one way for these high-profile organisations to alter the perceptions of the 
general public is to disclose sustainability-related information, such as disclosing extensive 
non-financial disclosures in relation to any one of the sustainability metrics, in contrast to low-
profile organisations (Hackston & Milne, 1996). Nevertheless, this study was unable to justify 
this relationship found in Hackston & Milne (1996), implying that high-profile organisations 
do not disclose more sustainability-related information than low-profile organisations. 
 
In line with the findings of Hackston & Milne (1996), this study only accepts firm size as the 
only potential determinant in explaining the amount of non-financial disclosures, while 
profitability and industry sensitivity do not. This view may be justified by the ‘beliefs’ of the 
 | P a g e  
 
148 
report preparers, for example, that organisations with the organisational objectives that are 
purely financial will not disclose a lot about social and environmental matters, but may publish 
sustainability reports to maintain and enhance their legitimacy. Whereas large high-profile 
organisations will regardless publish sustainability reports that are purely for strategic 
legitimacy reasons (Higgins et al., 2015) as they are led to believe that compliance with the 
norms of certain non-financial stakeholders enables organisations to preserve their “license to 
operate” (Kolk & Pinkse, 2010, p. 17), and consequently, obtain public approval from the 
society in which they operate (Clarkson et al., 2008). And, the quantitative findings seem to 
support this argument, highlighting that being a large organisation (in terms of sales, market 
capitalisation and assets) is quite advantageous, and is likely to indicate a greater amount of 
GRI hard key performance indicator disclosures (see Table 17).  
 
Given this study is unable to explain profitability and industry effects as potential determinants 
for the amount of non-financial disclosures, the relationship of overseas (multiple) stock 
exchange listings and the amount of non-financial information disclosures was then 
investigated. Once again, this study was unable to lucidly demonstrate this relationship, 
suggesting that New Zealand dual-listed organisations are not generally disclosing more 
sustainability-related information than NZX-only listed organisations. The possible 
explanations that may support this relationship are rested upon two premises. First, large listed 
organisations are constantly subjected to greater public scrutiny from the society in which they 
operate and, therefore, they are being pressured to be more transparent and accountable, via 
disclosure of sustainability-related information, by their influential non-financial stakeholders 
to become socially and environmentally responsible for its own activities (Dillard et al., 2004). 
Whereas, small listed organisations are not stereotypically subject to the same kind of non-
financial stakeholder pressure to voluntarily engage in sustainability reporting (Higgins et al., 
2015; Higgins et al., 2018). Since different organisations may experience different expectations 
 | P a g e  
 
149 
from society, they may find it necessary to report specific performance indicators in order to be 
perceived as legitimate (Roca & Searcy, 2012). A detailed discussion is provided in the next 
subsection. Second, larger organisations have greater resources to undertake sustainability 
reporting and, therefore, this empowers them to positively influence the extensiveness of 
sustainability-related information (Hackston & Milne, 1996).  
6.2.2 The current state of the quality of reporting among New Zealand’s listed organisations 
Through a rigorous content analysis of the quality of NZX50’s publicly available non-financial 
information disclosures, the findings indicated the rate of sustainability-related information 
disclosed by the NZX50 was disappointing. Past literature agreed that it was possible to 
distinguish the quality of disclosure as opposed to quantity (disclosure) by thoroughly 
examining the ratio of hard to soft disclosure GRI G4 items disclosed by the NZX50 (Clarkson 
et al., 2008). From Appendix 8.1, there are disclosure differences between reporting and non-
reporting organisations. The graph indicates that the amount of non-financial information 
reported by the NZX50 on average is 11% of the total GRI index (or equivalent to 10 key 
performance indicators). More specifically, the NZX50 on average disclosed 9% of total hard 
disclosure item index (or equivalent to 7 hard key performance indicators), while 17% for soft 
disclosure item index (or equivalent to 3 soft key performance indicators).  
 
By partitioning the sample into sub-groups, the level of disclosure among listed organisations 
within the NZX50 can be individually assessed. Appendix 8.2 separates reporters and non-
reporters. The results have now become more distinct in distinguishing the NZX50’s reporting 
behaviour. For reporters, the amount of non-financial disclose are averaged about 14% of the 
total GRI index (or equivalent to 12 key performance indicators), 13% of total hard disclosure 
item index (or equivalent to 9 key performance indicators), and 22% of total soft disclosure 
item index (or equivalent to 3 key performance indicators). On the other hand, non-reporting 
organisations averaged about 5% (or equivalent to 5 key performance indicators), 4% (or 
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equivalent to 3 key performance indicators), and 12% (or equivalent to 2 key performance 
indicators).  
 
There are similarities and differences between the results obtained and those reported in past 
studies. With exceptions to the GRI’s “Economic” indicators such as EC1, the indicators 
disclosed by Spanish (Gallego, 2006), Greek (Skouloudis & Evangelinos, 2009), and Canadian 
(Roca & Searcy, 2012) organisations were not commonly reported by the New Zealand’s listed 
organisations. For example, the GRI’s “Environmental” indicators on EN3 - direct energy 
consumption, EN8 - total water consumption, and EN15 and 16 - emissions were widely 
reported by the past studies, whereas New Zealand’s listed organisations barely discussed these 
environmental performance indicators. This is even among New Zealand’s best sustainability 
disclosers (see section 4.3.2). As regards to the GRI’s “Social” indicators, there were 
similarities in the social indicators disclosed such as SO1 - local communities, LA1 - 
breakdown of workforce, LA2 - employee benefits, LA6 - occupational health and safety, and 
LA9 - training and education. In line with the literature by Milne et al. (2003) and Chapman & 
Milne (2003), the results obtained show that New Zealand’s listed organisations typically do 
well in areas that require basic qualitative and quantitative disclosures - such as economic 
performance (EC1), indirect economic impacts (EC7 and 8), local communities (SO1), 
employment (LA1 and 2), occupational health and safety (LA6), and diversity and equal 
opportunity (LA12) - and tend to do poorly in areas where more specific quantitative disclosure 
is required - such as, training and education (LA11), equal remuneration for women and men 
(LA13), local communities (SO2 and 5), product responsibility dimensions (PR1, 2, 3, 4, and 
7), and issues concerning suppliers assessments (EN32; LA14 -15; HR10 - 11; and SO9 -10). 
 
Two explanations may be presented. First, Matten & Moon (2008) explain different countries 
may experience and/or have different national business systems that are coerced by a variety of 
national institutions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Deephouse, 1996). Hence, organisations may 
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find it necessary to report specific performance indicators in order to be perceived as legitimate 
(O'Donovan, 2002; Roca & Searcy, 2012), and meet the “expectations and demands of its 
powerful stakeholder” (Deegan, 2009, p. 360). Second, the New Zealand business environment 
is highly predominated by SMEs (Collins, Lawrence, Pavlovich, & Ryan, 2007; Collins, Roper, 
& Lawrence, 2010) and, therefore, an awareness around the value of sustainability reporting 
has not really expanded, and is not well understood by these organisations. Hence, this has 
further delayed the demand for sustainability reporting, and consequently, this has resulted in a 
low uptake of the reporting in New Zealand (Bebbington et al., 2009), although their reporting 
practice can be much improved by focusing on those items in Table 5 that receive poor or no 
coverage (Chapman & Milne, 2003).  
 
There are a number of theoretical explanations for the wide variety of indicators disclosed, 
where two particularly relevant perspectives are provided by stakeholder and legitimacy 
theories (Deegan & Unerman, 2006). Stakeholder theory argues organisations have social 
obligations to many individuals and groups who both affect and/or are affected by the 
organisation in the society in which they operate (Freeman, 1984). It is evident that the more 
salient the stakeholder to an organisation (Mitchell et al., 1997), the greater the effort 
management of the organisation to meet the expectations and demands of those stakeholders 
(Deegan, 2009). Hence, if different organisations have different pressures from different non-
financial stakeholders, it is easy to assume that, in the absence of mandatory sustainability 
reporting requirements, the organisations could be coerced to adopt reporting practices that 
achieve specific desired outcomes such as undertaking sustainability reporting that meets the 
“expectations and demands of its powerful stakeholder (while possibly ignoring the 
expectations of less powerful stakeholders) “ (Deegan, 2009, p. 360). 
 
For example, Fonterra and Sanford are large listed organisations with high public visibility (e.g. 
organisations that are highly visible due to their names or brands being highly [street] visible; 
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Higgins et al., 2015), both domestically and internationally, and, therefore, they are constantly 
put under pressure from the society in which they operate, particularly by their non-financial 
stakeholders (Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Higgins et al., 2015). In part these non-financial 
stakeholders, especially customers or consumers, have the power to potentially influence an 
organisation’s financial success (such as, unsatisfied consumers may stop buying products and 
services from one organisation), and consequently, this has become the organisation’s best 
interest to manage their non-financial stakeholder pressure (Aver et al., 2009; Becker, 2011; 
Higgins et al., 2015). And, one way that an organisation can maintain a good relationship with 
their stakeholders is to demonstrate transparency, such as participating in sustainability 
reporting activities (Carroll & Einwiller, 2014; Buhr, 2010). This can be explained with the 
interview results, when interviewed organisations were asked to “write down the top 3 key 
external stakeholders that might want sustainability-related information”; it was found that 
almost every organisation mentioned “customers” and “investors”, whom they consider to be 
their key external stakeholders or as their most powerful stakeholders.  
 
In a similar vein, legitimacy theory states that as organisations attempt to become 
institutionalised, they will deliberately try to mould their behaviours that are deemed ‘worthy’ 
in the eyes of a wider spectrum of stakeholders, thereby leading them to adopt rules and 
structures that enhance their legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Using a perspective framed 
by legitimacy theory, in the context of sustainability disclosure, environmental and social 
disclosure can be an effective mechanism for organisations to shape the general perceptions of 
their stakeholders and, essentially, the general public (Carroll & Einwiller, 2014). This is 
especially common for organisations that operate in a high-profile industry with high public 
visibility (Hackston & Milne, 1996; Higgins et al., 2015; Higgins et al., 2018). Given the quality 
and, especially the completeness, of the majority of New Zealand’s listed organisations are not 
that great, sustainability reporting may be viewed as part of an organisation’s overall strategy 
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that gains, maintains and repairs their legitimacy (Dillard et al., 2004; Higgins et al., 2015; 
Higgins et al., 2018; O'Donovan, 2002; Ratanajongkol, Davey, & Low, 2006; Tilling & Tilt, 
2010). 
 
To illustrate, Kathmandu and the Warehouse share a similar organisational structure, operate in 
a high-risk industry and, most importantly, they compete in a highly competitive retailing 
environment. The environment is not only competitive, but it has special characteristics and 
structure to its requirements - such as shortened lead time, faster inventory turnovers and high 
order fulfilment rates for consumer demand at its peak period. To become and remain 
responsive in this unique environment, various ethical issues in relation to supply chain, 
employment, product stewardship, and environmental issues are often being pushed aside 
(Turker & Altuntas, 2014). Because of this reason, Kathmandu and the Warehouse are highly 
concerned about their corporate image, and potentially frightened of their non-financial 
stakeholders (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008). In part it is not because they are actually concerned 
about their non-financial stakeholders, but their stakeholders can change and influence the 
financial success of the organisation (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Becker, 2011; Higgins et al., 
2015). For instance, to be perceived as transparent, the Warehouse and Kathmandu reported 
material items such as HR10 (% of new suppliers that were screened using human rights criteria) 
and HR11(negative human rights in the supply chain and actions taken) because they recognise 
that manufacturing processes in this particular sector do not usually require high skills or 
education and, therefore, it is often being outsourced to offshore countries - such as, India, 
Bangladesh, Vietnam, China- and are typically composed of either forced or child labour 
(Turker & Altuntas, 2014). Overall, this basic understanding is supported by legitimacy theory, 
which suggests that different organisations may experience slightly different pressures, 
potentially from the different sources, and consequently, the organisations may find it necessary 
to report specific performance indicators or undertake sustainability reporting altogether in 
order to be perceived as legitimate (Roca & Searcy, 2012). 
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6.3 Qualitative Discussion and Analysis  
The interview questions were framed in accordance to the pattern that emerged during the 
quantitative findings, and the questions covered the following areas:  
1) Examining what constitutes organisations to be ‘for or against’ the sustainability 
reporting practice in New Zealand context; 
2) How the revised NZX code, especially the NZX’s recommendation for ESG reporting, 
will induce the future uptake of sustainability reporting in New Zealand; and 
3) Investigating managerial perceptions and attitudes of ‘reporting’ and ‘non-reporting’ 
organisations toward the revised NZX code, especially the NZX’s recommendation for 
ESG reporting, and how might this change their disclosure practices in the short-, 
medium- and long-term. 
6.3.1 What constitutes organisations to be ‘for or against’ the sustainability reporting practice 
in New Zealand 
The social and organisational factors that were found to explain reporting and non-reporting in 
the sample of eight organisation are not a whole lot different from the early explorations of the 
motivations, drivers and barriers associated with sustainability reporting (Stubbs et al., 2013; 
Gray et al., 1996; Bansal & Roth, 2000; Higgins et al., 2015; Autry & Golicic 2010; Fombrun, 
2005; Lougee & Wallace 2008). The findings suggest that the lack of sustainability reporting 
in New Zealand can be attributed by a number of factors, which include:  
• The lack of general understanding regarding the value of sustainability reporting;  
• The lack of resources to implement the reporting; 
• The lack of regulatory interventions to influence the reporting; and 
• The lack of demand for the reporting 
 
The lack of sustainability reporting in New Zealand can be largely characterised by how the 
value of reporting is being perceived and understood by an organisation. The importance of 
sustainability reporting is likely to sit relatively low within an organisation’s priority list if the 
reporting is not perceived to be a risk factor for the organisation. This view can be justified as 
“something that is ‘nice to do’, but not a ‘must do’” (Stubbs et al., 2013, p. 466). Not 
surprisingly, without demonstrating quantified benefits associated with sustainability reporting, 
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it is less likely that non-reporting organisations will voluntarily engage in the reporting, let 
alone put in place the structural and cultural changes that facilitate the reporting (Stubbs et al., 
2013) because there are more effective ways for organisations of dealing with sustainability 
issues, rather than devoting all of their resources to sustainability reporting as “it’s expensive” 
(I2). One respondent from the non-reporting organisation earlier stated that: 
“if someone turned up tomorrow and said ‘if you report fully against GRI… your share 
price will increase by x.’ If you can demonstrate hard evidence that it does actually make a 
difference, but otherwise I think it’s about issuers identifying what’s relevant and important 
in their own businesses…” (I2) 
 
Most importantly, if they have not had the non-financial stakeholder pressure to voluntarily 
engage in sustainability reporting, then they have not been too interested in doing the reporting 
anyway. He went on to comment:  
“So we could choose to do GRI…but talking to our investor relations manager, in the last 
four years, he gets maybe one inquiry a year about that stuff, maybe one or two, and that’s 
from fund managers who need to do internal reporting” (I2) 
 
In contrast, reporting organisations, especially the top listed organisations with a high public 
visibility (e.g., Fonterra, the Warehouse, or Sanford) within the NZX50 do not need the “hard 
evidence” (I2) that demonstrates a positive relationship between the non-financial disclosures 
and the financial performance. Since sustainability reporting for them is seen as a way for their 
organisation to meet their social and ethical responsibilities (Higgins et al., 2018), typically 
disguised as a strategic tool that gains and maintains their legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Oliver, 1991), when they are under pressure from the society in which they operate, both 
internally and externally, or under the non-financial stakeholder pressure to be socially and 
ethically responsible (Bebbington et al., 2009; Higgins et al., 2015). One respondent from the 
telecommunication organisation commented:  
“some of the smaller companies may not be under that same[non-financial stakeholder] 
pressure, even though they’re listed…” (I1)  
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In part many of these non-reporting organisations do not have a very high public visibility and, 
therefore, they are not typically subjected to the same non-financial pressure to voluntarily 
engage in sustainability reporting, even if the non-reporting organisations are operated in a 
high-risk industry, their environment and social issues are less likely to attract media attention, 
or the general public (Higgins et al., 2015; Stubbs et al., 2013). Hence, non-reporting 
organisations may essentially be excused from undertaking this type of reporting (Higgins et 
al., 2018). Nonetheless, the majority of the organisations largely believe that the lack of 
regulatory interventions has further delayed the demand for sustainability reporting in New 
Zealand. 
 
On the contrary, for organisations that do engage in sustainability reporting, a number of 
motivational factors associated with sustainability reporting include:  
• Organisational characteristics/structure encourage sustainability reporting; 
• Sustainability reporting is perceived as a strategic tool; 
• Sustainability reporting assists an organisation’s financial success; and 
• Sustainability reporting is used to manage external and internal stakeholder pressure. 
 
This stems from the belief that the value associated with sustainability reporting outweighs the 
costs of undertaking it (Bebbington et al., 2009). Empirical evidence suggests internal 
organisational characteristics play a crucial role in how sustainability reporting is viewed and 
understood, and comes from a strong sustainability leadership for being accountable for wider 
societal interests (Stubbs et al., 2013). Certainly, this belief has been found as one of the 
rationales for why organisations state they engage in sustainability reporting. The findings 
further point out that internal organisational characteristics play a significant role in how the 
value of sustainability is viewed and understood.  
 
Nonetheless, a wide consensus among the interviewed organisations view sustainability as part 
of the way they do business and therefore, it is embedded within their organisational culture. 
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For some, a different logic prevails. It seems organisations that operate in a high-risk industry 
with a high public visibility are more likely to utilise sustainability reporting as a strategic tool 
(Higgins et al., 2018), which they arguably use to manage their non-financial stakeholder 
pressure in order to maintain their ‘license to operate’ (Higgins et al., 2015). This aligns with 
the notion of legitimacy theory, where environmental and social disclosures are used as strategic 
motives for organisations to shape the general perceptions of their non-financial stakeholders 
and, essentially, the general public (Carroll & Einwiller, 2014) in order to maintain their 
legitimacy (O'Donovan, 2002).  
 
As sustainability reporting continues to grow, organisations are becoming more alert to what is 
happening in today’s business (Galant & Cadez, 2017). As illustrated previously, if you 
compare and contrast non-reporting organisations inside the NZX50 (such as, A2 Milk 
Company Limited, CBL Corporation Limited or Delegat Group Limited) with reporting 
organisations of the same group (such as, the Warehouse Group Limited, Sanford Limited, 
Mercury NZ limited, or Fonterra Co-operative Group Limited), the general public would 
immediately recognise almost every reporting organisation. This is because these reporting 
organisations have a very high public visibility and, therefore, their organisations’ environment 
and social issues are more likely to attract much attention from a wider range of stakeholders 
(Higgins et al., 2015; Stubbs et al., 2013). Due to their high public profile, they are concerned 
about their corporate image, not that they concern about their non-financial stakeholders, 
because their non-financial stakeholders can potentially influence an organisation’s financial 
success, or financial performance (Higgins et al., 2018).  
 
This aligns with the notion of institutional theory, particularly through coercive and normative 
pressures, where an organisation is forced to adopt rules and structures that are deemed 
legitimately acceptable in the social contexts in which they operate (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Deephouse, 1996), and in return, organisations are rewarded with increased legitimacy, 
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resources and, most importantly, survival capabilities (Scott 1987; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1990; Suchman, 1995). As illustrated by one of the reporting organisations: 
the value of an organisation “goes much wider than the financials” (A1) and, therefore, 
organisations are expected to operate in respectable ways that benefit wider stakeholders, 
whether they are external or internal stakeholders. Overall, the findings suggest that an 
organisation undertakes sustainability reporting because of strategic legitimacy reasons in order 
to gain and maintain their legitimacy (Higgins et al., 2015). Non-reporting organisations may 
not have been subjected to the same pressure to report, and this is attributed by the lack of non-
financial stakeholder pressure to voluntarily engage in sustainability reporting (Bebbington et 
al., 2009; Stubbs et al., 2013; Higgins et al., 2018). 
6.3.2 What are managers’ perceptions and attitudes toward the changes to the new NZX code 
in the short, medium and long term and how might this change their practices? 
The majority of the organisations generally agreed that the NZX’s recommendation for ESG 
reporting would further induce the uptake of sustainability reporting among New Zealand’s 
listed organisations, and consequently, improve the overall transparency, disclosure and 
consistency of sustainability reporting produced by New Zealand’s listed organisations. 
However, some interviewed organisations believed the recommendation could have been 
stricter in a sense that the NZX’s recommendation for ESG reporting should have been 
mandated. Nonetheless, as mentioned by the interviewed organisations, the NZX’s 
Recommendation for ESG reporting was a reasonable first-step taken by the NZX to further 
accelerate sustainability reporting in New Zealand. 
 
As is evident, an organisation with a strong internal corporate sustainability strategy allows the 
organisation to have a clearer outlook of its short-, medium- and long-term organisational goal 
(Adams, 2002). This arises from the belief that an organisation with a strong internal corporate 
sustainability strategy affords an organisation the opportunity to plan-for and mitigate risks 
 | P a g e  
 
159 
associated with uncertainties in respect to its operational activities (Stephenson, 2009). Given 
the interviewed organisations are well-established organisations within their respective industry 
and have high public visibility, many of these organisations have already positioned themselves 
in a way that is deemed socially and environmentally responsible in the eyes of a wider 
spectrum of stakeholders, via incorporating the value of sustainability as part of the way they 
do business (Stubbs et al., 2013). Such organisations’ responses could be summarised as ‘no 
major changes’, apart from extending the scope of their current reporting. Again, this fits well 
with legitimacy theory, where sustainability reporting serves instrumentally for the sole purpose 
of financial success of the organisation or as symbolic reporting that forms part of an 
organisation’s overall business strategy that gains, maintains and repairs their legitimacy 
(Dillard et al., 2004; Higgins et al., 2015; Higgins et al., 2018; O'Donovan, 2002; Tilling & Tilt, 
2010). 
6.3.3 What is the likelihood the proposed updates (revisions) to the NZX code further induce 
the uptake of sustainability reporting among New Zealand’s listed organisations?  
The aim of the NZX code is to recognise that “one size doesn’t fit all” (R1), while attempting 
to gently raise an awareness around ESG issues, and potentially stimulate an overall uptake of 
sustainability reporting among New Zealand’s listed organisations. Although, it is worth 
mentioning, in core, the provisions of the corporate governance code are meant to be applied 
flexibly (Seidl et al., 2013), suggesting that organisations should have some level of flexibility 
to adjust the principles of corporate governance that fit their current reporting practice in order 
to become more efficient, rather than having to comply with all the Code’s provisions (Seidl et 
al., 2013). This means organisations are, therefore, given or provided with an option to justify 
why they deviate from the Code’s provisions, and what (if any) other arrangements/measures 
have been adopted in lieu of the absence of ESG reporting (Seidl et al., 2013). As stated by the 
market regulator:  
“ Having that flexibility is important, because we need to understand that perhaps for some 
companies…they may not be ready to provide this type of disclosure…and probably they 
are the companies who ESG was kind of a foreign concept for them. And, so for them 
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actually just getting a board comprised of suitably qualified individuals…while I’m sure 
they’d like to do it, it’s probably a resource factor,…so we need to acknowledge that and 
understand that we don’t want to impose regulation for regulation’s sake.” (R1) 
 
The ‘comply or explain’ model may have its merits in influencing sustainability reporting 
among New Zealand’s listed organisations and, according to the market regulator, “it’s actually 
a compelling form of regulation, because companies need to say they’ve chosen not to do it and 
explain that to their shareholders, and they find that quite difficult” (R1). In similar vein, the 
extent to which the ‘comply or explain’ offers good governance depends on the quality of the 
explanation. However it has been found that explanations for non-compliance are typically poor 
and uninformative (Shrives & Brennan, 2015). Thus, in this regard, the ‘comply or explain’ 
model is seen as an ineffective enforcement mechanism because the “explain” option allows an 
organisation to explain why they deviate from the Code’s provisions via dressing explanations 
for the absence of non-disclosure to be seen as an acceptable justification for non-compliance 
(Senn, 2018; Thanasas et al., 2018) while still retaining their legitimacy (Seidl et al., 2013). 
 
Organisations, however, seem to have different strategic reasons for wanting to disclose, or 
undertake sustainability reporting altogether. These range from pure philanthropy (actions 
taken for a better world and society without any payback) to conform with institutional pressure 
from the society in which organisations operate, or obvious return benefits such as financial 
gains, competitive benefits, and enhancing organisational reputation (Galant & Cadez, 2017; 
Higgins et al., 2015). Figure 3 divides New Zealand’s listed organisations into four distinct 
organisational groups that reflect their level of non-financial disclosures: Group 1 - the 
standouts; Group 2 - the reporters; Group 3 - the non-reporters; and Group 4 - the outsiders. 
Group 1, the standouts, includes New Zealand’s seven best sustainability reporters (see section 
4.2.3). Group 2, the reporters, the remaining reporting organisations inside the NZX50 after 
New Zealand’s seven best reporters. Group 3, the non-reporters, are the non-reporting 
organisations inside the NZX50. And, Group 4, the outsiders, the rest of the listed organisations 
outside the NZX50. By partitioning the aggregated New Zealand’s listed organisations into sub-
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groups, this permits the rationales behind ‘for and against’ engagement in sustainability-related 
reporting practices among these New Zealand’s listed organisations to be individually assessed, 
and speculates for how and to what extent the NZX’s Recommendation on ESG reporting 
requirements may affect each organisational group.  
Figure 3: The ‘FOUR’ distinct organisational groups 
 
As previously discussed, organisations within groups 1 and 2 are highly visible, and they are 
typically under enormous non-financial stakeholder pressure (pressure A) to be seen as 
environmentally and socially responsible in the society in which they operate (Hackston & 
Milne, 1996; Higgins et al., 2015; Higgins et al., 2018). More specifically, the majority of these 
organisations do not in fact require the “hard evidence” (I2) that demonstrates a positive 
relationship between the non-financial disclosures and the financial performance. The reason is 
that sustainability reporting for them is seen as a way to meet their social and ethical 
responsibilities (Higgins et al., 2018), which characteristically is disguised as a strategic tool 
that gains and maintains their legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991). This view 
is supported by the quantitative findings, where the quantity of non-financial disclosures among 
New Zealand’s listed organisations, particularly the NZX50, are primarily driven by firm size, 
whereas smaller listed organisations do not typically report. Given that there is a size effect 
found, it is possible to speculate and argue that many of these large listed organisations are 
motivated to become a reporter because of their high public visibility. In particular, large and 
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highly visible organisations are more likely to be scrutinised by their non-financial stakeholders 
and, therefore, they are concerned, not that they genuinely care about their stakeholders, but 
their financial stakeholders can potentially influence the financial success of their organisation 
as well as its license to operate may be at stake (O'Donovan, 2002; Dillard et al., 2004). And, 
as suggested by the sustainability reporting literature, one way for these organisations to 
demonstrate their accountability and transparency is to voluntarily engage in sustainability 
reporting (Buhr, 2010). Hence, for organisations within these organisational groups, 
sustainability reporting has instrumentally become part of an organisation’s defensive strategy, 
which purposely targets their non-financial stakeholders and, most importantly, ensures the 
continued financial success of their organisation.  
 
In contrast, organisations within groups 3 and 4 may not experience and/or have felt the same 
kind of non-financial stakeholder pressure to voluntarily engage in sustainability reporting. And, 
this raises a question: given these organisations have not made the effort by themselves to 
voluntarily engage in sustainability reporting in the past, how will the NZX code (pressure B) 
produce pressure for them to undertake the reporting? Or to put into simple terms, what is the 
chance that an additional pressure provided by the NZX code will motivate these organisations 
to become a reporter? Similar to the previously presented argument, the answer to this question 
can be explained by borrowing the lens from the notion of public visibility (Higgins et al., 2015), 
highlighting the presence of non-financial stakeholder pressure of these organisational groups 
has not really been high enough to motivate reporting. Considering the fact that the quantity of 
non-financial disclosures among New Zealand’s listed organisations, particularly the NZX50, 
are primarily driven by firm size, the ‘no resources’ arguments suddenly become viable in 
explaining an organisation’s sustainability disclosure behaviour and may inevitably apply to 
these organisations. In particular, due to resource constraints, the resource implications of 
producing “extra reporting” (I2) (such as, implementing sustainability management systems to 
keep track of such information or recruiting qualified sustainability personnel) are considerably 
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higher than utilising an “explain” option, or simply writing a couple of sentences to explain 
why they deviate from the Code’s provisions, rather than complying with it; while another 
argument lies on the assumption that they are not under the non-financial stakeholder pressure 
to voluntarily engage in sustainability reporting (Stubbs et al., 2013). 
 
Hess (2007, 2008) has also raised his concern in relation to voluntary disclosures, suggesting 
that voluntary disclosures alone are not adequate in achieving sustainability reporting because 
the reporting would be driven by strategic reasoning, rather than accountability. More 
specifically, if the power to execute sustainability reporting is rested upon an organisation’s 
board, an insufficiency of self-governance by organisations would lead to a lack of 
transparency, disclosure and comparability of sustainability reports (Dubbink et al., 2008). 
What is apparent is that many of these interviewed organisations are well-established within 
their respective industries, and are decent sustainability reporters. Without question, many of 
these reporting organisations will continue to undertake sustainability reporting because failure 
to be perceived as transparent will have a detrimental effect to their organisation’s reputation 
(Gower, 2006). However, a question on how the revised NZX code will improve the 
extensiveness of their sustainability information is less likely. One respondent from the energy 
organisation, for example, went on to say: 
“GRI is a really good framework, but again, it focuses on the material issues… the stuff that 
really matters to your organisation, that’s going to make a difference…there won’t be 
hundreds of [the GRI’s performance indicators], they’ll be a few that are really key” (E2) 
 
In line with the earlier findings, this understanding has likewise extended to the non-reporter 
(I2), however, without demonstrating quantified benefits received from that “extra reporting” 
(I2), it is almost less likely that non-reporting organisations will evocatively engage in 
sustainability reporting, let alone put in place the structural and cultural changes that facilitate 
the reporting (Stubbs et al., 2013). This is due to the fact that the benefits associated with 
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preparing sustainability information may not outweigh the costs from that extra reporting, 
especially the use of GRI framework (Gallego, 2006; Milne & Gray, 2013).  
 
Furthermore, the corporate governance literature (Seidl et al., 2013; Thanasas et al., 2018; 
MacNeil & Li, 2006) points out a positive correlation between the number of deviations and 
size; where smaller organisations are more likely to explain why they deviate from the Code’s 
provisions more often than larger organisations. Whether the ‘comply or explain’ regime will 
be effective remains to be seen. However, based on current research findings, this study 
anticipates that only a minority of high-profile non-reporting organisations within Group 3 
(such as, Comvita Limited, the A2 Milk Company Limited, Delegat Group Limited, Synlait 
Milk Limited, Freightways Limited, and Hallenstein Glasson Holdings Limited) will 
voluntarily undertake sustainability reporting, while the remaining organisations will more 
likely utilise an “explain” option to remain as non-reporters. To some degree, these non-
reporting organisations’ domestic and international presence are reasonably high and, therefore, 
they may find it necessary to report specific performance indicators (such as, social and product 
responsibility indicators) or undertake sustainability reporting altogether in order to be 
perceived as legitimate (Roca & Searcy, 2012). Although, it is worth mentioning, a negative 
relationship of the overseas (multiple) stock exchange listings and the amount of non-financial 
information disclosures was found, it is possible to speculate that the rationale behind for why 
these non-reporting organisations may engage in sustainability reporting in New Zealand is 
explained, or can be explained purely by strategic legitimacy reasons (Higgins et al., 2015). 
 
Since the New Zealand business environment is highly predominated by SMEs (Collins et al., 
2007; Collins et al., 2010), this study also speculates that listed organisations in Group 4 will 
more likely than not use an “explain” option to explain why they deviate from the Code’s 
provisions, rather than complying with it (Seidl et al., 2013; Senn, 2018; Shrive & Brennan, 
2015; Thanasas et al., 2018). Perhaps not surprisingly, legitimacy is something relevant to only 
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the very largest and highly visible organisations (Higgins et al., 2018), and this seems to be one 
of the many justifications for why SMEs do not undertake sustainability reporting. And, even 
if they have the will to adopt this type of reporting, due to resource constraints, the majority of 
SMEs may not have the capacity to do so. As such, organisations within these groups may be 
excused from voluntarily engaging in sustainability reporting, and above all, “fly under the 
radar” (Stubbs et al., 2013, p.462). Overall, the revised NZX code (especially the 
Recommendation 4.3 on ESG reporting) will perhaps not have a significant impact on the 
overall uptake of sustainability reporting among New Zealand’s listed organisations, let alone 
improving the quality of their sustainability information (and it is anticipated the quality of 
sustainability information will remain relatively unchanged until the recommendation of ESG 
reporting becomes at least regulated).  
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6.4 Summary and Conclusions  
This chapter discussed how and to what extent the revised NZX Code may or may not induce 
New Zealand’s listed organisations to undertake sustainability reporting or further improve it. 
Based on the quantitative analysis, size is a significant determinant in influencing the 
extensiveness of sustainability-related information among New Zealand’s listed organisations, 
and, size is most influential among high-profile industry organisations, and less so among low-
profile industry organisations. This is explained by the notion of public visibility, suggesting 
that large and highly visible organisations’ financial and sustainability information have larger 
economic consequences to the market (Jones et al., 2007) and, therefore, they are being 
pressured by their influential non-financial stakeholders, via disclosure of sustainability-related 
information, to become socially and environmentally responsible for its own activities (Dillard 
et al., 2004). Whereas smaller organisations do not stereotypically subject the same pressure to 
undertake this type of reporting (Stubbs et al., 2013; Higgins et al., 2018).  
 
Whereas, based on qualitative analysis, the rationale behind why organisations engage in 
sustainability reporting in New Zealand predominately is driven by strategic legitimacy reasons. 
What is apparent is that larger listed organisations are more likely to use sustainability reporting 
as symbolic reporting to form part of their organisation’s business strategy that gains, maintains 
and repairs their legitimacy. Considering the fact that the NZX’s recommendation was enacted 
under the ‘comply or explain’ regime, it is anticipated that the NZX’s recommendation for ESG 
reporting will exert weak pressure on an overall uptake of sustainability reporting among New 
Zealand’s listed organisations. Since the New Zealand business environment is largely 
predominated by SMEs, without demonstrate a tangible benefit associated with sustainability 
reporting, they are not expected to voluntarily engage in the reporting, let alone put in place the 
structural and cultural changes that facilitate the reporting (Stubbs et al., 2013). This 
justification is simply explained by the benefits associated with preparing sustainability-related 
information not outweighing the costs for that “extra reporting” (I2). 
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Finally, according to the market regulator, the objective of the NZX code is to recognise that 
“one size doesn’t fit all” (R1), while attempting to gently raise an awareness around ESG issues, 
and potentially stimulate an overall uptake of sustainability reporting among New Zealand’s 
listed organisations. Given the NZX’s recommendation for ESG reporting was enacted on a 
‘comply and explain’ regime, it is anticipated only a small group of large and highly visible 
non-reporting organisations within Group 3 (see Figure 3) will voluntarily engage sustainability 
reporting. Whereas, listed organisations in Group 4 will more likely than not to use an “explain” 
option to justify why they deviate from the Code’s provisions, rather than complying it. This 
argument is grounded on the idea that ‘comply or explain’ model being a weak enforcement 
mechanism that allows the explanations for the absence of non-compliance to be seen as an 
acceptable justification via imitating explanations provided by larger organisations. Overall, 
this study speculates that the revised NZX code (especially the Recommendation 4.3 on ESG 
reporting) will perhaps not have a significant impact to the overall uptake of sustainability 
reporting among New Zealand’s listed organisations. 
  





7.1 Overview  
This chapter presents conclusions to this thesis, which are structured according to the research 
questions. This is followed by recommendations, directions for future research, a concluding 
statement, and limitations. 
7.2 Conclusions 
RQ1: What is the current quantity and quality of non-financial disclosure among the 
largest 50 New Zealand listed organisations? 
The results obtained shows that the quality of sustainability-related information produced by 
the NZX50 is inadequate, and particularly, the analysis shows that organisations typically do 
well in areas that require basic quantitative and qualitative disclosures, and tend to do poorly in 
areas where more specific quantitative disclosures are required. Given the quality and, 
especially, the completeness of the majority of New Zealand’s listed organisations are not that 
great, it is evident that the more salient the stakeholder to an organisation (Mitchell et al., 1997), 
the greater the effort management of the organisation to meet the expectations and demands of 
those stakeholders (Deegan, 2009). If different organisations have different priorities for 
different stakeholders, it is virtually easy to assume that, in the absence of mandatory 
sustainability reporting requirements, organisations could be coerced to adopt reporting 
practices that achieve specific desired outcomes such as undertaking sustainability reporting 
that meets the “expectations and demands of its powerful stakeholder (while possibly ignoring 
the expectations of less powerful stakeholders) “ (Deegan, 2009, p. 360). Hence, sustainability 
 | P a g e  
 
169 
reporting practices among the New Zealand’s listed organisations provide might as well be 
viewed as part of the organisation’s overall strategy that gains, maintains and repairs their 
legitimacy (Dillard et al., 2004; Higgins et al., 2015; Higgins et al., 2018; O'Donovan, 2002; 
Tilling & Tilt, 2010), rather than accountability (Arvidsson, 2010). 
RQ2: What is the likely effect of the revised disclosure requirements in the NZX Code to 
further induce the uptake the sustainability reporting among New Zealand’s listed 
organisations. And what effect will it have on the quality of sustainability information among 
the largest 50 New Zealand listed organisations?  
The rationale behind the NZX’s decision to integrate ESG reporting within the revised NZX 
Code could be summarised as ‘helping listed organisations realise the value of sustainability 
reporting’ and he further stated that the NZX’s recommendation for ESG reporting will have 
“a good effect” (R1) on the overall uptake of sustainability reporting among New Zealand’s 
listed organisations. However, this study argues, due to the nature of the ‘comply or explain’ 
basis, it is anticipated that the NZX’s recommendation for ESG reporting will perhaps not have 
a significant impact to an overall uptake of sustainability reporting in New Zealand, let alone 
the quality of sustainability information. Although, the market regulator suggests otherwise, 
and argues that “ [the ‘comply or explain’ regime] is actually a compelling form of regulation, 
because companies need to say they’ve chosen not to do it and explain that to their 
shareholders, and they find that quite difficult.” (R1).  
 
In contradiction to the market regulator’s point of view, this study argues that the ‘comply or 
explain’ regime is a weak enforcement mechanism. The argument is situated the belief that the 
‘comply or explain’ regime affords an organisation the opportunity to utilise an “explain” option 
to justify why they deviate from the Code’s provisions while still retaining their legitimacy 
(Seidl et al., 2013), via dressing their explanations for the absence of non-disclosure to be seen 
as an acceptable justification for non-compliance (Senn, 2018). Even if non-reporting 
organisations decide to comply with the NZX’s Recommendation for ESG reporting, it is 
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anticipated that the rationale for why the organisations’ decisions to undertake the reporting 
will be driven purely by strategic legitimacy motives or decoupling, rather than accountability 
for “the broad stakeholder views in New Zealand’s capital markets” (NZX, 2017c, p.1). Hence, 
the quality and completeness of sustainability-related information produced by these 
organisations will not be that great.  
 
As is evident, the corporate governance literature (Seidl et al., 2013; MacNeil & Li, 2006; 
Thanasas et al., 2018) suggests a positive correlation between the number of deviations and size; 
where smaller organisations are much more profound to explain why they deviate from the 
Code’s provision more often as opposed to larger organisations. Since the New Zealand 
business environment is highly predominated by SMEs (Collins et al., 2007; Collins et al., 
2010), it is anticipated that non-reporting organisation will more than likely than not make use 
of an “explain” option to explain why they deviate from the Code’s provision, rather than 
complying with it. More specifically, in due course, the researcher speculates non-reporting 
organisations, especially SMEs, will more likely to imitate or mimic the statements of 
compliance provided by larger listed organisations, especially from the NZX50 or the ASX100, 
as a strategic response in order to gain and maintain their legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Oliver, 1991; Senn, 2018; Thanasas et al., 2018).  
RQ3: What are managers’ perceptions and attitudes toward the changes to the new NZX 
code in the short, medium and long term and how might this change their disclosure practices? 
As discussed, an organisation with a strong internal corporate sustainability strategy allows the 
organisation to have a clearer outlook of its short-, medium- and long-term organisational goal. 
This originates from the belief that an organisation with a strong internal corporate 
sustainability strategy affords the organisation to plan-for and mitigate risks associated with 
uncertainties in respect to their operational activities (Stephenson, 2009). Given the majority of 
the interviewed organisations have already positioned themselves in a way that is deemed 
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socially and environmentally responsible in the eyes of a wider spectrum of stakeholders, via 
incorporating the value of sustainability as part of the way they do business (Stubbs et al., 2013), 
the interviewed organisations’ responses could be summarised as ‘no major changes’, apart 
from extending the scope of their current reporting. As is shown, this fits well with the 
legitimacy theory, where sustainability reporting is viewed as a propaganda or symbolic 
reporting that forms part of an organisation’s overall strategy that gains, maintains and repairs 
their legitimacy (Dillard et al., 2004; Higgins et al., 2015; Higgins et al., 2018; O'Donovan, 
2002; Tilling & Tilt, 2010), rather than accountability (Arvidsson, 2010).  
7.3 Recommendations 
While the NZX’s recommendation for ESG reporting may be enacted as a ‘comply or explain’ 
basis, listed organisations should not turn a blind eye and forgo sustainability reporting for the 
sake of costs associated with the reporting. This view can be justified by the fact that 
transparency is highly valued in a corporate governance sense and therefore, a good corporate 
governance affords the foundations of good sustainability reporting practices in which creates 
value-enhancing relationships with all stakeholders (Welford, 2007), and is a pivotal element 
in promoting excellence in the reporting (Shahin & Zairi, 2007). For this reason, the researcher 
would recommend listed organisations who are thinking about initiating sustainability reporting 
as part of the compliance programme with the revised NZX Code to report because failure to 
be perceived as transparent will have a detrimental effect to an organisation’s financial success 
(Gower, 2006), and the current findings have valued the importance of sustainability reporting 
at the organisational level quite highly.  
 
Although the listed organisations are responsive to regulatory demands, the researcher believes 
that the effectiveness of a ‘comply or explain’ regime is somewhat debatable. In the context of 
the corporate governance, the extent to which the ‘comply or explain’ offers good governance 
depends on the quality of the explanation, however it has been found that explanations for non-
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compliance are typically poor and uninformative (Shrives & Brennan, 2015). The reason is that 
the ‘comply or explain’ model is an ineffective enforcement mechanism in which the “explain” 
option affords an organisation the legal loophole to explain why they deviate from the Code’s 
provisions while still retaining their legitimacy (Seidl et al., 2013) while being seen as an 
acceptable justification for non-compliance (Senn, 2018). Hess (2007, 2008) further points out 
that voluntary disclosures alone are not adequate in achieving sustainability reporting, and if 
the power to execute sustainability reporting is rested upon an organisation’s board, an 
insufficiency of self-governance by organisations would lead to lack of transparency, disclosure 
and comparability of sustainability reports (Dubbink et al., 2008). To address this concern, in 
the near future, the researcher would recommend to the market regulator to have the 
recommendation of ESG reporting regulated as the net effect of sustainability reporting is 
proven to be “value-enhancing than value-destroying” (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2017, p. 6). 
7.4 Directions for Future Research  
The findings of this thesis raise a number of potential avenues for future research. Firstly, 
partially replicating this research in the near future would be fruitful in understanding the actual 
impact of the revised NZX Code regarding sustainability reporting induces the uptake of 
sustainability reporting and, additionally, the quality of the reporting in New Zealand. More 
specifically, this would allow a better understanding of the effectiveness of the ‘comply and 
explain’ approach, which could provide a valuable input to a future policy-making process. 
Furthermore, this avenue of research would offer the opportunity to compare and contrast 
current research findings. 
 
Second, extending the research scope to include the perspectives of listed organisations that are 
situated outside the NZX50 would offer a fuller picture understanding of how the revised NZX 
Code may impact their organisation’s sustainability reporting. If any, what might have 
constituted their organisation to be ‘for or against’ the sustainability reporting practice. On top 
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of the first avenue of future research, this would offer a more in-depth qualitative analysis of 
the factors influencing organisations to avoid making ESG reporting and if any, under 
the ’comply or explain’ regime, how the revised NZX Code influences the disclosure strategies 
of organisations. This can be explored through an in-depth thematic qualitative content analysis 
of compliance statements issued by listed organisations in lieu of the absence of ESG reporting, 
and based on the patterns emerged from this content analysis, this can be followed-up with a 
qualitative semi-structure interview to further investigate what constitutes these organisations 
to deviate from the Code’s provisions and not undertake sustainability reporting altogether. 
 
Lastly, this study failed to fully capture the quality of sustainability reports produced sampled 
organisations’ sustainability reports. In terms of this perspective, this study did not analyse the 
quality of the sampled companies’ sustainability reports against all G4 items as this study only 
looked at the key performance indicators, while ignoring the general disclosure guidance like 
the CEO statement, corporate profile, governance structure of a reporting company and 
stakeholder engagement. Correspondingly, the results might not be able to fully represent each 
of the sampled organisations’ reporting quality. Hence, future studies should incorporate all the 
GRI G4 items to analyse the quality of reporting. On top of what have already been mentioned, 
to achieve this, a future research scholar should develop a rigid coding instrument that would 
allow the score to be assigned against the GRI general disclosure guidance. This would provide 
an opportunity for the researcher to fully examine the transparency of an organisation’s 
corporate governance practice. Of significance, organisations who receive higher scores would 
expect to have disclosed more non-financial information and therefore, this would demonstrate 
the difference in the quality of reporting. 
7.5 Concluding Statement  
As constantly mentioned throughout this thesis, transparency is seen as an essential constituent 
that organisations must cherish in today’s business environment. And, one way that 
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organisations can become transparent is to disclose sustainability information because 
disclosure is a powerful tool that will allow the organisations to subconsciously alter the general 
perceptions of their stakeholders. While the revised NZX Code for ESG reporting may be 
enacted under the ‘comply or explain’ regime, organisations should not be encouraged to 
explain for the absence of ESG reporting, rather the organisations should consider sustainability 
reporting as part of an organisation’s long-term investment or a strategic tool that affords the 
organisation the opportunity to meet the expectations of their existing and potential stakeholders. 
Given that transparency is highly valued in a corporate governance and, therefore, failure to be 
perceived as transparent will place an organisation in an unfavourable position that would have 
detrimental effect to the organisation’s reputation and their licence to operate. 
7.6 Limitations  
Like all environmental accounting studies, this research has also exposed to limitations. 
Subjectivity is a significant concern and it regards to be one the major limitations in qualitative 
accounting research. According to Bryman & Bell (2011), qualitative researchers sometimes 
criticise qualitative research as being too impressionistic and subjective. Determining the extent 
to which disclosure requirements of each performance indicator is covered by sampled 
organisations’ sustainability reports relies on the researcher’s judgement about what is 
significant and important. Overall, this can detract from the reliability of the research findings. 
To ensure that reliability of this research’s data is not jeopardised by a researcher’s subjectivity, 
an independent coder has been recruited by the researcher for this study to independently code 
six sampled organisations’ publicly available information measured against the GRI G4 
guidelines. Given the high levels of inter-coder reliability achieved, the content analysis was 
then performed solely by the researcher. 
 
The sample selection process used in this study is likewise regarded as one of the limitations. 
According to past literature by Cowen et al. (1987), they asserted large multinational 
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organisations are often under greater scrutiny from the general public and have more resources 
to report on sustainability-related disclosures in comparison to smaller ones. With reference to 
previous literature, this study mainly focuses on large multinationals, such as the ‘TOP 50’ 
listed organisations in the New Zealand stock exchange, as ranked by their market capitalisation. 
Given the lack of variation in the sample selection process, this fundamentally disregards the 
point of view of small- to medium-sized organisations, and consequently, the observed 
relationship may not hold for other types of organisations, such as SMEs, and it may be one of 
the main reasons why generalisations could not be drawn (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Nevertheless, 
every research will always be exposed to some sort of limitations, and these are inevitable. 
 
As discussed, the use of content analysis exposes several limitations (Gray et al., 1995; Milne 
& Adler, 1999; Galant & Cadez, 2017). The first major weakness is the use of content analysis 
captures quantity of disclosure rather than quality of disclosure. To overcome the 
aforementioned problem, this research uses the quality index based on past literature by 
Clarkson et al. (2008) because the study has asserted that it is possible to distinguish quality of 
reporting by looking at a ratio of hard to soft disclosure items by sample organisations’ 
sustainability reports. Hence, it becomes possible to distinguish quality of disclosure as opposed 
to quantity.  
 
Milne & Adler (1999) point out the second major weakness. They suggested that in order for 
valid research findings to be drawn from the content analysis, the research must have reliable 
data as well as the coding instrument that allows capturing the content of sampled organisations’ 
CSR reports. In order to overcome this hindrance imposed on this concern, this research uses 
the GRI guidelines in constructing the quality index because they are internationally accepted 
guidelines and used by many multinationals, as well as by many researchers in this field of 
study (Adams, 2004; Gallego, 2006; Gamerschlag, Möller, & Verbeeten, 2011; Roca & Searcy, 
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2012; Skouloudis & Evangelinos, 2009). According to latest, figures show 75% of the G250 
and 63% of the N100 have applied the GRI framework as part of their sustainability reporting 
practices (KPMG, 2017). Thus, the use of GRI guidelines is appropriate in this study, especially 
when assessing the quality of sampled organisations’ sustainability reports. 
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Appendix 1: Core GRI G4 Performance Indicators 






Economic Performance Indicators   
Economic Performance   
G4-EC1 - Direct Economic Value generated  ✓  
G4-EC2 - Financial implications of climate change ✓  
G4-EC3 - Coverage of pension obligations  ✓  
G4-EC4 - Financial assistance received from government ✓  
Market Presence   
G4-EC5 - Ratio of entry level to minimum wages ✓  
G4-EC6 - Local hiring of senior management positions  ✓  
Indirect Economic Impacts   
G4-EC7 - Infrastructure development   ✓ 
G4-EC8 - Indirect economic impacts   ✓ 
Procurement Practices   
G4-EC9 - Payments to locally-based suppliers  ✓  
Number of Disclosure Items  7 2 
 
Society Performance Indicators 








Social Performance Indicators     
Labour Practice Performance Indicators     
Employment     
G4-LA1 - Workforce statistics  ✓   
G4-LA2 - Benefits proved to full-time employee    ✓ 
G4-LA3 - Return to work and retention rate after parental leave  ✓  
Labor/Management Relations     
G4-LA4 - Minimum notice periods regarding operational 
changes  
  ✓ 
Occupational Health and Safety     
G4-LA5 - Employees covered by collective bargaining 
agreements / trade union representation, and coverage of total 
workforce in health and safety committees  
✓ 
  
G4-LA6 - Injuries, absentee rates and work-related fatalities ✓   
G4-LA7 - Workers with high incidence or high-risk of diseases 
related to their occupation 
  ✓ 
G4-LA8 - Trade unions and safety and health   ✓ 
Training and Education     
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G4-LA9 - Training hours by employee category  ✓   
G4-LA10 - Programs for skills management and lifelong 
learning that support the employability of employees and assist 
them in managing career endings 
  ✓ 
G4-LA11 - % employee receiving regular performance and 
career development reviews, by gender and by employee 
category 
✓   
Diversity and Equal Opportunity     
G4-LA12 - Composition of senior management and breakdown 
of employees (age/gender/ethnicity)  
✓   
Equal remuneration for Women and Men     
G4-LA13 - Ratio of basic salary of men to women by employee 
category  
✓   
Supplier Assessment for Labor Practices      
G4-LA14 - % of new suppliers that were screened using Labor 
practices criteria 
✓   
G4-LA15 - Negative Labor practices in the supply chain and 
actions taken 
✓   
Labor Practices Grievance Mechanisms     
G4-LA16 - Number of grievances about Labor practices filed, 
addressed, and resolved through formal grievance mechanisms.  
✓   
Number of Disclosure Items  11 5 
 








Human Rights Performance Indicators     
Investment      
G4-HR1 - Human rights and investment agreement  ✓   
G4-HR2 - Employee training concerning aspects of human 
rights  
  ✓ 
Non-discrimination     
G4-HR3 - Incidents of discrimination and actions taken  ✓   
Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining     
G4-HR4 - freedom of association  ✓   
Child Labor     
G4-HR5 - Child labour  ✓   
Forced and Compulsory Labor     
G4-HR6 - Forced labour  ✓   
Security Practices     
G4-HR7 - Security personnel and human rights training    ✓ 
Indigenous Rights     
G4-HR8 - Total number of incidents of violating involving 
rights of indigenous people and actions taken  
✓   
Assessment     
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G4-HR9 - % and total number of operations that have been 
subject to human rights reviews 
✓   
Supplier Human Rights Assessment     
G4-HR10 - % of new suppliers that were screened using human 
rights criteria  
✓   
G4-HR11 - Negative human rights in the supply chain and 
actions taken 
✓   
Human Rights Grievance mechanisms     
G4-HR12 - Number of grievances about human rights filed, 
addressed, and resolved through formal grievance mechanisms 
✓   
Number of Disclosure Items  10 2 
 








Society Performance Indicators     
Local Communities     
G4-SO1 - Community engagement, impact assessment 
development programs and practices 
✓   
G4-SO2 - Operations and associated communities with 
significant potential or actual negative impacts  
  ✓ 
Anti-corruption     
G4-SO3 - Corruption analysis - proportion of business nits 
analysed for risks of corruption  
✓   
G4-SO4 - Anti-corruption training  ✓   
G4-SO5 - Confirmed incidents of corruption, and actions taken ✓   
Public Policy     
G4-SO6 - Contribution to political parties  ✓   
Anti-Competitive Behaviour     
G4-SO7 - Legal actions for anti-competitive behaviour  ✓   
Compliance      
G4-SO8 - Significant fines for non-compliance with laws and 
regulations 
✓   
Supplier Assessment for Impacts on Society     
G4-SO9 - % of new suppliers were screened using criteria for 
impacts on society  
✓   
G4-SO10 - Negative impacts on society in the supply chain and 
actions taken 
✓   
Grievance Mechanisms for Impacts on Society     
G4-SO11 - Number of grievances about impacts on society 
filed, addressed, and resolved through formal grievance 
mechanisms.  
  ✓ 
Number of Disclosure Items  9 2 
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Product Responsibility Performance Indicators     
Customer Health and Safety     
G4-PR1 - % of significant product and service, which health 
and safety impacts are assessed  
✓   
G4-PR2 - Non - compliance with product safety regulations  ✓   
Product and Service Labeling     
G4-PR3 - Principles and measures related to product labelling   ✓ 
G4-PR4 - Non-compliance regarding product labelling  ✓   
G4-PR5 - Customer satisfaction   ✓ 
Marketing Communications     
G4-PR6 - Sale of banned or disputed products ✓   
G4-PR7 - Non-compliance regarding marketing 
communications  
✓   
Customer Privacy     
G4-PR8 - Customer privacy ✓   
Compliance      
G4-PR9 - Monetary value of fines for non-compliance with 
laws and regulations concerning use of products and services  
✓   
Number of Disclosure Items  7 2 
 








Environmental Performance Indicators     
Materials     
G4-EN1 - Materials used  ✓   
G4-EN2 - % of used that are recycled inputs materials ✓   
Energy     
G4-EN3 - direct energy consumption ✓   
G4-EN4 - Indirect energy consumption  ✓   
G4-EN5 - Energy intensity  ✓   
G4-EN6 - Conservation of energy efficiency  ✓   
G4-EN7 - Reduction in energy requirements of P&Ss ✓   
Water     
G4-EN8 - Water use  ✓   
G4-EN9 - Water source affected by withdrawal of water ✓   
G4-EN10 - % water conversion, reuse and recycle  ✓   
Biodiversity     
G4-EN11 - land use in protected areas ✓   
G4-EN12 - Areas significantly impacted by biodiversity    ✓ 
G4-EN13 - Protection and restoration of habitats   ✓ 
G4-EN14 - IUCN red listed species    ✓ 
Emissions     
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G4-EN15 - Managing impacts of biodiversity ✓   
G4-EN16 - Direct GHG emissions (Scope 1) ✓   
G4-EN17 - Indirect GHG emissions (Scope 2) ✓   
G4-EN18 - Other indirect GHG emissions (Scope 3) ✓   
G4-EN19 - GHG emission reduction initiatives  ✓   
G4-EN20 - Ozone-depleting substances by weight  ✓   
G4-EN21 - NOx, SOx and other airborne emissions by weight  ✓   
Effluents and Waste     
G4-EN22 - Water discharge  ✓   
G4-EN23 - Non-processing waste disposal  ✓   
G4-EN24 - Total number of environmental spills from waste 
discharges 
✓   
G4-EN25 - Total weight of transported waste ✓   
G4-EN26 - Significant environment impacts of water sources by 
waste discharges and spills  
✓   
Products and Services     
G4-EN27 - Initiatives at mitigate environmental impacts of P&Ss ✓   
G4-EN28 - % of recycled products and their packing materials ✓   
Compliance      
G4-EN29 - Fines for environmental non-compliance  ✓   
Transport     
G4-EN30 - Significant environmental impacts from 
transportation  
✓   
Overall     
G4-EN31 - Environmental protection expenditures and 
investments or environmental protection expenditures  
✓   
Supplier Environment Assessment     
G4-EN32 - New suppliers that were screened using 
environmental criteria 
✓   
G4-EN33 - Negative environmental impacts in the supply chain 
and actions taken 
✓   
Supplier Environment Mechanisms     
G4-EN34 - Number of grievances about environmental impacts 
filed, addressed, and resolved through formal grievance 
mechanisms  
✓   
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Appendix 2: Venn Diagrams  
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2.2 A Venn diagram of Generous Measure  
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Appendix 3: Decision Rules  
A hard disclosure indicator - A quantitative disclosure item  
o Reasonable (R) 
o An organisation will meet this decision rule when; 
▪ The organisation discloses a reasonable amount (if not full) of 
quantitative information about this specific indicator; or 
▪ The organisation discloses a partial (limited) amount of qualitative 
information with a reasonable amount of quantitative information about this 
specific indicator. 
o Partial (P) 
o An organisation will meet this decision rule when: 
▪ The organisation discloses a partial (limited) amount of quantitative 
information about this specific indicator; or 
▪ The organisation discloses a reasonable amount of qualitative 
information with a partial (limited) amount of quantitative information. 
o No Disclosure (N) 
o An organisation will meet this decision rule when the organization does not 
disclose any information about this specific indicator. 
  
A soft disclosure indicator - A qualitative disclosure item  
o Reasonable (R) 
o An organisation will meet this decision rule when; 
▪ The organization discloses a reasonable amount of qualitative 
information about this specific indicator. 
o Partial (P) 
o An organisation will meet this decision when; 
▪ The organization discloses a partial (limited) amount of qualitative 
information about this specific indicator. 
o No Disclosure (N) 
o An organisation will meet this disclosure item when the organization does not 
disclose any information about this specific indicator. 
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Appendix 4: Full Results 































Economic Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Economic Performance                                               
G4-EC1 ✓   1     1     1     1     1     1     1     
G4-EC2 ✓   1     1         0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EC3 ✓       0 1         0     0 1         0     0 
G4-EC4 ✓   1         0 1         0     0 1         0 
Market Presence                                               
G4-EC5 ✓     ˙ 0     0     0     0     0   0       0 
G4-EC6 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Indirect Economic Impacts                                               
G4-EC7   ✓ 1     1     1     1         0     0     0 
G4-EC8   ✓ 1     1     1     1     1     1     1   0 
Procurement Practices                                               
G4-EC9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  7 2 5 5 4 3 3 3 2 
Environmental Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Materials                                               
G4-EN1 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN2 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Energy                                               
G4-EN3 ✓       0 1         0   0       0     0     0 
G4-EN4 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN5 ✓       0 1         0     0     0   0       0 
G4-EN6 ✓   1       0       0 1     1     1         0 
G4-EN7 ✓   1         0     0     0 1         0     0 
Water                                               
G4-EN8 ✓   1       0       0     0     0   0       0 
G4-EN9 ✓       0     0 1         0     0     0     0 
G4-EN10 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Biodiversity                                               
G4-EN11 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN12   ✓ 1         0   0       0   0       0     0 
G4-EN13   ✓     0     0     0     0   0       0 1     
G4-EN14   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Emissions                                               
G4-EN15 ✓       0     0 1     1     1         0     0 
G4-EN16 ✓       0     0 1     1         0 1         0 
G4-EN17 ✓       0     0 1         0     0 1         0 
G4-EN18 ✓       0 1         0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN19 ✓       0 1     1       0   1     1         0 
G4-EN20 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN21 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Effluents and Waste                                               
G4-EN22 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
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G4-EN23 ✓       0 1         0 1         0 1         0 
G4-EN24 ✓       0 1         0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN25 ✓       0     0     0 1         0     0     0 
G4-EN26 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Products and Services                                               
G4-EN27 ✓       0     0     0     0 1     1         0 
G4-EN28 ✓       0     0     0   0       0     0     0 
Compliance                                                
G4-EN29 ✓       0 1         0     0     0     0 1     
Transport                                               
G4-EN30 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Overall                                               
G4-EN31 ✓       0     0     0     0     0   0   1     
Supplier Environment Assessment                                               
G4-EN32 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN33 ✓   1         0     0     0     0     0     0 
Supplier Environment Mechanisms                                               
G4-EN34 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  31 3 5 7 5 5 5 6 3 
Social Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Labour Practice Performance Indicators                                               
Employment                                               
G4-LA1 ✓       0   0   1     1       0   1         0 
G4-LA2   ✓     0 1     1     1     1     1     1     
G4-LA3 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0   0   
Labor/Management Relations                                               
G4-LA4   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Occupational Health and Safety                                               
G4-LA5 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-LA6 ✓   1       0   1       0   1       0       0 
G4-LA7   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-LA8   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Training and Education                                               
G4-LA9 ✓       0     0     0     0   0   1         0 
G4-LA10   ✓   0     0     0       0   0     0   1     
G4-LA11 ✓       0 1         0     0     0     0     0 
Diversity and Equal Opportunity                                               
G4-LA12 ✓   1     1     1     1     1     1     1     
Equal remuneration for Women and Men                                               
G4-LA13 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Supplier Assessment for Labor Practices                                                
G4-LA14 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-LA15 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Labor Practices Grievance Mechanisms                                               
G4-LA16 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  11 5 2 3 4 3 3 4 3 
Human Rights Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Investment                                                
G4-HR1 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-HR2   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Non-discrimination                                               
G4-HR3 ✓       0     0     0     0     0   0       0 
Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining                                               
G4-HR4 ✓       0     0     0     0     0   0       0 
Child Labor                                               
G4-HR5 ✓       0     0     0     0     0   0       0 
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Forced and Compulsory Labor                                               
G4-HR6 ✓       0     0     0     0     0   0       0 
Security Practices                                               
G4-HR7   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Indigenous Rights                                               
G4-HR8 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Assessment                                               
G4-HR9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Supplier Human Rights Assessment                                               
G4-HR10 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-HR11 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Human Rights Grievance mechanisms                                               
G4-HR12 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  10 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Society Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Local Communities                                               
G4-SO1 ✓   1     1     1     1     1       0   1     
G4-SO2   ✓     0 1         0     0     0     0     0 
Anti-corruption                                               
G4-SO3 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-SO4 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-SO5 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Public Policy                                               
G4-SO6 ✓       0     0     0     0 1         0 1     
Anti-Competitive Behavior                                               
G4-SO7 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Compliance                                                
G4-SO8 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Supplier Assessment for Impacts on Society                                               
G4-SO9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-SO10 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Grievance Mechanisms for Impacts on Society                                               
G4-SO11   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  9 2 1 2 1 1 2 0 2 
Product Responsibility Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Customer Health and Safety                                               
G4-PR1 ✓   1         0     0     0   0     0       0 
G4-PR2 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Product and Service Labeling                                               
G4-PR3   ✓ 1         0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-PR4 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-PR5   ✓ 1     1     1         0     0     0 1     
Marketing Communications                                               
G4-PR6 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-PR7 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Customer Privacy                                               
G4-PR8 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Compliance                                                
G4-PR9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  7 2 3 1 1 0 0 0 1 
  75 16                                           
Total  91 16 18 15 12 13 13 11 
 
  
 | P a g e  
 
198 


























Economic Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Economic Performance                                               
G4-EC1 ✓   1     1     1     1     1     1     1     
G4-EC2 ✓   1       0       0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EC3 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EC4 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0   0   
Market Presence                                               
G4-EC5 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EC6 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Indirect Economic Impacts                                               
G4-EC7   ✓ 1     1     1     1     1         0     0 
G4-EC8   ✓ 1     1     1         0 1     1     1     
Procurement Practices                                               
G4-EC9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0   0   
Number of Disclosure Items  7 2 4 3 3 2 3 2 2 
Environmental Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Materials                                               
G4-EN1 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN2 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Energy                                               
G4-EN3 ✓       0     0     0 1         0     0     0 
G4-EN4 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN5 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN6 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 1     
G4-EN7 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Water                                               
G4-EN8 ✓   1         0     0   0       0     0     0 
G4-EN9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN10 ✓       0     0     0   0       0     0     0 
Biodiversity                                               
G4-EN11 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN12   ✓ 1         0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN13   ✓ 1         0     0     0     0     0 1     
G4-EN14   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Emissions                                               
G4-EN15 ✓   1         0     0 1         0     0 1     
G4-EN16 ✓       0     0     0 1         0     0 1     
G4-EN17 ✓       0     0     0   0       0     0     0 
G4-EN18 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN19 ✓   1     1         0 1     1         0 1     
G4-EN20 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN21 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Effluents and Waste                                               
G4-EN22 ✓   1         0     0     0     0     0 1     
G4-EN23 ✓       0     0   0   1         0     0   0   
G4-EN24 ✓       0     0     0   0       0     0     0 
G4-EN25 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN26 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
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Products and Services                                               
G4-EN27 ✓   1         0     0     0 1         0 1     
G4-EN28 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Compliance                                                
G4-EN29 ✓   1         0     0 1         0 1     1     
Transport                                               
G4-EN30 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Overall                                               
G4-EN31 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Supplier Environment Assessment                                               
G4-EN32 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 1     
G4-EN33 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Supplier Environment Mechanisms                                               
G4-EN34 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  31 3 8 1 0 6 2 1 9 
Social Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Labour Practice Performance Indicators                                               
Employment                                               
G4-LA1 ✓   1       0     0   1     1     1       0   
G4-LA2   ✓     0   0   1     1         0     0     0 
G4-LA3 ✓       0     0     0 1         0     0     0 
Labor/Management Relations                                               
G4-LA4   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Occupational Health and Safety                                               
G4-LA5 ✓       0     0     0 1         0     0     0 
G4-LA6 ✓   1     1         0 1     1     1         0 
G4-LA7   ✓     0     0     0 1         0     0     0 
G4-LA8   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Training and Education                                               
G4-LA9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0 1         0 
G4-LA10   ✓ 1       0   1     1         0     0   0   
G4-LA11 ✓       0     0   0   1         0     0   0   
Diversity and Equal Opportunity                                               
G4-LA12 ✓   1     1     1     1     1     1         0 
Equal remuneration for Women and Men                                               
G4-LA13 ✓   1         0     0 1         0     0     0 
Supplier Assessment for Labor Practices                                                
G4-LA14 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 1     
G4-LA15 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Labor Practices Grievance Mechanisms                                               
G4-LA16 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  11 5 5 2 3 10 3 4 1 
Human Rights Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Investment                                                
G4-HR1 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-HR2   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Non-discrimination                                               
G4-HR3 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining                                               
G4-HR4 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Child Labor                                               
G4-HR5 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Forced and Compulsory Labor                                               
G4-HR6 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Security Practices                                               
G4-HR7   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
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Indigenous Rights                                               
G4-HR8 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Assessment                                               
G4-HR9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Supplier Human Rights Assessment                                               
G4-HR10 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 1     
G4-HR11 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Human Rights Grievance mechanisms                                               
G4-HR12 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  10 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Society Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Local Communities                                               
G4-SO1 ✓   1     1     1     1     1     1     1     
G4-SO2   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Anti-corruption                                               
G4-SO3 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-SO4 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-SO5 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Public Policy                                               
G4-SO6 ✓     0       0     0   0       0     0 1     
Anti-Competitive Behavior                                               
G4-SO7 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Compliance                                                
G4-SO8 ✓       0     0     0  1        0     0     0 
Supplier Assessment for Impacts on Society                                               
G4-SO9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 1     
G4-SO10 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Grievance Mechanisms for Impacts on Society                                               
G4-SO11   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  9 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 
Product Responsibility Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Customer Health and Safety                                               
G4-PR1 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-PR2 ✓   1         0     0     0     0     0     0 
Product and Service Labeling                                               
G4-PR3   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-PR4 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-PR5   ✓ 1     1         0 1         0 1         0 
Marketing Communications                                               
G4-PR6 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-PR7 ✓       0     0     0 1         0     0     0 
Customer Privacy                                               
G4-PR8 ✓   1         0     0     0     0     0     0 
Compliance                                                
G4-PR9 ✓   1         0     0 1         0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  7 2 4 1 0 3 0 1 0 
  75 16                                           
Total  91 22 8 7 23 9 9 16 
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Economic Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Economic Performance                                               
G4-EC1 ✓   1     1     1     1     1     1     1     
G4-EC2 ✓       0 1         0     0     0 1         0 
G4-EC3 ✓       0     0     0 1         0   0       0 
G4-EC4 ✓     0       0     0     0     0 1         0 
Market Presence                                               
G4-EC5 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EC6 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Indirect Economic Impacts                                               
G4-EC7   ✓   0   1       0       0 1         0     0 
G4-EC8   ✓ 1     1       0   1     1     1     1     
Procurement Practices                                               
G4-EC9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  7 2 2 4 1 3 3 4 2 
Environmental Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Materials                                               
G4-EN1 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN2 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Energy                                               
G4-EN3 ✓       0   0       0     0 1     1     1     
G4-EN4 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN5 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN6 ✓       0 1         0     0 1     1       0   
G4-EN7 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Water                                               
G4-EN8 ✓       0   0       0     0     0     0   0   
G4-EN9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN10 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Biodiversity                                               
G4-EN11 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN12   ✓   0       0     0     0     0 1         0 
G4-EN13   ✓   0       0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN14   ✓     0     0     0     0     0 1         0 
Emissions                                               
G4-EN15 ✓       0 1         0     0 1     1         0 
G4-EN16 ✓       0     0     0     0 1     1         0 
G4-EN17 ✓       0   0       0     0 1     1         0 
G4-EN18 ✓       0     0     0     0 1         0     0 
G4-EN19 ✓       0 1       0       0 1         0     0 
G4-EN20 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN21 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Effluents and Waste                                               
G4-EN22 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN23 ✓       0 1       0       0     0     0     0 
G4-EN24 ✓       0     0     0     0     0 1         0 
G4-EN25 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN26 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
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Products and Services                                               
G4-EN27 ✓       0     0     0     0   0       0     0 
G4-EN28 ✓       0     0     0     0   0     0       0 
Compliance                                                
G4-EN29 ✓       0 1         0 1         0     0     0 
Transport                                               
G4-EN30 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Overall                                               
G4-EN31 ✓       0     0     0 1         0   0       0 
Supplier Environment Assessment                                               
G4-EN32 ✓       0     0     0     0 1         0     0 
G4-EN33 ✓       0     0     0     0 1         0     0 
Supplier Environment Mechanisms                                               
G4-EN34 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  31 3 0 5 0 2 9 8 1 
Social Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Labour Practice Performance Indicators                                               
Employment                                               
G4-LA1 ✓     0   1         0 1       0   1       0   
G4-LA2   ✓ 1     1     1     1     1         0 1     
G4-LA3 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Labor/Management Relations                                               
G4-LA4   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Occupational Health and Safety                                               
G4-LA5 ✓       0 1         0     0     0   0       0 
G4-LA6 ✓       0 1         0 1       0   1         0 
G4-LA7   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-LA8   ✓     0     0     0     0     0 1         0 
Training and Education                                               
G4-LA9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0 1         0 
G4-LA10   ✓     0 1         0     0 1     1       0   
G4-LA11 ✓       0     0     0     0 1         0     0 
Diversity and Equal Opportunity                                               
G4-LA12 ✓   1     1     1     1     1     1     1     
Equal remuneration for Women and Men                                               
G4-LA13 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Supplier Assessment for Labor Practices                                                
G4-LA14 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-LA15 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Labor Practices Grievance Mechanisms                                               
G4-LA16 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  11 5 2 6 2 4 4 6 2 
Human Rights Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Investment                                                
G4-HR1 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-HR2   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Non-discrimination                                               
G4-HR3 ✓       0   0       0     0     0     0     0 
Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining                                               
G4-HR4 ✓       0   0       0     0     0     0     0 
Child Labor                                               
G4-HR5 ✓       0   0       0     0     0     0     0 
Forced and Compulsory Labor                                               
G4-HR6 ✓       0   0       0     0     0     0     0 
Security Practices                                               
G4-HR7   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
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Indigenous Rights                                               
G4-HR8 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Assessment                                               
G4-HR9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Supplier Human Rights Assessment                                               
G4-HR10 ✓       0     0     0     0 1         0     0 
G4-HR11 ✓       0     0     0     0 1         0     0 
Human Rights Grievance mechanisms                                               
G4-HR12 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  10 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 
Society Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Local Communities                                               
G4-SO1 ✓     0   1         0     0 1     1         0 
G4-SO2   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Anti-corruption                                               
G4-SO3 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-SO4 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-SO5 ✓       0 1         0     0     0     0     0 
Public Policy                                               
G4-SO6 ✓       0 1         0 1     1         0     0 
Anti-Competitive Behavior                                               
G4-SO7 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Compliance                                                
G4-SO8 ✓       0 1     1         0     0     0     0 
Supplier Assessment for Impacts on Society                                               
G4-SO9 ✓       0     0     0     0 1         0     0 
G4-SO10 ✓       0     0     0     0 1         0     0 
Grievance Mechanisms for Impacts on Society                                               
G4-SO11   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  9 2 0 4 1 1 4 1 0 
Product Responsibility Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Customer Health and Safety                                               
G4-PR1 ✓       0     0     0     0     0 1       0   
G4-PR2 ✓       0     0     0     0     0 1         0 
Product and Service Labeling                                               
G4-PR3   ✓     0     0     0     0 1     1     1     
G4-PR4 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-PR5   ✓ 1       0       0     0 1     1         0 
Marketing Communications                                               
G4-PR6 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-PR7 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Customer Privacy                                               
G4-PR8 ✓       0     0     0     0 1         0     0 
Compliance                                                
G4-PR9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0 1         0 
Number of Disclosure Items  7 2 1 0 0 0 3 5 1 
  75 16                                           
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Economic Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Economic Performance                                         
G4-EC1 ✓   1     1     1     1     1     1     
G4-EC2 ✓       0 1         0     0     0       
G4-EC3 ✓       0     0     0 1       0         
G4-EC4 ✓       0     0     0   0       0       
Market Presence                                         
G4-EC5 ✓       0   0       0     0     0       
G4-EC6 ✓       0     0     0     0     0       
Indirect Economic Impacts                                         
G4-EC7   ✓     0 1   0     0 1     1           
G4-EC8   ✓   0   1     1     1     1     1     
Procurement Practices                                         
G4-EC9 ✓     0       0     0     0     0       
Number of Disclosure Items  7 2 1 4 2 4 3 2 
Environmental Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Materials                                         
G4-EN1 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN2 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
Energy                                         
G4-EN3 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN4 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN5 ✓     0       0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN6 ✓     0       0     0   0       0     0 
G4-EN7 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
Water                                         
G4-EN8 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN10 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
Biodiversity                                         
G4-EN11 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN12   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN13   ✓     0   0       0     0     0     0 
G4-EN14   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Emissions                                         
G4-EN15 ✓       0     0     0     0 1         0 
G4-EN16 ✓       0 1         0     0 1         0 
G4-EN17 ✓       0 1         0     0 1         0 
G4-EN18 ✓       0 1         0     0 1         0 
G4-EN19 ✓       0 1         0     0 1         0 
G4-EN20 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN21 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
Effluents and Waste                                         
G4-EN22 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN23 ✓   1       0       0   0       0     0 
G4-EN24 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN25 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN26 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
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Products and Services                                         
G4-EN27 ✓       0 1         0     0     0     0 
G4-EN28 ✓     0       0     0   0       0     0 
Compliance                                          
G4-EN29 ✓       0     0     0     0 1         0 
Transport                                         
G4-EN30 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
Overall                                         
G4-EN31 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
Supplier Environment Assessment                                         
G4-EN32 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN33 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
Supplier Environment Mechanisms                                         
G4-EN34 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  31 3 1 5 0 0 6 0 
Social Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Labour Practice Performance Indicators                                         
Employment                                         
G4-LA1 ✓   1     1       0   1     1     1     
G4-LA2   ✓     0 1         0 1     1         0 
G4-LA3 ✓       0 1         0     0     0     0 
Labor/Management Relations                                         
G4-LA4   ✓     0     0     0     0 1         0 
Occupational Health and Safety                                         
G4-LA5 ✓       0     0     0     0 1         0 
G4-LA6 ✓   1     1     1     1         0   0   
G4-LA7   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-LA8   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Training and Education                                         
G4-LA9 ✓       0     0     0     0   0       0 
G4-LA10   ✓   0   1         0 1       0       0 
G4-LA11 ✓       0 1         0     0     0     0 
Diversity and Equal Opportunity                                         
G4-LA12 ✓   1     1     1       0   1     1     
Equal remuneration for Women and Men                                         
G4-LA13 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
Supplier Assessment for Labor Practices                                          
G4-LA14 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-LA15 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
Labor Practices Grievance Mechanisms                                         
G4-LA16 ✓       0     0     0     0     0       
Number of Disclosure Items  11 5 3 7 2 4 5 2 
Human Rights Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Investment                                          
G4-HR1 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-HR2   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Non-discrimination                                         
G4-HR3 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining                                         
G4-HR4 ✓       0   0       0     0     0     0 
Child Labor                                         
G4-HR5 ✓       0   0       0     0     0     0 
Forced and Compulsory Labor                                         
G4-HR6 ✓       0   0       0     0     0     0 
Security Practices                                         
G4-HR7   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0 
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Indigenous Rights                                         
G4-HR8 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
Assessment                                         
G4-HR9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
Supplier Human Rights Assessment                                         
G4-HR10 ✓       0 1         0     0     0     0 
G4-HR11 ✓       0 1         0     0     0     0 
Human Rights Grievance mechanisms                                         
G4-HR12 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  10 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Society Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Local Communities                                         
G4-SO1 ✓   1     1         0 1         0     0 
G4-SO2   ✓   0       0     0     0     0     0 
Anti-corruption                                         
G4-SO3 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-SO4 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-SO5 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
Public Policy                                         
G4-SO6 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
Anti-Competitive Behavior                                         
G4-SO7 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
Compliance                                          
G4-SO8 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
Supplier Assessment for Impacts on Society                                         
G4-SO9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-SO10 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
Grievance Mechanisms for Impacts on Society                                         
G4-SO11   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  9 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Product Responsibility Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Customer Health and Safety                                         
G4-PR1 ✓   1     1         0     0     0     0 
G4-PR2 ✓   1     1         0     0     0     0 
Product and Service Labeling                                         
G4-PR3   ✓ 1         0 1         0     0     0 
G4-PR4 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-PR5   ✓ 1         0     0     0     0     0 
Marketing Communications                                         
G4-PR6 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-PR7 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
Customer Privacy                                         
G4-PR8 ✓       0 1         0     0     0     0 
Compliance                                          
G4-PR9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  7 2 4 3 1 0 0 0 
  75 16                                     
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THE A2 MILK 
COMPANY 
LIMITED 
Economic Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Economic Performance                                               
G4-EC1 ✓   1     1     1     1     1     1     1     
G4-EC2 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EC3 ✓       0     0     0     0     0 1         0 
G4-EC4 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0 1     
Market Presence                                               
G4-EC5 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EC6 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Indirect Economic Impacts                                               
G4-EC7   ✓     0     0 1   0     0 1       0       0 
G4-EC8   ✓ 1     1     1     1   0 1     1     1     
Procurement Practices                                               
G4-EC9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  7 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 
Environmental Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Materials                                               
G4-EN1 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN2 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Energy                                               
G4-EN3 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN4 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN5 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN6 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN7 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Water                                               
G4-EN8 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN10 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Biodiversity                                               
G4-EN11 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN12   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN13   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN14   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Emissions                                               
G4-EN15 ✓       0     0     0     0   0     0       0 
G4-EN16 ✓       0     0     0     0   0       0     0 
G4-EN17 ✓       0     0     0     0   0       0     0 
G4-EN18 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN19 ✓       0     0     0     0     0 1         0 
G4-EN20 ✓       0     0     0     0     0   0       0 
G4-EN21 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Effluents and Waste                                               
G4-EN22 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN23 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN24 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN25 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN26 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
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Products and Services                                               
G4-EN27 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN28 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Compliance                                                
G4-EN29 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Transport                                               
G4-EN30 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Overall                                               
G4-EN31 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Supplier Environment Assessment                                               
G4-EN32 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN33 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Supplier Environment Mechanisms                                               
G4-EN34 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  31 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Social Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Labour Practice Performance Indicators                                               
Employment                                               
G4-LA1 ✓       0     0   0       0 1     1       0   
G4-LA2   ✓ 1         0   0       0 1     1       0   
G4-LA3 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Labor/Management Relations                                               
G4-LA4   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Occupational Health and Safety                                               
G4-LA5 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-LA6 ✓       0     0     0     0     0 1         0 
G4-LA7   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-LA8   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Training and Education                                               
G4-LA9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-LA10   ✓ 1         0     0     0     0 1         0 
G4-LA11 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Diversity and Equal Opportunity                                               
G4-LA12 ✓   1     1     1     1     1         0 1     
Equal remuneration for Women and Men                                               
G4-LA13 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Supplier Assessment for Labor Practices                                                
G4-LA14 ✓       0     0     0     0     0   0       0 
G4-LA15 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Labor Practices Grievance Mechanisms                                               
G4-LA16 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  11 5 3 1 1 1 3 4 1 
Human Rights Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Investment                                                
G4-HR1 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-HR2   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Non-discrimination                                               
G4-HR3 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining                                               
G4-HR4 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Child Labor                                               
G4-HR5 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Forced and Compulsory Labor                                               
G4-HR6 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Security Practices                                               
G4-HR7   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
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Indigenous Rights                                               
G4-HR8 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Assessment                                               
G4-HR9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Supplier Human Rights Assessment                                               
G4-HR10 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-HR11 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Human Rights Grievance mechanisms                                               
G4-HR12 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  10 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Society Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Local Communities                                               
G4-SO1 ✓   1     1     1         0 1     1       0   
G4-SO2   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Anti-corruption                                               
G4-SO3 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-SO4 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-SO5 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Public Policy                                               
G4-SO6 ✓       0     0     0     0     0 1         0 
Anti-Competitive Behavior                                               
G4-SO7 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Compliance                                                
G4-SO8 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Supplier Assessment for Impacts on Society                                               
G4-SO9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-SO10 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Grievance Mechanisms for Impacts on Society                                               
G4-SO11   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  9 2 1 1 1 0 1 2 0 
Product Responsibility Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Customer Health and Safety                                               
G4-PR1 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-PR2 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Product and Service Labeling                                               
G4-PR3   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-PR4 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-PR5   ✓     0     0     0     0     0 1         0 
Marketing Communications                                               
G4-PR6 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-PR7 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Customer Privacy                                               
G4-PR8 ✓       0     0     0     0 1         0     0 
Compliance                                                
G4-PR9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  7 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
  75 16                                           
Total  91 6 4 5 3 8 11 4 
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Economic Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Economic Performance                                               
G4-EC1 ✓   1     1     1     1     1     1     1     
G4-EC2 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EC3 ✓       0     0     0 1         0     0     0 
G4-EC4 ✓       0     0 1         0     0     0     0 
Market Presence                                               
G4-EC5 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EC6 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Indirect Economic Impacts                                               
G4-EC7   ✓     0     0     0     0     0   0   1   0 
G4-EC8   ✓ 1     1         0 1     1     1     1   0 
Procurement Practices                                               
G4-EC9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  7 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 
Environmental Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Materials                                               
G4-EN1 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN2 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Energy                                               
G4-EN3 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN4 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN5 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN6 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN7 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Water                                               
G4-EN8 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN10 ✓       0     0     0     0     0   0       0 
Biodiversity                                               
G4-EN11 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN12   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN13   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN14   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Emissions                                               
G4-EN15 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN16 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN17 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN18 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN19 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN20 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN21 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Effluents and Waste                                               
G4-EN22 ✓       0     0     0     0     0   0       0 
G4-EN23 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN24 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN25 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN26 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
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Products and Services                                               
G4-EN27 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN28 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Compliance                                                
G4-EN29 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Transport                                               
G4-EN30 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Overall                                               
G4-EN31 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Supplier Environment Assessment                                               
G4-EN32 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN33 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Supplier Environment Mechanisms                                               
G4-EN34 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  31 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Social Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Labour Practice Performance Indicators                                               
Employment                                               
G4-LA1 ✓       0     0     0   0       0     0   0   
G4-LA2   ✓ 1     1         0 1         0     0   0   
G4-LA3 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Labor/Management Relations                                               
G4-LA4   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Occupational Health and Safety                                               
G4-LA5 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-LA6 ✓       0     0 1       0       0     0     0 
G4-LA7   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-LA8   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Training and Education                                               
G4-LA9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-LA10   ✓     0   0       0   0       0     0   0   
G4-LA11 ✓       0     0     0   0       0     0     0 
Diversity and Equal Opportunity                                               
G4-LA12 ✓       0 1         0 1     1       0   1     
Equal remuneration for Women and Men                                               
G4-LA13 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Supplier Assessment for Labor Practices                                                
G4-LA14 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-LA15 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Labor Practices Grievance Mechanisms                                               
G4-LA16 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  11 5 1 2 1 2 1 0 1 
Human Rights Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Investment                                                
G4-HR1 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-HR2   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Non-discrimination                                               
G4-HR3 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining                                               
G4-HR4 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Child Labor                                               
G4-HR5 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Forced and Compulsory Labor                                               
G4-HR6 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Security Practices                                               
G4-HR7   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
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Indigenous Rights                                               
G4-HR8 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Assessment                                               
G4-HR9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Supplier Human Rights Assessment                                               
G4-HR10 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-HR11 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Human Rights Grievance mechanisms                                               
G4-HR12 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  10 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Society Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Local Communities                                               
G4-SO1 ✓       0 1         0     0     0   0       0 
G4-SO2   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Anti-corruption                                               
G4-SO3 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-SO4 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-SO5 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Public Policy                                               
G4-SO6 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0   0   
Anti-Competitive Behavior                                               
G4-SO7 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Compliance                                                
G4-SO8 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Supplier Assessment for Impacts on Society                                               
G4-SO9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-SO10 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Grievance Mechanisms for Impacts on Society                                               
G4-SO11   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  9 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Product Responsibility Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Customer Health and Safety                                               
G4-PR1 ✓       0     0     0   0       0     0     0 
G4-PR2 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Product and Service Labeling                                               
G4-PR3   ✓     0     0     0     0     0 1         0 
G4-PR4 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-PR5   ✓     0   0       0     0     0     0     0 
Marketing Communications                                               
G4-PR6 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-PR7 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Customer Privacy                                               
G4-PR8 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Compliance                                                
G4-PR9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  7 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
  75 16                                           
Total  91 3 5 3 5 3 3 4 
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Economic Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Economic Performance                                               
G4-EC1 ✓   1     1     1     1     1     1     1     
G4-EC2 ✓   1         0     0     0     0 1         0 
G4-EC3 ✓   1         0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EC4 ✓   1         0     0     0     0     0     0 
Market Presence                                               
G4-EC5 ✓       0     0     0 1         0     0     0 
G4-EC6 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Indirect Economic Impacts                                               
G4-EC7   ✓     0     0     0 1         0     0     0 
G4-EC8   ✓ 1     1     1   0 1     1         0 1   0 
Procurement Practices                                               
G4-EC9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  7 2 5 2 2 4 2 2 2 
Environmental Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Materials                                               
G4-EN1 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN2 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Energy                                               
G4-EN3 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN4 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN5 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN6 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN7 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Water                                               
G4-EN8 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN10 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Biodiversity                                               
G4-EN11 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN12   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN13   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN14   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Emissions                                               
G4-EN15 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN16 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN17 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN18 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN19 ✓     0       0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN20 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN21 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Effluents and Waste                                               
G4-EN22 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN23 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN24 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN25 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN26 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
 | P a g e  
 
214 
Products and Services                                               
G4-EN27 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN28 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Compliance                                                
G4-EN29 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Transport                                               
G4-EN30 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Overall                                               
G4-EN31 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Supplier Environment Assessment                                               
G4-EN32 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-EN33 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Supplier Environment Mechanisms                                               
G4-EN34 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  31 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Social Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Labour Practice Performance Indicators                                               
Employment                                               
G4-LA1 ✓     0       0     0 1         0     0     0 
G4-LA2   ✓ 1     1         0 1     1         0   0   
G4-LA3 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Labor/Management Relations                                               
G4-LA4   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Occupational Health and Safety                                               
G4-LA5 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-LA6 ✓       0     0   0       0     0     0     0 
G4-LA7   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-LA8   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Training and Education                                               
G4-LA9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-LA10   ✓     0     0     0   0       0     0     0 
G4-LA11 ✓       0     0     0   0       0     0     0 
Diversity and Equal Opportunity                                               
G4-LA12 ✓   1     1         0 1     1     1         0 
Equal remuneration for Women and Men                                               
G4-LA13 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Supplier Assessment for Labor Practices                                                
G4-LA14 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-LA15 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Labor Practices Grievance Mechanisms                                               
G4-LA16 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  11 5 2 2 0 3 2 1 0 
Human Rights Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Investment                                                
G4-HR1 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-HR2   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Non-discrimination                                               
G4-HR3 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining                                               
G4-HR4 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Child Labor                                               
G4-HR5 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Forced and Compulsory Labor                                               
G4-HR6 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Security Practices                                               
G4-HR7   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
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Indigenous Rights                                               
G4-HR8 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Assessment                                               
G4-HR9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Supplier Human Rights Assessment                                               
G4-HR10 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-HR11 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Human Rights Grievance mechanisms                                               
G4-HR12 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  10 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Society Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Local Communities                                               
G4-SO1 ✓   1         0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-SO2   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Anti-corruption                                               
G4-SO3 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-SO4 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-SO5 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Public Policy                                               
G4-SO6 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Anti-Competitive Behavior                                               
G4-SO7 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Compliance                                                
G4-SO8 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Supplier Assessment for Impacts on Society                                               
G4-SO9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-SO10 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Grievance Mechanisms for Impacts on Society                                               
G4-SO11   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  9 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Product Responsibility Performance Indicators     R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N R P N 
Customer Health and Safety                                               
G4-PR1 ✓       0     0     0   0       0     0     0 
G4-PR2 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Product and Service Labeling                                               
G4-PR3   ✓     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-PR4 ✓       0     0     0 1         0     0     0 
G4-PR5   ✓     0     0     0 1         0     0     0 
Marketing Communications                                               
G4-PR6 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
G4-PR7 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Customer Privacy                                               
G4-PR8 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Compliance                                                
G4-PR9 ✓       0     0     0     0     0     0     0 
Number of Disclosure Items  7 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
  75 16                                           
Total  91 8 4 2 9 4 3 2 
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Appendix 5: Interview Guide  
5.1 Reporting Organisations’ Interview Questions 
Introduction  
1. Can you please introduce yourself, and describe your role within the organisation 
2. How long have you been with the organisation, and how many years of experience do 
you have with your role?  
3. What inspired you to work in sustainability?  
4. On a daily basis, how much time do you dedicate to sustainability related work?  
5. Where does the function of sustainability sit within your organisational structure?  
6. Are you the person who is directly/indirectly responsible for the design and 
implementation of sustainability programme within your organisation?  
➢ If yes, what inspired you, and the organisation to start this programme?  
➢ If no, what do you think might have inspired the organisation to engage in this 
programme?  
 
Sustainability Reporting - Motivations, Drivers and Barriers  
7. Can you briefly talk about your organisation’s culture and objectives?  
➢ Past studies found organisations engaged in sustainability reporting because of 
the following organisational objectives: Profit maximisation, Share price 
maximisation, Cost minimisation, and Market leadership. 
I. Do you agree with these objectives?  
 
8. Surely, you must have heard the concept of sustainability before, correct (yes/no)?  
➢ From your own understanding, can you describe the concept of sustainability?  
➢ From your own perspective, what does a sustainable organisation look like?  
➢ Now, how well do you think your organisation’s objectives align with the value 
of sustainability?  
- Can you please give some examples of how is this communicated 
across the organisation? 
 
9. Given that there are abundant CSR studies out there that look into motivational drivers 
of why organisations may want to undertake sustainability reporting (SR). For this 
question, I would like you to complete the following table. (please complete this table 
in a separate handout)  






          
Motivating factors  Strongly disagree <------> Strongly Agree  
 1 2 3 4 5 
The organisation pursues SR as it is a sustainability/values-
based strategy. 
     
The organisation pursues SR to manage 
social/environmental impacts or material risks. 
     
Please write down top 3 key risks that the organisation 
must manage to become a sustainable organisation? 
     
The organisation pursues SR to manage internal 
stakeholder pressure. 
     
Please write down top 3 key internal stakeholders that 
might want this information? 
 
The organisation pursues SR to manage external 
stakeholder pressure. 
     
Please write down top 3 key external stakeholders that 
might want this information? 
     
The organisation pursues SR as your peers are doing it.      
The organisation pursues SR as a way to manage 
government intervention of the operation of your business. 
     
The organisation pursues SR as a way to secure businesses 
and resources. 
     
The organisation pursues SR in order to survive.      
The organisation pursues SR because the organisational 
culture encourages it. 
     
The organisation pursues SR because of an experiment.      
The organisation pursues SR to manage reputation.      
The organisation pursues SR to make the business looks 
more transparent via non-financial disclosures. 
     
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The potential impact, and Managers’ perceptions and attitudes 
10. As mentioned in my project cover sheet, I have been investigating the current state of 
sustainability reporting by NZX50. From my study, I’ve found that the rate of 
sustainability reporting has not really taken off in the same way that it has internationally, 
let alone the quality of reporting.  
 
➢ See graph 2. Why do you think sustainability reporting in NZ has not taken-off 
in the same way that it has internationally? 
i. What do you think might be contributing factors that prevent it from 
happening?  
➢ From my investigation of all listed organisations within the NZX, as at 31st of 
December 2016, I found the uptake of sustainability reporting by listed 
organisation was only 29%. To put this in simple terms, 71% of listed 
organisation did not report on non-financial information.  
i. What do you think might motivate these non-reporting organisations to 
not engage in sustainability reporting?  
ii. Given the high percentage of non-reporters, do you agree with this 
explanation, Milton Freidman asserts that “the only social responsibility 
of organisations is to maximise profits”? 
 
 
11. Recently, the NZX has released the new Corporate Governance code (NZX code) for 
its main board’s equity issuers to comply, and one of the most talked about topics is the 
recommendation of non-financial disclosure relating to ESG (Environmental, Social and 
Governance) reporting. What this does is indirectly enforce every equity issuer to report 
such information on a ‘comply or explain’ basis. To put this in simple terms, if listed 
organisation decided not to produce non-financial reporting, then they must explain why 
it has not been reported.  
➢  So my question to you is: what are your thoughts on this recommendation?  
i. Do you agree or disagree with it?  
ii. Are there any aspects do you agree/disagree with?  
iii. On a scale of 1-10, how committed is your organisation towards these 
changes? 
➢ How do you think the changes will impact your organisation’s non-financial 
reporting?  
➢ According to past studies, the study found organisations’ decisions were made 
based on economic incentives.  
i. Does your organisation intend to change a business model and core values 
to facilitate with these changes?  
ii. In what ways, how you intend to do this?  
➢ Quite recently, your organisation has released your very first sustainability 
report to the general public?  
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i. Without a stock exchange intervention, would your organisation have 
engaged in sustainability reporting? And why now?  
➢ From your perspective, instead of a stock exchange intervention, what else 
could have been done differently to promote and encourage the uptake of 
sustainability reporting in NZ?  
➢ Again, from your perspective, with a stock exchange intervention, what are 
the chances that the changes to NZX code will encourage the uptake of 
sustainability reporting in NZ?  
i. How will the changes impact your organisation’s short-, medium- and 
long- term organisation goals? 
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5.2 Non-Reporting organisations’ Interview Questions 
Introduction  
1. Can you please introduce yourself, and describe your role within the organisation? 
2. How long have you been with the organisation, and how many years of experience do 
you have with your role?  
Sustainability Reporting - Motivations, Drivers and Barriers  
3. Can you briefly talk about your organisation’s culture and objectives?  
➢ Past studies found organisations engaged in sustainability reporting because of 
the following organisational objectives: Profit maximisation, Share price 
maximisation, Cost minimisation, and Market leadership. 
I. Do you agree with these objectives?  
 
4. Surely, you must have heard the concept of sustainability before, correct (yes/no)?  
➢ From your own understanding, can you describe the concept of sustainability?  
➢ From your own perspective, what does a sustainable organisation look like?  
➢ Now, how well do you think your organisation’s objectives align with the value 
of sustainability?  
- Can you please give some examples of how is this communicated across 
the organisation?  
- What do you think might inspire an organisation to become a sustainable 
organisation? 
1. Would you say that your organisation is a sustainable 
organisation?  
2. If not, what prevents it from happening? And how does your 
organisation intend to achieve this?  
 
5. From my investigation, your organisation does not seem to disclose much of 
sustainability-related information in your organisation’s annual report or website, let 
alone a sustainability report.  
➢ Does your organisation disclose any types of sustainability information in other 
formats, except from those than have already been mentioned?  
i. If no. 
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6. Given that there are abundant CSR studies out there that look into motivational drivers 
of why organisations may not want to undertake sustainability reporting (SR). For this 
question, I would like you to complete the following table. (please complete this table 
in a separate handout)  
The potential impact, and Managers’ perceptions and attitudes 
7. As mentioned in my project cover sheet, I have been investigating the current state of 
sustainability reporting by NZX50. From my study, I’ve found that the rate of 
sustainability reporting has not really taken off in the same way that it has internationally, 
let alone the quality of reporting.  
 
Motivating factors Strongly disagree <-----> Strongly agree 
 1 2 3 4 5 
The organisation does not pursue SR because of 
the lack of internal stakeholder pressure. 
     
The organisation does not pursue SR because of 
the lack of external stakeholder pressure. 
     
The organisation does not pursue SR because 
there is no public expectations to undertake it. 
     
The organisation does not pursue SR because 
there are no material risks for the organisation 
report against. 
     
The organisation does not pursue SR because 
there is no regulatory demands from the 
government to do so. 
     
The organisation does not pursue SR because the 
organisational culture does not encourage it. 
     
The organisation does not pursue SR because of 
the organisational internal characteristics, 
whereby the decisions to pursue SR must be made 
by the CEO or senior management. 
     
The organisation does not pursue SR because it 
perceives as a luxury. 
     
The organisation does not pursue SR because the 
costs associated with preparing sustainability 
information outweighs the benefits. 
     
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➢ See graph 2. Why do you think sustainability reporting in NZ has not taken-off 
in the same way that it has internationally? 
i. What do you think might be contributing factors that prevent it from 
happening?  
➢ From my investigation of all listed organisations within the NZX, as at 31st of 
December 2016, I found the uptake of sustainability reporting by listed 
organisation was only 29%, 
i.  Given the high percentage of non-reporters, do you agree with this 
explanation, Milton Freidman states that “the only social responsibility 
of organisations is to maximise profits”? 
 
 
8. Recently, the NZX has released the new Corporate Governance code (NZX code) for 
its main board’s equity issuers to comply, and one of the most talked about topics is the 
recommendation of non-financial disclosure relating to ESG (Environmental, Social and 
Governance) reporting. What this does is indirectly enforce every equity issuer to report 
such information on a ‘comply or explain’ basis. To put this in simple terms, if listed 
organisation decided not to produce non-financial reporting, then they must explain why 
it has not been reported.  
➢  So my question to you is: what are your thoughts on this recommendation?  
i. Do you agree or disagree with it?  
ii. Are there any aspects do you agree/disagree with?  
iii. On a scale of 1-10, how committed is your organisation towards these 
changes?  
➢ How do you think the changes will impact your organisation’s non-financial 
reporting?  
➢ According to past studies, the study found organisations’ decisions were made 
based on economic incentives.  
i. Does your organisation intend to change a business model and core 
values to facilitate with these changes?  
ii. In what ways, how you intend to do this?  
➢ Without a stock exchange intervention, would your organisation have 
engaged in sustainability reporting?  
i. Yes, in your own words, can you explain why?  
➢ From your perspective, instead of a stock exchange intervention, what else 
could have been done differently to promote and encourage the uptake of 
sustainability reporting in NZ?  
➢ Again, from your perspective, with a stock exchange intervention, what are 
the chances that the changes to NZX code will encourage the uptake of 
sustainability reporting in NZ?  
i.  How will the changes impact the operation of your organisation, and 
your short-, medium- and long- term organisation goals? 
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5.3 Market Regulator’s Interview questions  
Introduction  
1. Can you please introduce yourself, and describe your role within the organisation?  
 
2. How long have you been with the organisation, and how many years of experience do 
you have with your role?  
 
3. Are you the person who is directly/indirectly responsible for the design and 
implementation of the revised NZX corporate governance code?  
➢ If yes, what inspired and motivated you, and the [XXX]to revise the code?  
➢ If no, what do you think might have inspired the [XXX] to revise code?  
 
Rationale behind the revised NZX code  
4. As mentioned in my project cover sheet, I have been investigating the current state of 
sustainability reporting by NZX50. From my study, I’ve found that the rate of 
sustainability reporting has not really taken off in the same way that it has internationally, 
let alone the quality of reporting.  
➢ My question is: Why do you think sustainability reporting in NZ has not 
taken-off in the same way that it has internationally? 
i. What do you think might be contributing factors that prevent it from 
happening?  
 
5. Recently, the NZX has released the new Corporate Governance code (NZX code) for 
its main board’s equity issuers to comply, and one of the most talked about topics is the 
recommendation of non-financial disclosure relating to ESG (Environmental, Social 
and Governance) reporting. What this does is indirectly enforce every equity issuer to 
report such information on a ‘comply or explain’ basis. To put this in simple terms, if 
listed organisation decided not to produce non-financial reporting, then they must 
explain why it has not been reported.  
➢ What were the drivers behind the [XXX]’s decision to integrate ESG reporting 
into the revised corporate governance code?  
➢ Past study suggested that “the widespread of sustainability reporting has 
only been achieved so far when mandated by law and regulations”. 
i. My questions is: If the [XXX]’s objective is to promote and encourage 
the uptake of sustainability reporting among the listed organisations. 
would it make more sense to have the recommendation of ESG 
reporting regulated, rather than having it as a comply or explain basis?  
 
➢ From my investigation of all listed organisations within the NZX, as at 31st of 
December 2016, I found the uptake of sustainability reporting by listed 
organisation was only 29%. To put this in simple terms, 71% of the listed 
organisation did not report on non-financial information.  
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i. So my question: do you believe that a ‘comply or explain’ basis on the 
ESG reporting will promote and encourage the uptake of sustainability 
reporting in NZ?  
ii. Without a stock intervention, has the [XXX] attempted anything in the 
past to promote and encourage the uptake of sustainability reporting 
among the listed organisations?  
1. If not, why now?  
iii. From your perspective, instead of a stock exchange intervention, what 
else could the [XXX] have done differently to promote and encourage 
the uptake of sustainability reporting among the listed organisations?  
iv. From your perspective, with a stock exchange intervention, what are 
the chances that the changes will encourage the uptake of sustainability 
reporting among the listed?  
1. How will the [XXX] “enforce” the code to improve the listed 
organisations’ non-financial disclosure behaviours.  
2. And How do you think the changes will impact listed 
organisations’ non-financial reporting practices in the coming 
year?  
 
6. Do you believe that having the recommendation of ESG reporting as a “comply and 
explain” basis is a fair game for those listed organisations who may not have resources 
to report on ESG factors?  
➢ Or do you think this is the only way to promote and encourage the uptake of SR 
among the listed organisations?  
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Appendix 6: The Most and Least Disclosed GRI Items by NZ’s Seven Best Reporters  
Disclosure Indicator  Hard Disclosure item  Score  
Economic Performance G4-EC1 - Direct Economic Value generated  7 
Diversity and Equal 
Opportunity 
G4-LA12 - Composition of senior management and breakdown of 
employees (age/gender/ethnicity)  7 
Local Communities 
G4-SO1 - Community engagement, impact assessment 
development programs and practices 7 
Emissions G4-EN19 - GHG emission reduction initiatives  5 
Occupational Health and 
Safety 
G4-LA6 - Injuries, absentee rates and work-related fatalities 
5 
Economic Performance G4-EC2 - Financial implications of climate change 4 
Energy G4-EN3 - direct energy consumption 4 
Emissions G4-EN15 - Managing impacts of biodiversity 4 
Emissions G4-EN16 - Direct GHG emissions (Scope 1) 4 
Employment G4-LA1 - Workforce statistics  4 
Training and Education 
G4-LA11 - % employee receiving regular performance and career 
development reviews, by gender and by employee category 4 
Energy G4-EN6 - Conservation of energy efficiency  3 
Emissions G4-EN17 - Indirect GHG emissions (Scope 2) 3 
Emissions G4-EN18 - Other indirect GHG emissions (Scope 3) 3 
Compliance  G4-EN29 - Fines for environmental non-compliance  3 
Customer Health and Safety 
G4-PR1 - % of significant product and service, which health and 
safety impacts are assessed  3 
Customer Health and Safety G4-PR2 - Non - compliance with product safety regulations  3 
Customer Privacy G4-PR8 - Customer privacy 3 
Compliance  
G4-PR9 - Monetary value of fines for non-compliance with laws 
and regulations concerning use of products and services  3 
Economic Performance G4-EC4 - Financial assistance received from government 2 
Water G4-EN8 - Water use  2 
Effluents and Waste G4-EN23 - Non-processing waste disposal  2 
Effluents and Waste 
G4-EN24 - Total number of environmental spills from waste 
discharges 2 
Products and Services G4-EN27 - Initiatives at mitigate environmental impacts of P&Ss 2 
Supplier Environment 
Assessment 
G4-EN33 - Negative environmental impacts in the supply chain 
and actions taken 2 
Employment G4-LA3 - Return to work and retention rate after parental leave  2 
Equal remuneration for 
Women and Men 
G4-LA13 - Ratio of basic salary of men to women by employee 
category  2 
Supplier Human Rights 
Assessment 
G4-HR10 - % of new suppliers that were screened using human 
rights criteria  2 
Supplier Human Rights 
Assessment 
G4-HR11 - Negative human rights in the supply chain and actions 
taken 2 
Economic Performance G4-EC3 - Coverage of pension obligations  1 
Energy G4-EN5 - Energy intensity  1 
Energy G4-EN7 - Reduction in energy requirements of P&Ss 1 
Effluents and Waste G4-EN22 - Water discharge  1 
Supplier Environment 
Assessment 
G4-EN32 - New suppliers that were screened using environmental 
criteria 1 
Occupational Health and 
Safety 
G4-LA5 - Employees covered by collective bargaining agreements 
/ trade union representation, and coverage of total workforce in 
health and safety committees  1 
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Training and Education G4-LA9 - Training hours by employee category  1 
Public Policy G4-SO6 - Contribution to political parties  1 
Compliance  
G4-SO8 - Significant fines for non-compliance with laws and 
regulations 1 
Supplier Assessment for 
Impacts on Society 
G4-SO9 - % of new suppliers were screened using criteria for 
impacts on society  1 
Supplier Assessment for 
Impacts on Society 
G4-SO10 - Negative impacts on society in the supply chain and 
actions taken 1 
Marketing Communications G4-PR7 - Non-compliance regarding marketing communications  1 
Market Presence G4-EC5 - Ratio of entry level to minimum wages 0 
Market Presence G4-EC6 - Local hiring of senior management positions  0 
Procurement Practices G4-EC9 - Payments to locally-based suppliers  0 
Materials G4-EN1 - Materials used  0 
Materials G4-EN2 - % of used that are recycled inputs materials 0 
Energy G4-EN4 - Indirect energy consumption  0 
Water G4-EN9 - Water source affected by withdrawal of water 0 
Water G4-EN10 - % water conversion, reuse and recycle  0 
Biodiversity G4-EN11 - land use in protected areas 0 
Emissions G4-EN20 - Ozone-depleting substances by weight  0 
Emissions G4-EN21 - NOx, SOx and other airborne emissions by weight  0 
Effluents and Waste G4-EN25 - Total weight of transported waste 0 
Effluents and Waste 
G4-EN26 - Significant environment impacts of water sources by 
waste discharges and spills  0 
Products and Services G4-EN28 - % of recycled products and their packing materials 0 
Transport G4-EN30 - Significant environmental impacts from transportation  0 
Expenditures  
G4-EN31 - Environmental protection expenditures and investments 
or environmental protection expenditures  0 
Supplier Environment 
Mechanisms 
G4-EN34 - Number of grievances about environmental impacts 
filed, addressed, and resolved through formal grievance 
mechanisms  0 
Supplier Assessment for 
Labor Practices  
G4-LA14 - % of new suppliers that were screened using Labor 
practices criteria 0 
Supplier Assessment for 
Labor Practices  
G4-LA15 - Negative Labor practices in the supply chain and 
actions taken 0 
Labor Practices Grievance 
Mechanisms 
G4-LA16 - Number of grievances about Labor practices filed, 
addressed, and resolved through formal grievance mechanisms.  0 
Investment  G4-HR1 - Human rights and investment agreement  0 
Non-discrimination G4-HR3 - Incidents of discrimination and actions taken  0 
Freedom of Association and 
Collective Bargaining 
G4-HR4 - freedom of association  
0 
Child Labor G4-HR5 - Child labour  0 
Forced and Compulsory 
Labor 
G4-HR6 - Forced labour  
0 
Indigenous Rights 
G4-HR8 - Total number of incidents of violating involving rights of 
indigenous people and actions taken  0 
Assessment 
G4-HR9 - % and total number of operations that have been subject 
to human rights reviews 0 
Human Rights Grievance 
mechanisms 
G4-HR12 - Number of grievances about human rights filed, 
addressed, and resolved through formal grievance mechanisms 0 
Local Communities 
G4-SO3 - Corruption analysis - proportion of business nits 
analysed for risks of corruption  0 
Local Communities G4-SO4 - Anti-corruption training  0 
Local Communities G4-SO5 - Confirmed incidents of corruption, and actions taken 0 
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Anti-Competitive Behaviour G4-SO7 - Legal actions for anti-competitive behaviour  0 
Product and Service 
Labeling 
G4-PR4 - Non-compliance regarding product labelling  
0 
Marketing Communications G4-PR6 - Sale of banned or disputed products 0 
   
Disclosure Indicator Soft Disclosure item  Score  
Indirect Economic Impacts G4-EC7 - Infrastructure development  6 
Product and Service 
Labeling 
G4-PR5 - Customer satisfaction 
6 
Indirect Economic Impacts G4-EC8 - Indirect economic impacts  6 
Training and Education 
G4-LA10 - Programs for skills management and lifelong learning 
that support the employability of employees and assist them in 
managing career endings 5 
Employment G4-LA2 - Benefits provided to full-time employees 4 
Biodiversity G4-EN12 - Areas significantly impacted by biodiversity  3 
Product and Service 
Labeling 
G4-PR3 - Principles and measures related to product labelling 
3 
Biodiversity G4-EN13 - Protection and restoration of habitats 1 
Biodiversity G4-EN14 - IUCN red listed species  1 
Occupational Health and 
Safety 
G4-LA7 - Workers with high incidence or high-risk of diseases 
related to their occupation 1 
Occupational Health and 
Safety 
G4-LA8 - Trade unions and safety and health 
1 
Local Communities 
G4-SO2 - Operations and associated communities with significant 
potential or actual negative impacts  1 
Labor/Management 
Relations 
G4-LA4 - Minimum notice periods regarding operational changes  
0 
Investment  G4-HR2 - Employee training concerning aspects of human rights  0 
Security Practices G4-HR7 - Security personnel and human rights training  0 
Grievance Mechanisms for 
Impacts on Society 
G4-SO11 - Number of grievances about impacts on society filed, 
addressed, and resolved through formal grievance mechanisms.  0 
 
 
EC1 - EC9 Economic Performance Indicators  
EN1 - EN34 Environmental Performance Indicators 
 Social Performance Indicators  
LA1 - LA16  Labour Practice Performance Indicators 
HR1 - HR12  Human Rights Performance Indicators 
SO1 - SO11  Society Performance Indicators  
PR1 - PR9  Product Responsibility Performance Indicators  
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Appendix 7: Statistical Results - Industry Variation 2 
7.1 Association tests  










t-value Two-tailed p  
Dependent Variable       
Size:       
Nat Log of 2016 Sales 20.64 20.40 0.242 0.311 0.777 0.441 
Nat Log of 2016 total assets 2016 21.19 20.59 0.598 0.360 1.659 0.104 
Nat Log of 2016 market capitalization 21.06 20.43 0.631 0.357 1.768 0.084 
Note: Industry 2 is partitioned into high-profile (25 cases) and low-profile (23 cases) 
 
7.1.2 3rd Association test - Industry and Profitability Index 
Note: Industry 2 is partitioned into high-profile (25 cases) and low-profile (23 cases) 
 






Mean diff SE of diff t-value Two-tailed p  
Dependent Variable       
GRI Measures:       
Total GRI % 10.55% 9.94% 0.61% 2.07% 0.295 0.769 
Total Hard % 9.07% 8.46% 0.60% 2.04% 0.296 0.768 
Total Soft % 17.50% 16.85% 0.65% 2.93% 0.223 0.825 
Total Eco % 32.89% 28.02% 4.87% 3.09% 1.575 0.122 
Total Eco Hard % 24.57% 17.39% 7.18% 2.72% 2.644 0.012 
Total Eco Soft % 62.00% 65.22% -3.22% 8.89% -0.362 0.719 
Total Env % 7.41% 4.86% 2.55% 2.50% 1.022 0.312 
Total Env Hard % 7.23% 5.33% 1.90% 2.55% 0.744 0.461 
Total Env Soft % 9.33% 0.00% 9.33% 4.09% 2.281 0.032 
Total Soc % 8.58% 10.15% -1.56% 2.11% -0.742 0.462 
Total Soc Hard % 7.68% 9.40% -1.73% 2.10% -0.824 0.414 
Total Soc Soft % 11.64% 12.65% -1.01% 3.01% -0.336 0.739 
Note: Industry 2 is partitioned into high-profile (25 cases) and low-profile (23 cases)









t-value Two-tailed p  
Independent variable        
Profitability:        
Return on Assets (using EBIT) 2016 8.98% 9.83% -0.85% 2.02% -0.422 0.675 
Average Return on Assets (using 
EBIT) 2012-2016 
7.44% 10.99% -3.55% 1.72% -2.067 0.044 
Return on Equity (using EBIT) 2016 17.25% 19.38% -2.13% 3.84% -0.554 0.582 
Average Return on Equity (using 
EBIT) 2012-2016 
14.10% 22.48% -8.38% 3.18% -2.635 0.012 
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7.2 Regression analysis  
7.2.1 1st Regression model - Hackston & Milne (1996) 
  B SE B Beta t Sig. 
Nat Log of Sales 2016 2.20967 0.93505 0.33390 2.36315 0.02260 
Industry (2) -0.04343 1.98776 -0.00309 -0.02185 0.98267 
Return on Assets (using EBIT) 2016 -0.14126 0.14384 -0.13813 -0.98210 0.33142 
Constant -33.74411 19.22144 0.00000 -1.75555 0.08613 
 
Regression measures  ANovA DF  Sum of squares  Mean squares 
Multiple R= 0.36600  Regression 3   316.35556   105.45185 
R Square = 0.13376  Residual 44   2048.67687   46.56084 
Adjusted R = 0.07470     F= 2365.03243  F= 0.0940 
Standard error = 0.06824          
 
Note: B = regression coefficient; SE B = standard error of regression coefficient; Beta = standardized regression 
coefficient; Industry = industry classification - dummy variable with 1 = high profile, 0 = low profile, n = 48. 













































Nat Log of 
Sales 2016 
Pearson Correlation .421* .434* 0.153 .452* 0.352  0.248 0.250 -0.245 0.322 0.202 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.036 0.030 0.466 0.023 0.084  0.254 0.250 0.260 0.134 0.356 
Spearman Correlation  .444* 0.387 0.079 0.354 .416*  0.195 0.236 -0.222 0.248 0.241 




Pearson Correlation .525** .547** 0.083 .623** .421*  0.244 0.212 -0.147 0.189 0.236 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.007 0.005 0.692 0.001 0.036  0.261 0.332 0.503 0.389 0.277 
Spearman Correlation  .622** .600** 0.189 .702** .534**  0.366 0.310 -0.175 0.194 0.378 
Nat Log of 
Total Assets 
2016 
Pearson Correlation .533** .535** 0.067 .558** .481*  0.250 0.198 -0.064 0.170 0.218 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.006 0.006 0.751 0.004 0.015  0.250 0.364 0.770 0.439 0.318 
Spearman Correlation  .634** .613** 0.114 .649** .632**  0.340 0.284 0.016 0.181 0.356 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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7.3 2nd Regression model - Overseas listings  
7.3.1 Overseas listings 
  B SE B Beta t Sig. 
Nat Log of Sales 2016 2.21798 0.93986 0.33516 2.35991 0.02278 
Industry (2) 0.03720 1.99518 0.00265 0.01865 0.98521 
Overseas listing 1.67305 2.35734 0.10018 0.70972 0.48162 
(Constant) -35.66656 19.21567 0.00000 -1.85612 0.07014 
 
Regression measures  ANovA DF  Sum of Squares  Mean Squares  
Multiple R= 0.35300  Regression 3   295.14191   98.38064 
R Square = 0.12479  Residual 44   2069.89052   47.04297 
Adjusted R = 0.06512     F= 2365.03243  F= 0.1150 
Standard error = 0.06859          
           
Note: B = regression coefficient; SE B = standard error of regression coefficient; Beta = standardized regression 
coefficient; Industry = industry classification - dummy variable with 1 = high profile, 0 = low profile; Overseas 




7.3.2 Overseas listings 1 
  B SE B Beta t Sig. 
Nat Log of Sales 2016 1.99600 0.93300 0.30200 2.14000 0.03800 
Industry (2) 1.64200 1.96700 0.11700 0.83500 0.40800 
Overseas listing 1 2.91100 2.33100 0.17400 1.24900 0.21800 
(Constant) -33.81500 18.91100 0.00000 -1.78800 0.08100 
 
Regression measures  ANovA DF  Sum of Squares  Mean Squares  
Multiple R= 0.39500  Regression 3   369.70400   123.23500 
R Square = 0.15600  Residual 44   1995.32900   45.34800 
Adjusted R = 0.09900     F= 2365.03200  F= 0.0560 
Standard error = 0.06734          
           
 Note: B = regression coefficient; SE B = standard error of regression coefficient; Beta = standardized regression 
coefficient; Industry = industry classification - dummy variable with 1 = high profile, 0 = low profile; Overseas 
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7.3.3 Overseas listings 2  
  B SE B Beta t Sig. 
Nat Log of Sales 2016 2.26839 0.93021 0.34278 2.43860 0.01885 
Industry (2) -0.11645 1.98048 -0.00829 -0.05880 0.95338 
Overseas listing 2 3.32575 2.78552 0.16722 1.19394 0.23890 
(Constant) -39.07851 19.22763 0.00000 -2.03241 0.04817 
 
Regression measures  ANovA DF  Sum of Squares  Mean Squares  
Multiple R= 0.37800  Regression 3   337.14515   112.38172 
R Square = 0.14255  Residual 44   2027.88728   46.08835 
Adjusted R = 0.08409     F= 2365.03243  F= 0.0770 
Standard error = 0.06789          
           
Note: B = regression coefficient; SE B = standard error of regression coefficient; Beta = standardized regression 
coefficient; Industry = industry classification - dummy variable with 1 = high profile, 0 = low profile; Overseas 
listing 2 = overseas listing classification - dummy variable with 1 = US, Canada, Europe or Australia listings, 0 




7.3.4 Overseas listings and Market Capitalisation  
  B SE B Beta t Sig. 
Nat Log of Market Capitalisation 
2016 
2.20174 0.80502 0.39190 2.73500 0.00896 
Industry (2) -0.81120 2.00967 -0.05773 -0.40364 0.68843 
Overseas listing 1.44992 2.31653 0.08682 0.62590 0.53461 
(Constant) -35.35602 16.48243 0.00000 -2.14507 0.03751 
 
Regression measures  ANovA DF  Sum of Squares  Mean Squares  
Multiple R= 0.39700  Regression 3   371.98136   123.99379 
R Square = 0.15728  Residual 44   1993.05107   45.29662 
Adjusted R = 0.09983     F= 2365.03243  F= 0.0550 
Standard error = 0.06730          
           
Note: B = regression coefficient; SE B = standard error of regression coefficient; Beta = standardized regression 
coefficient; Industry = industry classification - dummy variable with 1 = high profile, 0 = low profile; Overseas 
listing = overseas listing classification - dummy variable with 1 = US or Canadian listings, 0 = others; n = 48 
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Appendix 8:  
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T H E  C U R R E N T  U PT A K E  O F SU ST A I N A B I I T Y  R E PO R T I N G  B Y  N Z X 5 0
R A T I O  O F H A R D  T O  SO FT  D I SC L O SU R U R E  I T E M S
AS AT 3 1 ST O F  D E C E M B E R  2 0 1 6
Hard Disclosure Soft Disclosure
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T H E  C U R R E N T  U P T A K E  O F  S U S T A I N A B I I T Y  R E P O R T I N G  B Y  N Z X 5 0
R A T I O  O F  H A R D  T O  S O F T  D I S C L O S U R U R E  I T E M S
E X P R E S S E D  B Y  S U B - G R O U P S
A S  A T  3 1 S T  O F  D E C E M B E R  2 0 1 6
Hard Disclosure Soft Disclosure
